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Energy plays an important role in modern 
society, touching almost every aspect of our 
daily lives. It provides fuel for transport and 
heating, power for domestic uses and affects 
almost every business in industry, services and 
agriculture. Indeed energy is so inextricably 
interlinked with our modern lives that we 
take it for granted until either a system failure 
(e.g. blackouts or shortages) or large price 
movements (as witnessed in the 1970s and again 
since 1999) remind us of its importance. The 
price gyrations over the last number of years 
have been particularly dramatic. International 
oil prices ﬂ  uctuated around USD 20 per barrel in 
the 1990s, before rising, especially since 2004, 
to reach an all time high of close to USD 150 per 
barrel in mid-2008, and subsequently declining 
to USD 30 per barrel by end-2008. Since then, 
oil prices have rebounded and averaged around 
USD 75 per barrel in the ﬁ  nal quarter of 2009. 
Central banks, when facing energy price 
ﬂ  uctuations, must understand their nature and 
how they will propagate through the economy 
to affect output and prices. The nature of 
energy price ﬂ  uctuations refers to their driving 
forces, whether they are driven by fundamental 
demand, supply-side factors or ﬁ  nancial market 
activity, and to their persistence. An increase in 
international energy prices can, for example, be 
a short-term phenomenon (as witnessed in 1990 
during the Persian Gulf War) or a medium to 
long-term change in the terms of trade driven 
by structurally rising demand, as seems to have 
been the case over the past decade. Energy 
supply shocks, which have countervailing 
impacts on inﬂ  ation and activity, pose particular 
challenges for monetary policy-makers. The 
propagation of shocks, on which most of this 
report will focus, depends on the energy mix, 
the energy dependency of a country and the 
energy intensity of consumption and production 
as well as the effective competition in energy 
markets, which are generally characterised 
by a high degree of complexity. Moreover, 
the transmission of energy price shocks is 
shaped by the real adjustments in the economy 
in the short and medium to long run, as well 
as structural determinants of the pass-through 
to consumer prices. The combination of these 
factors and the policy response of central banks 
eventually explain the transmission of energy 
price ﬂ  uctuations to overall inﬂ  ation.
Two key factors determine the vulnerability 
of the euro area economy to large energy 
price changes in international markets: energy 
intensity and energy dependency. The energy 
intensity of the euro area (i.e. energy used 
per unit of output) has, in common with other 
industrialised economies, generally fallen 
over the past 50 years owing to technological 
advances as well as sector shifts. On its own, this 
trend, coupled with the increased diversiﬁ  cation 
of energy sources, would have served to 
attenuate the impact of international energy 
price changes. However, despite an increase in 
electricity generated within the euro area from 
nuclear and renewable sources, the overall 
energy dependency (i.e. the ratio of net energy 
imports – including intra-euro area imports – 
to energy consumption) of euro area countries 
has remained high, with two-thirds of overall 
energy consumption being imported, and oil 
remaining the main component of ﬁ  nal energy 
consumption. High energy dependency may also 
have implications for energy security. In terms 
of both intensity and dependency, substantive 
diversity exists across markets and countries. 
Country energy markets remain largely national 
or regional in nature, although their integration 
has increased. Further integration, in particular 
in gas and electricity markets, would not only 
have beneﬁ  cial impacts on security, but could 
also help to cushion idiosyncratic energy price 
changes and improve overall efﬁ  ciency  and 
competition in European energy markets.
Looking ahead, the main factors impacting on 
the future of euro area energy markets point 
to a further reduction in the degree of energy 
intensity making the euro area economy 
less vulnerable to price changes. However, 
energy dependency is expected to remain 
high and energy prices may remain volatile. 
Energy supply may have been adversely affected 8
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by the downscaling of investment during the 
crisis, and tightness in the global energy market 
may re-emerge as global activity growth resumes. 
In recent years the increasing “ﬁ  nancialisation” 
of commodity markets, combined with high 
global liquidity, may have had some impact on 
commodity price volatility and, in perspective, 
this factor is likely to continue to play a role. 
Similarly, climate change policies, particularly 
those related to greenhouse gas emissions, may 
also inﬂ   uence price volatility. All in all, the 
outlook for energy markets and prices remains 
uncertain in the long run.
The impact of energy price changes depends 
not only on their driving force, but also on 
their persistence and how they are absorbed 
by the economy, including the monetary 
policy response. The adjustment costs are to a 
signiﬁ   cant extent determined by the structure 
and the ﬂ   exibility of the economy. In the 
short run, they cannot be easily countered 
by changes in the production process and 
impact on ﬁ   rms’ costs or households’ real 
income, thereby affecting investment and 
consumption. These effects show strong 
cross-country heterogeneity linked to the 
degree of energy intensity in consumption and 
production. However, the transfer of income 
emerging from a deterioration of terms of trade 
associated with higher international energy 
prices may be counteracted to some extent by 
the degree to which countries beneﬁ  t  from 
higher demand from energy-exporting countries. 
In this respect, countries that are favourably 
positioned in terms of export specialisation, 
historical ties and geographical proximity 
are better able to compensate the moderation 
in domestic demand through higher exports. 
There are some indications that the overall 
impact of energy ﬂ  uctuations on activity may 
have moderated compared with the 1970s and 
early 1980s, owing not only to decreased energy 
intensity, but also to the evolution of other 
factors including wage-setting institutions and 
monetary policy.
In the long run, increases in the relative price 
of energy may lead to substitution effects and 
to a reduction in the overall energy intensity 
of production and consumption. Therefore the 
impacts of long-run relative price changes are 
stronger the more energy intensive the economy   
and the less ﬂ   exible the production process. 
In addition, the losses of output and labour input 
into the production process are less pronounced 
if wages and prices allow for a more speedy 
adjustment process. 
Wage and price-setting behaviour and credibility 
of monetary policy are key determinants of how 
energy prices feed into inﬂ  ation over a medium-
term horizon. The pass-through of energy 
prices can be broken down into direct and 
indirect  ﬁ   rst-round and second-round effects. 
Direct ﬁ  rst-round effects refer to the impact on 
consumer energy prices. The indirect ﬁ  rst-round 
effect captures the impact of energy prices on 
producer and distribution costs which then feeds 
into consumer prices. Second-round effects arise 
when energy prices impact on wages, proﬁ  t 
margins and inﬂ   ation expectations. First and 
second-round effects are interlinked and difﬁ  cult 
to disentangle empirically, yet conceptually 
different. Monetary policy can do little about 
the ﬁ  rst-round effects of energy price shocks, in 
particular international oil price changes, but it 
shapes second-round effects.
The direct pass-through of changes in 
international oil prices to consumer prices 
for liquid fuels is very quick (mainly within 
two to three weeks), complete and, at the 
aggregate level, there is little evidence of 
substantial asymmetry. For gas prices the
pass-through takes longer, approximately six to 
nine months; for electricity prices an estimate 
of the pass-through is more difﬁ  cult  because 
of price regulation, cost structures and market 
arrangements. Owing to the full pass-through 
into pre-tax prices for liquid fuels and natural 
gas, as well as the important role of excise taxes 
and the broad constancy of production margins 
in these sectors, the elasticity (percentage 
response) of consumer energy prices with respect 
to crude oil prices is larger the higher the level 
of crude oil prices. The level of excise taxes also 
impacts on the elasticity of consumer oil prices: 9
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EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY other things being equal, a higher level of excise 
taxes increases the level of consumer energy 
prices, but dampens their elasticity.
Price levels vary across energy markets 
owing to taxes, energy policies and cost 
structures. Differences in competition and 
market concentration as well as the degree of 
vertical integration also exert an inﬂ  uence. 
Although European energy markets have been 
liberalised and competition has increased, 
de facto  competition still remains lower than 
de jure competition. Pre-tax price dispersion 
remains sizeable in electricity and gas markets. 
Nonetheless, evidence can be found that past 
market liberalisation has supported price 
reduction in these sectors. Further reforms 
towards a more competitive environment 
creating a level playing ﬁ   eld across the euro 
area would diminish price dispersion and beneﬁ  t 
consumers and ﬁ  rms.
Results from different econometric approaches 
suggest that indirect ﬁ   rst and second-round 
effects account for roughly half of the overall 
impact of energy price ﬂ  uctuations  on 
non-energy components of inﬂ   ation. At the 
country level there are important differences in 
the transmission of energy commodity prices 
to non-energy consumer prices. Whilst this is 
attributable in part to sector specialisation and 
the intensity of energy use, a more important 
factor is the automatic link between wages and 
inﬂ   ation through formal indexation schemes 
in some countries, which is found to have a 
role in amplifying the transmission of oil price 
changes to the prices of non-energy products. 
With regard to both energy intensity and
wage-setting behaviour, there is some evidence 
of a reduced impact on inﬂ  ation compared with 
the 1970s and early 1980s. Further progress 
in reducing downward wage rigidities and 
wage indexation could prevent unnecessary 
inﬂ  ationary pressures in the future. 
Inﬂ  ation expectations can become unanchored 
by energy price changes if monetary policy is 
not credible. However, in an environment with a 
credible central bank, energy price ﬂ  uctuations 
should not affect inﬂ  ation expectations over the 
medium to long term. The fact that, despite the 
recent period of high and volatile energy prices, 
medium to long-term inﬂ  ation expectations in 
the euro area have remained at levels consistent 
with price stability, the primary objective of the 
ESCB, can be seen as a sign of its credibility.
The ability of the euro area to weather future 
energy price ﬂ  uctuations relies on the continued 
stability-oriented conduct of monetary policy 
and appropriate government and institutional 
policies. The promotion of energy efﬁ  ciency 
and the ﬂ  exibility of the euro area economies 
remain crucial in order to minimise the costs of 
energy price volatility.10
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INTRODUCTION
This report aims to analyse euro area energy 
markets and the impact of energy price changes 
on the macroeconomy from a monetary 
policy perspective. The core task of the 
report is to analyse the impact of energy price 
developments on output and consumer prices. 
Nevertheless, understanding the link between 
energy price ﬂ  uctuations, inﬂ  ationary pressures 
and the role of monetary policy in reacting to 
such pressure requires a deeper look at the 
structure of the economy. Energy prices have 
presented a challenge for the Eurosystem, as the 
volatility of the energy component of consumer 
prices has been high since the creation of EMU 
(see Chart 1). At the same time, a look back into 
the past may not necessarily be very informative 
for gauging the likely impact of energy price 
changes on overall inﬂ  ation in the future. For 
instance, the reaction of HICP inﬂ  ation  to 
energy price ﬂ   uctuations seems to have been 
more muted during the past decade than in 
earlier periods such as the 1970s.
Chapter 1 provides an overview of energy 
markets, presenting both the supply (primary 
production, imports and trade, and secondary 
transformation) and demand (consumption 
and intensity) sides. The regulatory and 
policy aspects and market structures are also 
considered as they have a signiﬁ  cant bearing on 
the functioning of the economy. 
Chapter 2 considers the impact of energy 
prices on economic activity. First, the 
conceptual framework for the channels through 
which energy price movements impact on 
activity is outlined, with particular emphasis 
on the distinction between supply and
demand-side channels, and empirical estimates 
of the impact on activity derived from
large-scale macroeconometric models are 
presented. Second, the consequences of energy 
price changes for output in the long run are also 
considered. The main channels through which 
this may occur are discussed and then some 
empirical evidence in support of these effects 
on long-run output is presented. Finally, as the 
euro area is a large net importer of energy, 
energy price movements may have a signiﬁ  cant 
impact on trade balances speciﬁ  cally  and 
macroeconomic imbalances generally. This issue 
is addressed in the ﬁ  nal part of the chapter. 
Chapter 3 discusses energy prices and inﬂ  ation 
in some detail. The discussion is structured 
along a stylised framework for considering 
price developments: direct and indirect
ﬁ   rst-round effects and the possibility of 
second-round effects. Given their relatively 
immediate and substantial impact, direct
ﬁ   rst-round effects on consumer energy prices 
are discussed with a distinction made between 
liquid fuel (i.e. transport and heating) prices and
non-oil energy prices (primarily gas and 
electricity). Several approaches are then adopted 
to assess indirect ﬁ  rst and second-round effects 
in view of the difﬁ  culties in distinguishing and 
empirically identifying these effects. Indirect 
ﬁ  rst-round effects are analysed using different 
approaches: input-output analysis, small-scale 
structural models and larger macroeconometric 
models. Energy price changes may also give 
rise to second-round effects, which are more 
likely to be a function of institutional features 
Chart 1 Long-term evolution of overall HICP 
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annual inflation rate; overall HICP (right-hand scale)
Sources: Eurostat, national sources and Eurosystem staff 
calculations.11
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INTRODUCTION
of the economy, in particular the structure of 
product and labour markets, than of features of 
the energy markets themselves. These effects are 
mainly identiﬁ  ed using larger macroeconometric 
models.
There are other highly relevant issues – such 
as the international drivers of energy prices, 
energy security and environmental issues – 
which are not part of the core of this report. 
They are nevertherless addressed in boxes, 
since they clearly have repercussions on the 
economic outlook for the euro area. In the same 
way, the report highlights the role of inﬂ  ation 
expectations in the conduct of monetary policy.12
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1  OVERVIEW OF ENERGY MARKETS
This chapter provides the basis for further 
analysis. It describes the three main stages of 
euro area energy markets – primary energy 
extraction, ﬁ  nal energy production (in particular 
electricity generation) and energy consumption. 
In doing so, it presents evidence on the energy 
dependency and intensity of the production 
process and consumption. The main pattern and 
major trends in the energy mix of production 
and consumption provide the background to 
which later chapters will refer in explaining 
the macroeconomic impact of energy prices. 
Further, the chapter gives an account of energy 
market regulations and market structures, 
which are relevant for cross-country price 
differentials. To complete the picture on the 
economic policy setting, reference is also made 
to European energy policy focusing on energy 
security and climate change. Aspects of energy 
security and environmental impact, as well as 
the international drivers of energy prices are 
discussed in boxes. 
1.1  ENERGY PRODUCTION AND DEPENDENCE
1.1.1 ENERGY PRODUCTION 
Energy-related activities represented around 3% 
of total euro area gross value added in 2005 (see 
Chart 2) and this share has remained broadly 
stable over the last 15 years. However, this broad 
stability hides noteworthy composition effects. 
There has been a decreasing trend in primary 
energy production that was broadly compensated 
by an increase in ﬁ   nal energy production. 
In terms of employment, the energy sectors 
accounted for over one million jobs in 2005, 
corresponding to around 1% of employment in 
the euro area (see Chart 3). Employment in the 
energy sector has been declining both in relative 
(1.3% of total employment in 1990) and in 
absolute terms. Given this relatively small size, 
the impact of the energy sector on the economy 
derives primarily from the fact that it represents 
a crucial production factor and consumption 
component, rather than from its direct 
contribution to value added and employment. 
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I   OVERVIEW 
OF ENERGY 
MARKETS
Primary energy production increased 
substantially in the 1970s and early 1980s 
and has remained fairly stable since then. 
The change in the composition of primary 
energy, by comparison, has been more 
continuous. The share of solid fuels has declined 
almost constantly, whilst natural gas and nuclear 
emerged as key energy sources in the 1970s and 
1980s respectively. More recently, the share of 
renewable energy sources has started to grow to 
more signiﬁ  cant proportions, stemming mainly 
from combustible renewables and waste and, 
to a lesser extent as yet, from wind and solar 
energy. Before this most renewable energy was 
derived from hydro sources. Nowadays, primary 
energy production in the euro area comes mostly 
from nuclear power, representing around 40% 
of total production (see Chart 4, left panel). 
The second largest primary energy product is 
the category “other”, which includes renewable 
primary energy production (hydroelectric, 
solar, wind, geothermal, biomass) and waste. 
This category represented 22% of total primary 
energy production in 2007, while solid fuel 
(coal and peat) and gas represented 16% and 
18% respectively. 
Primary energy production is very heterogeneous 
across euro area countries (Chart 4, right panel). 
Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Slovenia, 
Slovakia and Finland have large shares of nuclear 
energy, while other countries have not adopted 
this technology. Other relevant cases in terms of 
energy production are associated with countries’ 
natural endowments, such as the Netherlands 
with a sizeable production of gas and Greece 
with a relevant contribution of solid fuels. 
The evolution from 1990 to 2007 generally 
matches the aggregate trend (see Chart A1 in 
Annex 1) that solid fuels have decreased their 
share in most euro area countries, while nuclear 
and renewable energies increased in importance. 
This pattern is especially important in Germany, 
but is also visible in Belgium, Spain, France, 
Slovenia and Slovakia.
Approximately 40% of the primary energy 
supply, including own and imported primary 
Chart 4 Share of primary energy production by fuel type





























































Sources: Eurostat, IEA and Eurosystem staff calculations.14
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energy, is used to generate electricity, which is a 
key step in the transformation of primary energy 
for ﬁ  nal consumption. Total electricity generated 
in the euro area has grown by an average of 
2.2% per annum from 1,630 TWh in 1990 
to 2,319 TWh in 2007 (see Chart 5). This rate of 
growth is broadly in line with average euro area 
GDP growth over the same period. As electricity 
is not easily stored supply must match demand 
in real time or else the stability of the system 
may be compromised. The average annual rate 
of growth in electricity generated was lowest 
in Germany and Slovakia at 0.9% per annum. 
Ireland, Spain, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta 
all had annual growth rates in excess of 4% per 
annum – see Table A1 in Annex 1. 
In 2007 the largest single source of energy for 
electricity generation was nuclear fuel, 
accounting for 31% at the aggregate euro area 
level. All the so-called conventional thermal 
power plants grouped together accounted for 
52%. Among the conventional thermal power 
plants, natural gas had the most weight, at 22%.1 
Coal and lignite accounted for 15% and 10% 
respectively. Hydropower plants and wind 
turbines represented 10% and 4%. The share of 
the latter has been increasing rapidly as has that 
of biomass. Oil was used relatively sparingly 
with a weight of 4%.2
In terms of trends since 1990, a number of 
features are noteworthy. First, although nuclear 
fuel remains the largest single source of input 
fuel, its share has declined from a peak of 38% 
in the early 1990s to 31% in 2007. Second, the 
overall constancy of the share of non-renewable 
conventional thermal power plants – around 
50% – masks considerable shifts in the relative 
share of different types of conventional fuels, 
with an increase in natural gas and declines in 
coal and oil.3 Third, the share of renewables 
in electricity generation has increased from 
around 15% in the early 1990s to 20% currently. 
Electricity generated from renewable sources 
has risen by an average of 4.4% per annum since 
1990. The increasing importance of renewable 
energy in electricity generation (which has 
occurred notwithstanding some decline in the 
share of hydropower) is mainly attributable to 
substantial growth in recent years in the use of 
sources such as biomass and wind turbines – 
these have increased by 15% and 25% per 
annum respectively over the last ﬁ  ve years.
The three countries with the most diversiﬁ  ed 
portfolio of fuel types used in electricity 
The preference for gas-fuelled power stations is motivated by  1 
several factors. Gas power plants are more efﬁ  cient and can be 
used to satisfy both intermediate and peak load demand; natural 
gas combustion is also less carbon intensive. Gas-ﬁ  red power 
stations provide the marginal supply of electricity. 
Remaining fuel types (geothermal, derived gas, miscellaneous,  2 
photovoltaic, solar, municipal solid waste, wood, biogas and 
industrial waste) only had marginal shares in terms of overall 
electricity generation.
Natural gas has almost tripled its share from 8% in 1990 to  3 
22% in 2007. This development has occured in most euro area 
countries. The share of coal has decreased from around 20% in 
1990 to 15% in 2007, whilst that of lignite has remained broadly 
constant at around 10%. In terms of climate change, lignite 
and coal, in particular the former, result in signiﬁ  cantly higher 
carbon emissions relative to, for example, natural gas. The fall 
of the oil share from around 10% in the early 1990s to 4% has 
been driven primarily by Italy, which reduced the share of oil 
in electricity generation from around 50% in the early 1990s to 
around 10% in 2007.
Chart 5 Evolution of electricity generated 


















Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: Renewables comprises hydropower, geothermal, 
biomass, wind turbines, photovoltaic, solar thermal, municipal 
solid waste, wood, biogas and industrial waste. “Fossil” denotes 
non-renewable conventional thermal and comprises coal, 
lignite, oil, gas and other thermal stations.15
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generation were Germany, Spain and Finland 
(see Table A1 in Annex 1 for an overview of key 
individual country electricity characteristics). 
Unsurprisingly, small countries tended to have 
relatively undiversiﬁ   ed electricity generating 
systems. Among the larger countries, France 
is a notable exception as it derives the largest 
share of its electricity from nuclear fuel. 
Another key feature of electricity markets is the 
relatively small amount of trade in comparison 
with other more storable fuel types such as oil, 
gas and coal. A progressive increase of trading 
volumes since the 1970s has been a feature of 
European economic integration. According to 
ﬁ  gures from the Union for the Coordination of 
Transmission of Electricity (UCTE), which 
covered most of the euro area market, the 
volume of electricity exchanged in the euro area 
as a percentage of total electricity consumption 
increased relatively steadily from 6% in 1975 
(8% in 1985 and 10% in 1995) to 14% in 2007.4 
In the euro area as a whole gross trade ﬂ  ows 
(i.e. imports and exports) of electricity as a 
percentage of domestic generation have even 
increased progressively from 14% in 1990 to 
19% in 2007. Net trade ﬂ   ows, on aggregate, 
are close to balance at 1% of total domestic 
electricity generation. This is also the case 
across most countries with some exceptions. 
France, and until recently Slovenia, have been 
net exporters of electricity, whilst four countries, 
namely Italy (16% of domestic generation on 
average), Luxembourg (293%), the Netherlands 
(16%) and Finland (13%) have been net 
importers of electricity. Cross-border electricity 
ﬂ  ows may run in both directions (i.e. a country 
may be both an importer and exporter of 
electricity depending on its situation at a given 
point in time). Despite larger ﬂ  ows of electricity 
within the EU, the overall volume remains 
relatively small and most electricity markets are 
still essentially “national”, partly owing to 
remaining interconnection bottlenecks (see 
European Commission 2007). This limits the 
competitive pressure which can be exerted on 
national electricity prices through international 
ﬂ  ows and constrains the smoothing of electricity 
supply in the euro area. 
1.1.2 ENERGY DEPENDENCE
Europe’s primary energy production sector is 
largely “undersized” compared with the amount 
of energy required for ﬁ  nal  consumption, 
mainly owing to endowment reasons. Energy 
dependence, deﬁ  ned as net imports – including 
intra-euro area trade – as a percentage of total 
gross inland consumption, of euro area countries 
was 66.5% on average in 2007 (see Chart 6a). 
This share is substantially above the energy 
dependency observed for more fossil-energy-
rich countries, like the United States and the 
United Kingdom, but below that of Japan. 
Energy dependence is higher in the case of small 
countries like Ireland, Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
Malta and Portugal, but also Italy, with ﬁ  gures 
above 80% (see Chart 6c). The Netherlands is the 
euro area country least dependent on imported 
energy, showing an energy dependency lower 
than 40%. 
Historically Europe was divided into ﬁ   ve regional networks  4 
of electricity transmission system operators (TSOs). However, 
on 1 July 2009 the European Network of Transmission System 
Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) became operative merging 
these regional associations.
Chart 6a Energy dependence – international 
comparison
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Sources: Eurostat, IEA and Eurosystem staff calculations.16
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Overall energy dependency has remained 
broadly unchanged, ﬂ   uctuating around a rate 
of 60% since the early 1970s. However, these 
aggregate data hide differences across products 
and time (see Chart 6b). Dependence has always 
been high for crude oil products. Whilst it was 
low for solid fuel in the 1960s, it has increased 
steadily over time owing mainly to declining 
production. Dependence has also been steadily 
increasing since the 1970s for natural gas, 
mainly as the result of increased demand owing 
to the move away from solid fuel power plants 
and increased residential use, and now stands at 
around 70%. Energy dependence by type of fuel 
product hinges primarily on two key aspects. 
First, countries’ endowments determine net 
imports. Second, energy imports depend on the 
technological choices related to the production 
of  ﬁ   nal energy for consumption, notably on 
the production of electricity. The Netherlands 
is the only euro area country with a negative 
dependence (net exporter), which is located 
in the gas segment and is associated with the 
endowment of this natural resource.
Chart 6b Energy dependence – development 
in euro area by fuel type
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Chart 6c Euro area energy dependence 
by fuel type









































Sources: Eurostat, IEA and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Box 1
DRIVERS OF INTERNATIONAL OIL PRICE DEVELOPMENTS
The prices of energy commodities, particularly oil, have risen sharply over the past decade, 
bringing oil and gas prices to new historical highs (both in nominal and real terms) in the 
summer of 2008 (see Chart A). This rise was unprecedented over the course of the previous 
40 years, both in terms of magnitude and duration. Real oil prices are also high by historical 
standards, although still below the real price levels recorded from the mid-1970s to the mid-
1980s. The energy (and more general commodity) price boom came to an end in the second 17
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exacerbated by the onset of the ﬁ  nancial crisis 
and the sharp decline in economic activity. 
The decline in prices was sharp and fast, but 
more recently prices have started to rebound. 
In this box, we analyse the main drivers of 
international oil price developments over the 
last number of years, and try to assess their 
potential impact on future developments.
Natural gas prices are closely linked to oil 
prices, both because of indexation in long-term 
contracts and competition between different 
energy sources in power generation and 
end-user markets. However, given that only a 
relatively small share of natural gas is traded 
on global markets, regional differences and 
discrepancies can originate and persist. This 
makes prices more sensitive to local factors 
and disruptions.1
Causes and consequences of the oil price 
shocks of the 1970s
To understand the determinants and prospects of energy markets, we start by looking at the 
background against which past oil price shocks took place. During the 1960s, the spare capacity 
in the United States, which had to date been the marginal producer of oil, began to erode owing 
to economic growth and the increasing demand for automobile fuels. Parallel to that, OPEC 
started to test its newly acquired market power: the oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979 were 
associated with signiﬁ  cant reductions in OPEC’s supply and operable capacity.
Higher prices had an impact on both supply and demand. Following the second oil 
price shock, global demand declined markedly, especially in OECD countries, where 
several measures were undertaken to reduce dependence on oil. At the same time, higher 
prices generated incentives to increase supply, also by enhancing the viability of some 
ﬁ   elds previously considered unproﬁ   table. Capacity was expanded with new ﬁ  elds  being 
developed in several non-OPEC countries. The steady growth of non-OPEC supply, from 
25 mb/d in 1973 to 38 mb/d in the late 1980s, eventually offset OPEC’s output cuts. 
This weakened OPEC’s control on the marginal supply, and created greater incentives for the 
cartel members to exceed the agreed quotas. Against this background, prices progressively 
declined (Kaufmann et al. 2008).
More recent developments in oil demand and supply
After more than a decade of persistently low levels, from 1999, oil prices became substantially 
more volatile and surged with increasing momentum between 2004 and mid-2008, rising by 
1  See Section 3.2.2 for a short discussion of differences between the euro area and the United States.
Chart A Nominal and real oil and gas prices
(USD per barrel)
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Sources: Energy Information Administration, IMF.
Note: Real prices are expressed in 2005 USD. Last observation 
refers to June 2009.18
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almost 400% in nominal USD terms. This hike in crude oil prices was triggered by increasing 
demand from non-OECD emerging economies, particularly China and the Middle East 
(see Chart B) (Hamilton 2008, Kilian 2009). Initially, both the failure of oil producers to anticipate 
the fast growth of the emerging economies and the low levels of exploration investment owing 
to low crude oil prices in the 1990s caused supply to lag behind growing demand. One indication 
of increasing difﬁ  culties was skyrocketing exploration costs. In turn, future supply prospects 
increasingly became a matter of concern, as global crude oil production stagnated (see Chart C). 
Given the fact that scope for increased non-OPEC production was constrained because of 
geological restrictions especially in the more mature ﬁ  elds (e.g. in the North Sea and Mexico), 
the only hope for meeting increasing demand was the oil production by OPEC countries. The low 
level of spare capacity in OPEC countries added to market tightness and generated concerns that, 
in the event of political instability and disruptions in some regions, the cartel would be unable to 
match world oil demand (Hamilton 2008). 
The oil price boom was disrupted by the slowing in economic growth during the ﬁ  rst half 
of 2008. The fall in oil prices was exacerbated by the onset of the ﬁ  nancial crisis and the 
subsequent very sharp decline in economic activity from the third quarter of 2008 onwards, 
which also led demand to decline in emerging economies. The downward price adjustment was 
particularly sharp and fast, with prices falling to around USD 37 per barrel in late December. 
Since the beginning of 2009, however, as less pessimistic sentiments pervaded markets, prices 
rebounded and stood at around USD 75 per barrel at the end of 2009, i.e. the same levels as 
mid-October 2008. OPEC responded swiftly to the slowdown in global oil demand by announcing 
a reduction in production quotas by a total of 4.2 mb/d, and member countries showed a 
compliance rate well above historical averages. OPEC is now experiencing a revival of some of 
its market power, as announced production cuts have now again been at least partly effective.
Chart C Global oil supply by producer
(millions of barrels per day)
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The speed and size of the recent movements in prices have led many to argue that there has been 
a disconnect between market prices and those warranted by fundamentals and to discuss the 
potential role of other factors in driving price movements. Some evidence points to the impact 
of exchange rate ﬂ  uctuations – in particular the USD/euro exchange rate – on crude oil prices 
(Breitenfellner and Crespo Cuaresma 2008). While it appears that oil prices and the USD rate 
have become increasingly correlated over the last decade, this correlation does not seem to be 
stable across a longer span of time.
Theoretical results by Frankel (2006) suggest that interest rates play a role in determining 
commodity prices. Based on this, there has been wide discussion on whether the accommodative 
monetary policy stance deployed at the global level has somehow fuelled the oil price increases, 
either via incentives for producers to postpone extraction, or via portfolio shifts into commodity 
markets. 
There is strong evidence of a sharp increase in the “ﬁ  nancialisation” of commodity markets, 
particularly those for oil, during the last number of years: the volume of crude oil derivatives 
traded on NYMEX (New York Mercantile Exchange) quintupled between 2000 and 2008. 
Nevertheless, it is hard to ﬁ  nd clear-cut evidence that ﬁ  nancial activity can exert an impact on 
physical oil prices, at least in the short term. It could also be argued that “speculation” speeds 
up the price discovery mechanism in the market place and the response to changes in market 
fundamentals. However, it is very difﬁ  cult to measure its direct impact on prices owing to the 
intrinsic difﬁ  culties in clearly deﬁ  ning and identifying “speculators”. Empirical studies have 
so far been unable to ﬁ  nd robust evidence of systemic causality between investment positions 
held by non-commercial agents in oil futures markets and spot prices as well as their volatility 
(Commodity Futures Trading Commission 2008; Haigh et al. 2005; International Monetary Fund 
2006). Other studies examining the co-movement between future and spot prices or between 
ﬁ  nancial market and oil market indicators do suggest that some overshooting of oil prices above 
their fundamentally justiﬁ  ed equilibrium level took place at least temporarily (Khan 2009, Miller 
and Ratti 2009, and Kaufmann and Ullman 2009). On the other hand, it is also important to keep 
in mind that, as documented by the literature, oil demand and supply are not very sensitive to 
prices, especially in the short term. This implies that relatively small changes in fundamentals 
can exert a large impact on prices.2 
In any event, it is crucial that market participants can operate on the basis of reliable data in 
order to avoid undue uncertainty and thereby contain price volatility. Accordingly, it is important 
to foster the compilation of appropriate supply, demand and, particularly, stock and inventory 
statistics. 
Medium and long-term prospects of energy markets
Looking ahead, in the medium term the supply and demand balance may turn out to be 
tighter. As soon as the world economy recovers, oil demand is expected to start increasing 
vigorously again in emerging economies. The IEA estimates that by 2014 up to 4 mb/d of 
crude oil could be needed to match growing demand (International Energy Agency 2009a). 
2  It has indeed been argued that the extent of the recent price gyrations is compatible with elasticities estimated in the literature 
(International Energy Agency 2009a).20
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1.2  ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND INTENSITY
1.2.1 CONSUMPTION PATTERNS
Energy consumption may be viewed in two 
main ways: either in “gross” terms (i.e. the 
combination of domestic primary production 
and net imports) or in “ﬁ  nal” terms (i.e. after 
the transformation of primary energy sources 
into usable forms of energy). A key difference 
between gross and ﬁ   nal consumption is the 
transformation of primary energy sources 
(nuclear, gas, solid fuels and oil) into electricity. 
Both measures have their uses: the “gross”   
measure is useful for understanding the 
However, supply prospects have also been affected by the economic downturn, with investment 
in upstream capacity and maintenance declining by almost 20% in 2009 (International Energy 
Agency 2009b). As a consequence, around 2 mb/d of new capacity is estimated to have been 
deferred since the inception of the crisis, and a further 4 mb/d may suffer delays of 18 months 
or more. Overall, capacity is expected to grow by around 4 mb/d by 2014. All this increase is 
projected to come from OPEC member countries, Saudi Arabia in particular. Hence, OPEC’s 
production capability and policy are likely to be decisive in shaping future prices (Nakov and 
Pescatori 2009). Saudi Arabia, despite representing only 12% of the total oil production, is the 
only country with signiﬁ  cant spare capacity and hence has a crucial role as marginal supplier, so 
its decisions can exert a signiﬁ  cant impact on prices (Nakov and Nuño 2009). 
In the longer term, regardless of OPEC’s economic willingness to expand capacity, its physical 
ability to do so depends on the resource base: should global oil production peak, no production 
expansion will be possible, regardless of price.3 There is considerable uncertainty surrounding 
the amount of oil left in the ground. The IEA and the US Energy Information Administration do 
not envisage a peak in oil production until 2030, provided that the decline in currently producing 
ﬁ  elds will be offset by new ﬁ  elds going on stream and those yet to be discovered.4 However, 
even taking this into account, additional non-conventional sources will be required to match 
growing demand. Indeed, the IEA estimates the use of unconventional oil sources to increase 
four-fold by 2030, reaching 7.4 mb/d (International Energy Agency 2009b).
Besides oil sources that could be recovered at higher costs (e.g. using Enhanced Oil Recovery 
techniques, or located in deep water and in Arctic zones), there are plenty of unconventional 
oil sources.5 Among these, the geological resource base for heavy oil such as tar sands and oil 
shale is quite considerable.6 However, even if estimated costs of production for tar sands are 
comparable with current prices, they are subject to wide uncertainty, as it takes considerable 
amounts of energy to recover alternative fuels and the energy return is considerably smaller than 
for oil. Similar considerations apply to oil shale, with costs even higher and more uncertain. 
Apart from environmental considerations, these new extraction technologies are highly capital 
intensive, with long lead times of up to ten to 15 years. Finally, the uncertainty stemming 
from the high volatility observed in oil prices in recent years and the increased risk aversion 
in ﬁ  nancial markets may also have served to discourage or postpone investment in this sector, 
although higher prices should stimulate to some extent investment in supply.
3  The case of the US mainland supply well illustrates this point: production has been steadily declining in the last 40 years despite 
increasing prices.
4  There is however widespread debate among energy economists and geologists about the peak in oil production. Kaufmann and Shiers 
(2008), for example, examine several possible scenarios, and place the oil peak somewhere between 2009 and 2031.
5  Here the focus is only on alternative fuels that can be used in the transportation sector, which according to the current technology have 
to be in liquid form. Renewable resources such as biofuels should also be mentioned, but it is unlikely that they could replace oil: 
converting the whole US corn crop into fuel would satisfy only 12% of demand for fuels.
6  Tar sands represent a form of heavy oil which is present in Canada and Venezuela. Similarly, oil shale is a type of rock containing oil, 
a large resource base is available in the United States.21
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potential impact of raw energy commodity 
prices whilst the “ﬁ  nal” measure is useful for 
understanding their impact via consumption 
patterns. Charts 7a and 7b respectively show 
the evolution and breakdown of gross and ﬁ  nal 
inland consumption of energy. Having increased 
strongly between 1960 and 1973 at an annual 
rate close to 10%, growth in overall energy 
consumption has since trended upward at an 
average rate of around 1% per annum. However, 
within overall energy consumption there have 
been a number of signiﬁ  cant  developments. 
One of the major trends in the composition of 
ﬁ  nal energy consumption has been the growing 
share of natural gas and electricity, largely at the 
expense of natural coal and peat. The share of 
oil strongly increased until the end of the 1970s 
but then stabilised. Currently, oil products are 
the most important component of ﬁ  nal energy 
consumption in the euro area, representing 44% 
of the total. Gas products are the second largest 
product of ﬁ   nal energy consumption (23%), 
a share slightly higher than that of electricity 
(22%). Taking a longer-term perspective, the 
major trends are the growing shares of natural 
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Chart 7c Final inland consumption
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gas and electricity. In almost all countries, oil, 
gas and electricity account for more than 80% 
of energy consumption (see Chart 7c)
It is also informative to analyse ﬁ  nal  energy 
consumption according to the sector where it is 
consumed. Compared with 1960, the transport 
and services sectors have gained most in terms 
of consumption, while industry has shown 
some decline. Chart 8a reveals that in 2007 the 
transport sector was the largest consumer of 
energy in the euro area with a share of 33%, 
followed by industry (28%) and households 
(23%). Road transport, representing more than 
80% of total transport-related consumption, 
is by far the largest component within this 
sector, followed by air transport with a share 
of around 14%. Although detailed data are 
lacking, approximately 50% of road transport 
is accounted for by passenger cars with the 
remainder accounted for by commercial transport. 
The proﬁ  le of fuel consumption across these two 
categories is very different. Approximately one-
third of passenger cars are diesel powered, with 
most of the remainder petrol powered. On the 
other hand, the commercial transport sector is 
almost completely diesel powered. The current 
sector distribution is broadly similar across 
euro area countries. Nevertheless, the shares 
of industry consumption are relatively larger in 
Belgium, Slovakia and Finland, and relatively 
smaller in Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Luxembourg 
and Malta (see Chart 8b). 
An alternative perspective from which to analyse 
ﬁ  nal energy consumption in the euro area is the 
energy proﬁ  le of household and industry sectors. 
Regarding  households, the energy basket is 
relatively diversiﬁ   ed, with substantial 
heterogeneity between euro area countries 
(see Chart 9). Gas represented around 40% of 
households’ energy consumption in the euro 
area in 2007, but as much as 72% in the 
Netherlands, 57% in Italy and just 0.7%, 3.3% 
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Chart 8b Energy consumption by sector
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and 6.8% in Finland, Greece and Portugal 
respectively. Electricity occupied second 
position in the euro area households’ energy 
basket (25%), followed by oil products (20%).5
As for the energy proﬁ  le of the industry sector, 
Chart 10 reveals that gas and electricity also 
play the leading roles, with shares in the euro 
area of 33% and 32% respectively. The shares of 
solid fuels and oil as suppliers of energy to the 
euro area industry sector decreased in the period 
1990-2007 (see Chart A5 in Annex 1). The main 
differences between the energy consumption 
proﬁ   les of households and industry are the 
higher weight of oil and gas for the former and 
a higher weight of electricity and solid fuels for 
the latter.
1.2.2 ENERGY INTENSITY
Energy intensity is a useful concept in the 
analysis of countries’ energy developments, as 
it links energy consumption to activity and is 
a proxy measure for the efﬁ  ciency with which 
energy resources in the economy are used. 
It should be borne in mind that many factors 
may impact on energy intensity including 
living standards, economic structure, climatic 
conditions, the age of the housing and capital 
stocks, population density and transport 
infrastructure. Not all of these are necessarily 
linked to energy efﬁ  ciency per se. 
After increasing in the 1960s and early 1970s, 
energy intensity in the euro area has been on 
a steadily declining path ever since, owing to 
sector developments but also probably to the 
occurrence of oil shocks and the progressive 
adoption of energy-saving technologies. 
At present, relative to other industrialised 
economies, the euro area shows a lower energy 
intensity than the United States, but higher 
than that of Japan and the United Kingdom 
(see Chart 11). Whilst the broad pattern of 
euro area energy intensity is evident in other 
economies, some convergence in energy 
intensity has occurred over time in these 
In terms of evolution, from 1990 to 2007 the consumption of  5 
gas has gained share in most countries, while oil decreased its 
relevance in the energy mix (see Chart A9 in Annex 1).
Chart 9 Household energy consumption
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Chart 10 Industry energy consumption
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industrialised countries. In the 1960s the levels 
of energy intensity were much higher in the 
United States than in the euro area and Japan. 
The reduction of energy intensity was much 
stronger in the United States than in the euro 
area, while Japan stabilised in the last decades.
The overall evolution in energy intensity 
arises from the improvements recorded in each 
sector of activity, together with the change of 
share of the different sectors in total economy. 
Chart 12 describes the evolution of the ratio 
between the indices of energy consumption in 
total economy, industry and services and the 
respective indices of gross value added in the 
euro area since 1990. This ﬁ  gure shows that the 
improvement in energy efﬁ  ciency is common to 
industry and services. However, as the degree 
of energy intensity in services is lower than in 
industry, the increase in the share of services 
gives rise to a stronger reduction in overall 
energy intensity.
Virtually all euro area countries stabilised or 
reduced energy intensity from 1990 to 2007 
(see Chart 13). Euro area energy intensity 
declined notwithstanding an increase in gross 
inland energy consumption of about 12%, 
as overall activity (GDP) grew by around 66%. 
While gas intensity remained broadly constant 
over time, that of solid fuels and oil declined. 
In summary, after increasing substantially in the 
1960s, overall economy energy intensity in the 
euro area has been on a declining trend since the 
early 1970s. This should reduce the vulnerability 
of the euro area economy to energy price 
ﬂ   uctuations. There are two additional trends 
in this direction. First, the share of industry in 
ﬁ  nal energy consumption and industrial energy 
intensity has fallen. Energy price ﬂ  uctuation 
should therefore affect industrial production 
less than in the past. Second, the energy mix has 
become more diversiﬁ  ed with the rise of nuclear 
power and renewables, although this has to be 
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Note: The deﬁ  nition of the services sector in the energy statistics 
(used to calculate the numerator – energy consumption) is not 
completely aligned with that in the national account statistics 
(used to calculate the denominator – total output).
Chart 11 Energy intensity (1960-2007)
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seen against the background of an increase in 
total consumption of fossil fuels (particularly 
natural gas) and high dependency rates.
1.3  ENERGY MARKET STRUCTURE 
AND REGULATION
The degree of competition in energy markets 
determines their functioning in several respects. 
It affects the margins available to entrepreneurs 
and therefore incentives to invest, which in turn 
determine the capacity to innovate and attain 
higher productivity. The degree of competition 
also affects the need to react to price signals, as 
highly regulated and non-competitive markets 
tend to allow for larger margins and induce 
frictions in the reaction of prices to changes 
in input costs. In turn, the deregulation of 
markets allowing consumers greater choice 
and an appropriate return on investment tends 
to have beneﬁ   cial effects on productivity as 
well as consumer and producer prices. Market 
competition increases investment incentives, 
since companies must ensure service quality and 
face a stronger pressure to increase productivity 
to lower prices.
Implementing the appropriate degree of 
deregulation may be more challenging in energy 
sectors than in other industries since some 
elements of the production process may justify 
regulation or lead to centralised market 
structures. First, the energy sector is more 
capital intensive than many other industries, 
requiring long-term investments (project 
lifetimes can be as long as 20 and 45 years) and 
substantial ﬁ  nancial commitments.6 The extent 
and long-term nature of the ﬁ  nancial resources 
and speciﬁ  city of energy infrastructures can lead 
to bottlenecks if highly volatile prices or low 
margins undermine investment incentives. 
Second, whilst oil is relatively easily transported 
and stored, natural gas and electricity have more 
limited storage and distribution possibilities.7 
Gas and electricity supply are therefore 
characterised by the predominant role of 
network infrastructures, conﬁ   guring a market 
structure where the transmission of the energy 
service by a single ﬁ   rm can under some 
circumstances minimise costs and therefore 
create “natural monopolies”. Finally, vertical 
integration implies certain advantages in the 
energy industries. It limits the technical 
problems that can arise along the different stages 
of the production chain (e.g. in the electricity 
sector, where a continuous balance between 
demand and supply is vital and where the energy 
source is not storable). Vertical integration also 
facilitates long-term commitments towards third 
parties (e.g. the long-term take-or-pay contracts 
signed with natural gas producers), and helps to 
avoid “double marginalisation”, whereby every 
stage requires an adequate margin.
According to IEA estimates, in 2000, investments in energy  6 
infrastructures amounted to USD 413 billion, about 1.3% of 
world GDP, with the power sector registering the highest ratio of 
capital investment to unit of value added (IEA 2003).
Whilst liqueﬁ   ed gas can be transported, the process of  7 
liquefaction and re-gasiﬁ   cation is costly in terms of energy 
losses and the required infrastructures. According to the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA 2003), the construction 
of a liquefaction plant could cost USD 1.5 to 2.0 billion; 
a re-gasiﬁ  cation terminal costs around USD 300 million.
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Regulatory authorities in these sectors therefore 
face the complicated task of maintaining 
investment incentives and implementing 
efﬁ   cient market structures to the beneﬁ  t  of 
consumers, which do not allow incumbent 
ﬁ   rms to exploit their strategic advantage by 
limiting competition. Regulatory instruments 
shaping market structures and energy prices for 
consumers cover a number of dimensions, most 
prominently entry and access rules applicable to 
ﬁ  rms, consumer rights and price regulations. 
1.3.1 EVOLUTION OF EU ENERGY MARKET 
REGULATION
Owing to some of the factors outlined above as 
well as the strategic nature of energy and the 
traditionally strong role of national governments 
in setting energy policy, energy markets were 
only brought within the remit of the Single 
Market at a relatively late stage. Since the 
middle of the 1990s, the EU, recognising that 
certain segments of the market need not be 
served by monopoly producers, pursued a more 
differentiated policy of liberalisation and 
de-verticalisation of gas and electricity markets. 
Common rules for the EU markets in electricity 
and gas were ﬁ  rst introduced in 1996 and 1998 
respectively. They took the form of general rules 
and principles and emphasised the need for 
objective and transparent licensing or 
authorisation procedures and non-discriminatory 
technical and access rules governing 
transmission and distribution systems.8 
Although these directives were credited with 
improving the functioning of markets, the 
dominance of incumbent energy ﬁ  rms limited 
access to energy networks for new entrants, 
who also faced discriminatory tariffs, thus 
impeding the emergence of competition. As a 
result, stricter, more prescriptive legislation was 
introduced in June 2003. In order to guarantee 
non-discriminatory access to energy networks, 
transmission and distribution systems were 
to be legally and organisationally separated 
(“unbundled”) from the other activities of 
integrated energy companies (although they 
could retain ownership) and endowed with their 
own decision-making powers. Market opening 
was speeded up by allowing all industrial and 
household customers to choose their electricity 
and gas suppliers by 1 July 2004 and 1 July 2007 
respectively. Finally, the powers and remit of 
national regulatory authorities were widened to 
include responsibility for effective competition 
and the efﬁ  cient functioning of national energy 
markets. 
European Commission monitoring of the energy 
market during 2006 revealed that the emergence 
of an EU-wide, integrated and competitive 
energy market was still held back, owing, inter 
alia, to persistently high market concentration 
and insufﬁ  cient unbundling, limiting effective 
access to energy networks. According to many 
institutional actors, including the Commission9, 
ownership unbundling of network activity is the 
only means to resolve the conﬂ  ict of interest that 
arises when operators control the network and 
compete in the upstream or downstream stage of 
the energy business.10 
New legislation was adopted in June 2009 
and will apply from March 2011. Ownership 
unbundling, requiring integrated energy ﬁ  rms to 
divest their network assets, was introduced as a 
To prevent cross-subsidisation of activities and the distortion  8 
of competition, integrated energy companies were required to 
keep separate accounts for each of their activities, although 
ownership structures were allowed to remain unchanged. 
High-volume customers were given the right to choose their 
own gas and electricity suppliers and the relevant thresholds 
were progressively lowered in order to increase the share of 
the market subject to competition. Finally, Member States were 
required to establish an independent regulatory authority with 
dispute-settling powers.
See for example, Council of European Energy Regulators  9 
(CEER) (2007); Kroes “[…] the European Commission sees full 
ownership unbundling as the most effective option to solve the 
problems of discrimination, and the distortion of incentives to 
invest in connecting regional or national networks”. Europa press 
release, SPEECH/07/63.
Furthermore, unbundling should stimulate the investments  10 
needed to increase network capacity, which in turn can improve 
efﬁ  ciency through the pressure of competition. Nevertheless, 
fair and certain access to networks has been assessed in the 
literature as a necessary – but not sufﬁ  cient – condition for the 
development of competition in energy markets as long-term 
(e.g. take-or-pay) contracts may also block effective gas sector 
competition through vertical foreclosure or market segmentation 
(Polo and Scarpa 2007, 2003 and Buchan 2009).27
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general principle.11 To increase the effectiveness 
of regulatory oversight, the independence 
and decision-making capacity of national 
regulators has been strengthened further and 
their powers harmonised. In addition, a separate 
regulation establishes a European Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) 
to supplement, harmonise and coordinate 
the work of national regulators, formalise 
cross-border cooperation between transmission 
system operators in European networks and 
advise the European Commission as to how to 
improve the functioning of EU energy markets. 
To promote the integration of European energy 
markets, the Commission also makes use of its 
powers to enforce existing legislation. As the 
implementation of the 2003 directives was 
deemed insufﬁ   cient, infringement procedures 
were launched against 25 Member States 
in 2009.
1.3.2 OPENNESS AND COMPETITION 
IN EU ENERGY MARKETS
In the euro area, 99.5% and 96.2% of the 
electricity and gas markets respectively were 
open to competition in 2007, meaning that 
consumers became completely free to choose 
their energy supplier (see Table 1). However, 
even if de jure competition is in place, de facto 
competition is still generally lacking. The 
market share of the three largest companies (C3) 
in the euro area countries’ wholesale and retail 
electricity and gas markets in 2007 remained 
high: in the electricity market the C3 indicator 
was close or above 75% on average and in the 
wholesale and retail gas market above 70% and 
60% (for an overview of C3 by country, see 
Chart A6 in Annex 1). A similar picture emerges 
looking at another indicator of market 
concentration, the Herﬁ  ndahl-Hirschman Index, 
which was above 4,000 in euro area countries’ 
wholesale and retail electricity and gas markets 
thus pointing to highly concentrated markets.12 
Only a few euro area countries are characterised 
by a moderately concentrated market: Ireland, 
Spain, Italy and Austria in wholesale electricity, 
Slovenia in retail electricity and Ireland in 
wholesale gas. In all other cases the HHI was 
above 1,800 (see Table 2).
Additional insight into market liberalisation 
may be obtained by looking at the OECD 
Product Market Regulation database.13 For the 
gas sector, the market structure indicator ranges 
from six (market share of the largest player in 
the gas market bigger than 90%) to zero (market 
share of the largest player in the gas market 
less than 50%). This information is particularly 
valuable because data are available back to 
1975. Chart 14 reports both the level of the 
indicator in 2007 and the progress made since 
1990. Several countries (Greece, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Slovakia and Finland) made no 
progress in terms of reduction in the dominant 
However, as part of the compromise reached between the Council  11 
of the European Union and the European Parliament, existing 
integrated companies can, as an exception and under certain 
conditions, continue to own such assets. In return, the directives 
strengthen consumer rights, inter alia by facilitating the switching 
of suppliers. The Commission is tasked with assessing the 
competition effects of this exception.
The Herﬁ  ndahl-Hirschman Index is deﬁ  ned as the sum of the  12 
squared individual market shares. The HHI ranges from zero 
(perfect competition) to 10,000 (monopoly).
See OECD 2006 and the Product Market Regulation section of  13 
the OECD’S website at www.oecd.org.
Table 1 Indicators of market competition in the euro area electricity and gas markets
Euro area Market open 
to competition (%)
2007 
Market share of three largest 











Retail gas market 63.6  4,078.3
Sources: NCBs, European Commisssion and Eurosystem staff calculations. The euro area is obtained by aggregating country data 
weighted by private consumption.
1) Data for the gas market refer to 2006.28
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position of the incumbent operator in the gas 
market while other countries (Ireland, Spain, 
France, Italy, the Netherlands and Austria) made 
good progress over the same period. 
It is worth mentioning that in some energy 
markets nationwide indicators of competition 
may not fully reﬂ  ect effective competition. Some 
euro area countries (Germany, Spain and Austria) 
were characterised by a decentralised energy 
market structure originating historically from 
regional monopolies. Germany, for example, 
was dominated by regional monopolies in the 
electricity and gas markets until 1998. Even after 
liberalisation took place the gas transmission 
network was segmented into 19 “market areas” 
and gas suppliers had to negotiate entry and 
exit conditions both between and within market 
areas. Since 2007 access has been facilitated and 
the number of market areas reduced, although 
former incumbents retain dominant positions in 
their original market areas.
One requirement for fully-ﬂ  edged liberalisation 
is the creation of a level playing ﬁ  eld for new 
entrants through fair and certain access to network 
services. Despite progressively stricter regulation 
(see previous section), ownership unbundling is 
implemented only in half of the euro area 
countries (Ireland, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland) in 
electricity transmission 14 and the framework for 
legal unbundling is considered by several 
commentators to be generally insufﬁ  cient  and 
weak (ERGEG 2008). In the gas market vertical 
integration is very common and is evident to a 
higher degree than in the electricity market 
(OECD 2006). Only ﬁ   ve euro area countries 
(Germany, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Portugal) have at least one transmission system 
operator (European Commission 2009).
See EC 2009. According to information provided by the  14 
Deutsche Bundesbank, in Germany, a recent tendency towards 
unbundling is apparently emerging, with some large electricity 
providers agreeing to divest their transmission networks in 
return for being spared anti-trust measures by the European 
Commission.







Wholesale gas market  Retail gas market 
Very highly concentrated 
(HHI>5,000)
BE, GR, FR, LU, MT, 
SI, SK
BE, GR, MT, PT, FI BE, GR, MT, NL, 
SI, SK
BE, IE, MT, SI, SK
Highly concentrated
(HHI 1,800-5,000)
DE, NL, PT  IE, ES, NL, AT, SK  ES, IT ES, NL
Moderately concentrated
(HHI 750-1,800)
IE, ES, IT, AT  SI  IE
Sources: NCBs, European Commission and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Note: The HHI takes into account the relative size and distribution of the ﬁ  rms in a market and is computed as the sum of the squared 
market share of each company operating in a market segment. 
1) Latest available year – generally 2007/2008.
Chart 14 OECD market structure indicator 
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Sources: OECD and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Note: A higher index indicates a larger market share of the 
largest incumbent company. The euro area is a simple average 
of available countries.29
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These different elements of market structure can 
be traced jointly by looking at the indicators of 
overall regulation/liberalisation of the 
electricity and gas markets provided by the 
OECD PMR database. These aggregate 
indicators are based on entry regulation, the 
extent of public ownership and vertical 
integration (a higher overall index indicates 
weaker competition). Chart 15 reports the level 
of the index in 2007 and its progress since the 
1990s in the electricity and gas markets 
respectively (see Annex 1 for the individual 
sub-indices). Several observations are worth 
mentioning. First, since the beginning of the 
1990s the electricity and gas markets have made 
important steps towards liberalisation, especially 
in facilitating market entry. This reﬂ  ects  the 
efforts of the European Commission to 
implement a single European energy market 
mentioned above. Second, progress made in the 
euro area to liberalise energy markets since the 
1990s in the electricity sector appears on average 
greater than that for the overall PMR indicator 
which includes other network industries.15 By 
contrast, progress is smaller in the case of gas. 
Third, large heterogeneity across countries still 
exists. In 2007 regulation in the electricity 
market was stricter (and competition lower) in 
Belgium, Ireland, Greece, France, the 
Netherlands and Slovakia compared with the 
euro area average. Regulation in the gas market 
was stricter in Ireland, Greece, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, and Finland. 
Overall, effective competition in the euro area 
gas and electricity markets is still lacking and, 
in the majority of countries, has failed to emerge 
fully. Limited competition in wholesale markets 
is particularly worrisome given that well-
functioning and integrated wholesale markets 
are a prerequisite for competitive retail markets. 
Low rates of customer switching, especially in 
the gas market and for households and small 
commercial customers, tend to conﬁ  rm that there 
is only limited competition in the market.16
Two issues are not addressed by these indicators. 
First, the interdependence of gas and electricity 
is relevant in promoting competition in these 
markets. In Europe (and in the euro area) almost 
one-quarter of electricity is generated using gas 
(see Section 1.1.1). This share is expected to 
This indicator consists of seven non-manufacturing industries  15 
(airlines, telecoms, electricity, gas, post, rail and road).
EC 2009 and ERGEG 2008. On the contrary, high switching  16 
rates were recorded in the Netherlands where between July 
2007 and July 2008 approximately 8% of consumers switched 
between energy suppliers. Low switching rates may, however, 
also be associated with other factors including high customer 
satisfaction, low price elasticity of consumers, long lock-in 
contract agreements, or simply consumer inertia.
Chart 15 OECD overall regulation indicator 
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FR SK IT ES GR PT AT BE IE NL DE LU euro
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Sources: OECD and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: A higher index indicates stricter regulation. 
The euro area is a simple average of available countries.30
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continue to rise (IEA 2008a), which suggests 
that the interconnection between gas and 
electricity price dynamics will be further 
ampliﬁ   ed in the coming years. Thus, while 
vertical integration may be diminishing, certain 
forces may give rise to increased horizontal 
integration: electricity generators may seek to 
manage gas input price risk, and multi-utility
companies might seek to exploit economies of 
scope by providing a complete set of energy 
services (gas and electricity) to their customers 
(Finon and Glachant 2004).
Second, around 80% of EU consumers in 
countries with end-user regulated electricity 
and gas prices were being supplied at regulated 
prices in 2008. Despite the opening up of energy 
markets for households in 2007, regulated 
end-user prices continued to exist in a large 
number of countries. In fact, more countries 
opened up markets with price regulation in 
place than without. In the euro area, electricity 
price regulation for households and businesses 
continued in eight countries, and gas price 
regulation in seven countries (ERGEG 2009). 
With regard to the liquid fuel market, the 
situation is somewhat different since the liquid 
fuel distribution system is not characterised by 
such strong network properties. Nonetheless, 
although it is a relatively homogenous product 
with a relatively large number of individual 
retail outlets, there are a relatively small number 
of large-scale retailer chains who tend to be 
vertically integrated.17 A relatively common 
trend across the euro area, potentially affecting 
local level competition, is that the number of 
petrol stations in the euro area has been declining 
steadily since the early 1970s (from more than 
200,000 in 1973 to around 80,000 in 2007).18 
The number of stations per capita and per 
passenger vehicle varies considerably across 
countries reﬂ  ecting many factors including, inter 
alia, market regulation, preferences, geographic 
country characteristics and the number of 
vehicles per inhabitant. While the declining 
number of petrol stations might appear to have 
negative implications for competition, it may at 
the same time represent an improvement in 
efﬁ   ciency and have, on balance, beneﬁ  cial 
effects for consumers. The C3 indicator in the 
euro area liquid fuel distribution market, which 
was close to 48% in 2005 (see Chart A7 in 
Annex 1), is clearly below the level of 
concentration seen in the gas market.19 The C3 
indicator varies substantially across countries, 
ranging from 21% in France to 100% in Malta 
and Slovenia. Vertical integration is a key issue 
in the liquid fuel market, since local retailers are 
often part of a large vertically integrated 
company or have a contractual relationship.20 
Moreover, vertically integrated companies tend 
to have upstream activities in parts of the 
production chain that are relatively concentrated, 
such as reﬁ  ning. Petroleum companies frequently 
share such upstream facilities, which may also 
limit the degree of competition. On the other 
hand, a growing phenomenon in some countries 
is the entry of large supermarket chains into the 
transport liquid fuel market. These supermarkets 
often sell petrol relatively cheaply, relying either 
on scale economies or loss-leading on a “known-
value item” such as petrol to attract customers.21 
Nonetheless, the main players remain large 
international companies in most markets, as 
reﬂ  ected by the C3 indicator.
1.3.3 OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE EU ENERGY 
POLICY FRAMEWORK
The scope of EU legislation has broadened 
signiﬁ   cantly since the 1990s to encompass 
For a detailed discussion of the issue of vertical integration in  17 
petrol retailing, see OECD 2009.
A notable exception to this trend is the Spanish market which  18 
was opened to competition in the 1990s.
An additional factor impacting on effective competition is fuel  19 
tourism. This is particularly the case in small countries with 
shared borders. Population density may also have an impact on 
competition, ceteris paribus.
Generally there may be ﬁ  ve broad classes of petrol retailers:  20 
(i) those owned and operated by a vertically integrated company, 
(ii) those owned by a vertically integrated company but leased 
to another company, (iii) those operated but not owned by 
a vertically integrated company (iv) franchises issued by a 
vertically integrated company, and (v) independent operators.
See Walsh and Whelan 1999 for a discussion of the concept of  21 
known-value items (KVIs) and their pricing in an environment 
where consumers lack complete knowledge of all prices 
retailers offer. A 2007 study by the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission found that increased market penetration 
by supermarkets reduced retail prices for petrol, and was not at 
the expense of increased prices for other items.31
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not only well-functioning energy markets, 
but also energy security concerns and climate 
change objectives. (Chart 16 provides a stylised 
overview). The three pillars are seen as inter-
dependent and mutually reinforcing. The 
piecemeal approach in the 1990s towards energy 
and climate change/environmental problems has 
progressively given way to an integrated EU 
approach.
The aim of increasing the EU’s security of energy 
supply is pursued through a number of different, 
but complementary, avenues. As part of the 
short-term response to recent disruptions in the 
supply of energy products, such as the January 
2009 Russia-Ukraine gas crisis, existing 
legislation on oil and gas is being revised. This 
encompasses the harmonisation of minimum 
stocks, enhanced monitoring and transparency, 
as well as the development of detailed emergency 
response procedures in the case of a major 
disruption of oil or gas supplies, both 
intra-EU and with major energy suppliers.22 
Longer-term, additional investment in energy 
infrastructure, in particular cross-border energy 
interconnections – the physical backbone of an 
integrated energy market – is key to enhancing 
energy security. Initiatives have also been taken 
to strengthen the external aspects of energy 
security via the 2009 internal energy market 
legislation and, in 2006, the establishment of the 
“Energy Community” by the EU together with a 
number of countries in south-eastern Europe. 
Box 2 provides more conceptual and empirical 
information on different aspects of energy 
security in the EU, as well as an 
international comparison.
A third area of EU legislation affecting the 
functioning of energy markets aims to reduce 
the carbon intensity of the European economy. 
In April 2009 legislation was introduced that 
commits the EU to ambitious targets to combat 
climate change, increase the role of renewables 
in energy production and improve energy 
efﬁ  ciency, commonly known as the “20-20-20
agenda”. This plan aims to reduce CO2 emissions 
in the EU by 20% compared with 1990, increase 
energy efﬁ   ciency by 20% and increase the 
contribution of renewable energies to 20% of 
total energy consumption by 2020. These targets 
are to be reached through a variety of means, 
including emissions trading and the promotion 
of renewable energy sources. Box 3 provides 
more conceptual and empirical information 
on different aspects of carbon emissions and 
climate change policies.
Examples are the current proposal to revise the security of gas  22 
supply directive (2004/67/EC) as well as the Memorandum on 
an “Early Warning Mechanism” in the energy sector within the 
framework of the EU-Russia dialogue signed in November 2009.























Source: Drawn from European Commission (2007a).
Box 2
THE SECURITY OF ENERGY SUPPLY IN THE EURO AREA
The notion of energy security has short-term dimensions encompassing the risk of temporary 
supply disruptions and the ability of the system to react to sudden changes in demand for energy 
such as electricity, as well as longer-term dimensions such as the possible depletion of crude 
oil and gas reserves (availability), and their geopolitical distribution and transportation via 32
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transit countries (accessibility).1 More recently, broader deﬁ  nitions have included other aspects 
of energy security, such as exposure to the volatility of fossil fuel prices and the acceptability 
of energy sources on environmental grounds.2 Whereas concerns about physical availability 
are mostly relevant when prices cannot immediately respond to a shortfall in supply (e.g. in 
the natural gas market where prices are often linked to the price of oil), they are less relevant 
in globally integrated markets such as the crude oil and coal markets (Nordhaus 2009). 
Here, price volatility is the main concern.
For the euro area as a whole, Russia has remained the most important supplier of natural gas, 
even though its importance has diminished over the past decade (see Chart A) and dependence 
on Russian gas imports varies considerably by Member State. At the same time, the share 
of euro area oil imports from Russia has increased over the past few years (see Chart B). 
Owing to the integrated nature of the global oil market, the geographic composition of oil imports 
has triggered fewer energy security concerns than in the case of the natural gas market.
In this box, energy security in the euro area is measured along the following dimensions3: 
(i) degree of self-sufﬁ  ciency of primary energies deﬁ  ned as the proportion of consumption 
covered by a country’s primary energy production, (ii) reliability of imports, calculated by 
multiplying the share of each source in the supply of a given fuel (oil or gas) by the political 
security of that country (measured by the OECD’s country risk rating), (iii) negotiating power 
in gas markets deﬁ  ned as each country’s share in total gas exports of its main supplier of gas, 
1  For a comprehensive discussion of the concept of energy security, see Kruyt et al. 2009.
2  According to the IEA, energy security can be described as “the uninterrupted physical availability [of energy] at a price which is 
affordable, while respecting environment concerns”. Energy insecurity may thus occur as a result of a change in the price or the 
physical availability of energy (Bohi and Toman 1996).
3  The indicators are drawn from, but develop, the methodology proposed by Avedillo and Muñoz (2007).
Chart A Euro area natural gas imports 
by geographic origin
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Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Chart B Euro area crude oil imports 
by geographic origin
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as LNG imports as a proportion of total gas 
imports 4, (v) degree of electrical connectivity 
calculated as imports plus exports as a 
fraction of electricity consumption, (vi) self-
sufﬁ   ciency in electricity production deﬁ  ned 
as the proportion of total electricity that is 
produced with domestic energy (renewable 
and nuclear) and (vii) degree of diversiﬁ  cation 
of primary energies deﬁ  ned as one minus the 
Herﬁ  ndahl index for primary energy sources. 
These seven indicators are computed for 
13 euro area Member States (see Annex 2.1).5 
A euro area aggregate is computed in two 
ways, namely (i) as an unweighted average and 
(ii) as a composite aggregate, hypothetically 
treating the euro area as a single integrated 
energy market, excluding intra-euro area trade 
in energy and electricity where relevant.
The main ﬁ   ndings from this analysis are 
summarised in Charts C and D. In Chart C, all 
indicators are aggregated into a single indicator 
for energy security, using weights from a 
principal factor analysis 6, whose evolution is 
shown over time. Chart D compares the two 
euro area aggregates with the United States 
using the latest available information (2006) for 
all seven indicators. As can be seen in Chart C, 
energy security in the euro area has tended to 
increase over the past decade. To a great extent, 
this was a result of increases in the reliability 
of euro area oil and gas imports, attributable to 
the diversiﬁ  cation of some supplies to countries 
with lower geopolitical risk. To a lesser extent, 
other indicators have also improved, with the 
exception of the degree of self-sufﬁ  ciency of 
primary energies and the degree of electrical 
connectivity, owing to physical endowment 
and capacity constraints respectively. The 
aggregate indicator also suggests that the euro 
area might considerably beneﬁ  t from a closer 
integration of energy markets and reach a level 
of energy security comparable to that of the 
4  During shortages of natural gas supply, countries with LNG infrastructure tend to be able to respond more ﬂ  exibly than countries 
receiving natural gas through pipelines (see also Annex 2.1).
5  Due to a lack of data, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta are not included in the analysis.
6  Weights are chosen according to their contribution to the overall variance in the data. See Annex 2.1 for details.
Chart C Energy security index 





















Sources: EIA, Eurostat, Eurosystem staff calculations and 
OECD.
Note: The principal factor applied to the seven indicators analysis 
yields one factor with eigenvalue greater than one, which explains 
82% of the overall variance (see Annex 2.1 for details).
Chart D Indicators of energy security 


























Sources: EIA, Eurostat, Eurosystem staff calculations and 
OECD.
Note: The principal factor applied to the seven indicators 
analysis yields one factor with eigenvalue greater than one, 
which explains 82% of the overall variance (see Annex 2.1 for 
details).34
ECB
Occasional Paper No 113
June 2010
Box 3
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES
This box provides information about the main greenhouse gas emitting countries and sectors in 
the euro area, the current European climate change policies and considerations related to other 
possible ways to reduce carbon emissions, such as carbon taxes. 
Since pre-industrial levels, the concentration of GHGs included in the Kyoto Protocol has 
increased from 280 to 430 parts per million by volume of carbon dioxide equivalent, with a 
rise in global mean surface temperature of 0.7°C. Under the “business as usual” scenario, GHG 
concentration would continue to increase and global temperature could rise to a range between 
2.4°C and 6.4°C (2090-99 relative to 1980-99). While a mild increase in temperature entailed by 
CO2 concentration might have beneﬁ  cial effects in northern hemispheric countries (increasing 
crop yields, reducing winter deaths and heating costs), elsewhere such a warming could lead to 
more frequent extreme weather events, increasing stress on water resources and a major rise in 
sea level that could endanger coastal areas. 
The available estimates of climate change policies’ costs are uncertain, because of uncertainties 
about, among other things, technological change, estimates of which often vary signiﬁ  cantly. 
However, some recent estimates suggest that the costs of mitigation and adaptation could 
reach around USD 200 billion to USD 300 billion (i.e. about 0.4% to 0.6% of world GDP) per 
year by 2030 (UNFCC 2008). In the case of inaction some studies assess that global damage 
from climate change would amount to a 5% loss of GDP each year at least; others estimate the 
potential loss of a 2.5°C increase – with respect to the pre-industrial level – at about 1% of GDP 
(see Stern 2007 and Tol 2008). In order to overcome the “greatest market failure” which climate 
change constitutes, the Stern Review recommends three elements of policy for an effective 
global response: the pricing of carbon, supporting low-carbon technologies and education about 
energy-efﬁ  cient behaviour.
United States. At the Member State level, energy security has on average remained below the 
level in the United States, barring notable exceptions, namely euro area countries in which either 
nuclear power or renewables are important sources for electricity generation or where access to 
the global LNG market is available.
Chart D suggests that with an integrated energy market, the euro area, compared to the 
United States, might achieve particularly high scores with respect to electricity interconnections 
(given the very low level of this indicator in the United States), LNG imports and the degree of 
self-sufﬁ  ciency in electricity generation. 
In the long term, energy security in the euro area might also be affected by the EU’s climate 
change policies. Indeed, recent studies on a possible link between climate policies and energy 
security ﬁ  nd that there may be a “double dividend” of global climate policies in terms of enhanced 
energy security (see Criqui and Mima 2009). Work by the IEA (2007) suggests that the impact 
of a reduction in CO2 emissions on energy security would depend on how it is implemented. 
For example, an increase in end-use energy efﬁ  ciency and enhanced reliance on non-fossil 
technologies (renewables and nuclear) are likely to have a positive impact on energy security. 35
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dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, there is wide agreement that 
the overall global annual mean surface temperature increase should not exceed 2°C above pre-
industrial levels.1 In order to achieve this, the overall GHG concentration should not exceed 450 
ppmv CO2-e, which means that the global emissions of GHGs should peak by 2020 and then 
begin a sharp decline, if they are to be halved by 2050. According to the fourth assessment report 
of the IPCC (2007), to achieve this, developed countries should at least reduce their emissions 
by 80% compared with 1990 levels, whereas other countries should make a substantial deviation 
from their baseline emissions. 
GHG emissions in the euro area
Total GHG emissions, without international bunkers (aviation and maritime emissions) and 
LULUCF (land use, land use change and forestry), represented around 3,364 million tons of 
CO2-e in the euro area in 2007. They have decreased by only 1.6% since 1990 (see Table A).2 
In 2007 euro area countries were responsible for 67% of the EU27’s total GHG emissions. 
Unsurprisingly, the share of emissions is closely linked to country size, particularly in terms of 
population. 
In parallel with the decrease in the overall level of GHG emissions since 1990, the quantity per 
unit of real GDP has also decreased owing to improvements in energy efﬁ  ciency, the change in 
1  UN Climate Change Conference Copenhagen, 2009. “We underline that climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time. … 
To achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention to stabilize greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, we shall, recognizing the scientiﬁ  c view that the increase in 
global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius, on the basis of equity and in the context of sustainable development, enhance 
our long-term cooperative action to combat climate change.”
2  The most important GHG by far is carbon dioxide, accounting for 83.5% of total euro area emissions in 2007 (excluding international 
bunkers and LULUCF). In 2007 euro area CO2 emissions were around 2,809 Mt, 2.3% above the 1990 level.
Table A Total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the euro area1)
GHG  Shares (%)  GHG per capita  GHG per unit of output
Mt CO2-e  t CO2-e Kg CO2-e per GDP
1990 2000 2007  1990 2000 2007 1990 2000 2007 1990 2000 2007
BE  143.2  145.1  131.3  4.2  4.3  3.9 14.4 14.2 12.4 0.70 0.58 0.45 
DE  1,215.2  1,008.2   956.1  35.5  29.9  28.4 15.4 12.3 11.6 0.69 0.49 0.43 
IE  55.4 69.0 69.2  1.6  2.0  2.1 15.8 18.3 16.0 1.06 0.66 0.45 
GR  105.6  127.1  131.9  3.1  3.8  3.9 10.4 11.7 11.8 0.98 0.93 0.73 
ES  288.1  385.8  442.3  8.4  11.4  13.1  7.4  9.6  9.9 0.60 0.61 0.55 
FR  562.6  556.8  531.1 16.5 16.5 15.8   9.9  9.5  8.6  0.47  0.39  0.32 
IT  516.3  549.5  552.8 15.1 16.3 16.4  9.1  9.7  9.3  0.51  0.46  0.43 
CY  5.5  9.3 10.1  0.2  0.3  0.3   9.5 13.5 13.0 0.86 0.95 0.80 
LU  13.1 10.0 12.9  0.4  0.3  0.4 34.6 23.0 27.1 0.97 0.45 0.44 
MT  2.0 2.6 3.0 0.1 0.1 0.1  5.8  6.8  7.4  0.79  0.65  0.67 
NL  212.0  214.4  207.5  6.2  6.3  6.2 14.2 13.5 12.7 0.69 0.51 0.43 
AT  79.0 81.1 88.0  2.3  2.4  2.6 10.3 10.1 10.6 0.49 0.39 0.37 
PT  59.3  81.7  81.8 1.7 2.4 2.4  5.9  8.0  7.7  0.64  0.67  0.62 
SI  18.6 18.9 20.7  0.5  0.6  0.6  9.3  9.5 10.3 1.21 1.02 0.83 
SK  73.3  48.4  47.0 2.1 1.4 1.4  13.9  9.0  8.7  3.12  1.55  0.99 
FI  70.9 69.5 78.3  2.1  2.1  2.3 14.2 13.4 14.8 0.65 0.53 0.48 
euro area 3,420.1 3,377.4 3,364.1  100.0 100.0 100.0  11.4 10.9 10.4  0.61 0.50 0.44 
EU27 5,564.0 5,053.6 5,045.4  11.8 10.5 10.2 0.74 0.55 0.47
Source: DG TREN (2010) “EU energy and transport in ﬁ  gures – Statistical pocketbook 2010”.
1) Excluding international bunkers (international aviation and maritime transport) and LULUCF (land use, land use change and forestry) 
emissions.36
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the fuel mix away from solid fuels, and structural shifts in the sectoral composition of economic 
activity.
Table B gives an overview of euro area GHG emissions in the main source categories for the 
period 1990-2007. Energy is the most important source of GHG by far, accounting for 79% of total 
euro area emissions in 2007. Energy-related emissions in 2007 were 1.2% above the 1990 level. 
The second largest sector is agriculture (9.4%), followed by industrial processes (9.0%). 
Concerning the main sub-categories of energy 3, the most important were energy industries – with 
electricity and heat production the major contributors to GHG emissions – accounting jointly 
for 38.0% of emissions in 2007 (994 Mt CO2-e). The second largest was transport (27.2%, 
711 Mt CO2-e), followed by other sectors – mainly households – (17.6%, 460 Mt CO2-e) and 
manufacturing and construction (17.0%, 444 Mt CO2-e).
European climate change policies
Because of the close links between climate change and energy policies (for instance the majority 
of the total CO2-e emissions result from the production and consumption of energy), the EU 
is pursuing an integrated climate change and energy strategy. Legislation was introduced in 
April 2009 which envisages a reduction in EU CO2 emissions by 20% compared with 1990 (to 
be scaled up to 30% under a binding global agreement), a 20% increase in energy efﬁ  ciency and 
an increase in the contribution of renewable energies to 20% of total energy consumption by 2020
(the “20-20-20 agenda”). These targets are to be reached through (i) an improved and extended EU 
Emission Trading Scheme with progressively stricter emission caps, (ii) stricter energy-efﬁ  ciency 
standards, such as for cars and buildings, (iii) the geological storage of carbon dioxide and (iv) the 
promotion of renewable energies, including a 10% biofuel target in transport. 
“Cap and trade” systems, such as the ETS, play a central role in the EU’s long-term strategy 
for reducing GHG emissions. The EU ETS, established in January 2005, covers around 40% of 
3  The energy sector consists of fuel combustion and fugitive emissions from combustion. Fuel combustion consists of the energy 
industries, manufacturing and construction, transport, other sectors and other (not elsewhere speciﬁ  ed).
Table B Total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 1) by main source category in the euro area
Mt CO2-e  Shares (%)
1990 2000 2007 1990 2000 2007
Energy  2,621 2,630 2,652  76.6  77.9  78.8
Fuel  combustion  2,559 2,581 2,615  97.6  98.1  98.6
Energy  industries  913 911 994  35.7  35.3  38.0
Manufacturing and construction  531  464  444  20.8  18.0  17.0
Transport  560 684 711  21.9  26.5  27.2
Other  sectors  538  515  460 21.0 19.9 17.6
Other (not elsewhere speciﬁ   ed)  18  7  5 0.7 0.3 0.2
Fugitive emissions from fuels  62  49  37  2.4  1.9  1.4 
Industrial  processes  318  295  303 9.3 8.7 9.0 
Solvent and other product use  13  11  10  0.4  0.3  0.3 
Agriculture  352  340  316 10.3 10.1  9.4 
Waste  116  101  82 3.4 3.0 2.4 
Total  emissions  3,420 3,377 3,364 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: DG TREN “EU energy and transport in ﬁ  gures – Statistical pocketbook 2010”.
1) Excluding international bunkers and LULUCF (land use, land use change and forestry) emissions.37
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1.4 FUTURE  TRENDS
Future developments in European energy 
markets will be largely shaped by two main 
forces: (i) trends in global energy markets in 
terms of supply, demand and technology and (ii) 
the implementation of energy market policies 
both at the European and global level, the 
latter particularly in relation to climate change. 
However, although identifying the main forces 
may be straightforward, estimates of future 
developments in energy markets are subject to 
great uncertainty. This uncertainty stems from a 
number of sources including the high volatility 
in energy markets themselves, the fact that 
global policies are still evolving, and lastly the 
fact that global supply, demand and technology 
trends may react endogenously to changes 
in policy in ways that are hard to anticipate a 
priori.
This section reports estimates from the European 
Commission (2008a) and the IEA (2009) on 
likely future trends up to 2020. Both institutions 
report “baseline” scenarios, which are based on 
currently agreed policies and global market 
trends in terms of supply, demand and 
technology, and “policy change” scenarios.23 
The Commission considers the scenario of full 
implementation of the EU’s current energy and 
climate policy plans, whilst the IEA reports a 
450 ppm scenario.24 The Commission presents 
its baseline estimates for two different proﬁ  les 
of oil prices (moderate and high). The IEA bases 
its oil price assumption on a model which 
balances forecast supply and demand.25 Different 
oil prices account for some of the most salient 
differences between the two baseline scenarios.
Whilst this distinction is useful, it should also be borne in mind  23 
that some current market developments may be driven by an 
anticipation of future policy developments. Hence the baselines 
and alternative scenarios may not be completely independent. 
Furthermore, the two estimates are based on different 
assumptions and are thus not fully comparable.
This refers to greenhouse gas concentrations limited to 450 parts  24 
per million in the atmosphere.
The IEA reports that in its model USD 100 in constant 2008  25 
prices equates USD 131 in nominal terms. In terms of sensitivity 
analysis the IEA also reports the impact of assuming higher 
or lower GDP growth and oil prices compared to its reference 
scenario.
all EU27 emissions. Applicable between 2005 and 2012, emission caps have been established 
according to national allocation plans, and will be replaced from 2012 onwards by an 
EU-wide cap. In 2008 more than 3 gigatons of CO2-e allowances were traded on the EU 
ETS, representing a total value of €63 billion (up 87% when compared with 2007 levels) and 
amounting to 73% of the global carbon market (World Bank 2009). From 2012 onwards about 
half of allowances will be auctioned, rising to 80% by 2020. The proceeds of the auctioning 
can be used to reduce distortionary taxes (e.g. labour taxes), reap the beneﬁ  ts of the so-called 
double dividend, or to ﬁ  nance climate change policies in the EU or in developing countries. 
According to the European Commission’s estimations, auction revenues could be substantial: 
assuming that all sectors covered under the EU ETS would have to acquire allowances using 
auctions, in 2020 revenues could represent 0.5% of GDP (assuming a price of about €40/t CO2-e) 
(see EC 2008).
Current considerations on pricing carbon emissions
Whatever instrument is used, a stable, transparent and credible price signal as well as long-term 
expectations of rising carbon prices are needed in order to make GHG mitigation cost effective 
and politically sustainable. From this perspective, energy subsidies and other price distortions 
in the developing and developed countries undermine the effectiveness of price signalling. 
An international carbon market could be developed in which existing markets are linked and 
integrated. Such linking and the broadening of the sectors covered would increase the possibility 
of achieving a global emission target at the lowest cost. 38
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Although there are considerable differences 
between the Commission and IEA regarding 
their baseline/reference scenarios, these 
differences stem more from the timing of when 
the forecasts were made than from other factors 
such as modelling assumptions. The impact of 
ﬁ   nancial market developments on economic 
activity and energy consumption was not 
anticipated when the Commission compiled its 
forecasts in early 2009. Thus whilst the 
Commission anticipates an increase in primary 
energy demand up to 2020, the IEA now 
suggests a decline (see Table A2). Energy 
demand is a function of many factors including 
prices and general economic activity, but also 
more structural determinants such as population 
demographics or societal behaviour with regard 
to energy efﬁ  ciency.26 With respect to the 
expected decomposition by fuel type the broad 
patterns are the same: i.e. a strong increase in 
renewables, some increase likely in natural gas 
and a decline in nuclear power. There are some 
differences with respect to oil and solid fuels, 
but these may, in part, be accounted for by recent 
developments as well as by different oil price 
assumptions. Overall, fossil fuels will remain 
the dominant fuel source. Energy efﬁ  ciency 
should improve arising both from structural 
improvements driven by R&D and technological 
change, as well as a result of the increasing 
importance of services in the economy’s 
structure. On the other hand, the Commission 
envisages that energy dependency will increase 
further as the overall reduction in primary 
energy production is combined with increased 
fossil fuel consumption in Europe. Regarding 
greenhouse gas emissions, the Commission 
forecasts suggest at best a levelling off from 
2005/06 levels, which clearly would not meet 
the Kyoto obligations. However, the large 
uncertainty surrounding these estimates may be 
underscored by the impact of the economic 
slowdown in the period 2008-09 and its effects 
on energy demand. In part reﬂ  ecting  this, 
between 2008 and 2009, the IEA revised down 
estimated energy demand in the OECD countries 
up to 2015 by 6% compared with its 2008 World 
Energy Outlook.
Alternative  policy scenarios reveal some 
important differences from the baseline 
scenarios. First, rather than increasing slightly, 
energy demand in the EU would decrease 
slightly, arising mainly from greater gains in 
energy efﬁ  ciency.27 These improvements in energy 
efﬁ  ciency, which arise from the assumption of 
additional R&D and enhanced technological 
change, underscore the interaction of likely 
future trends and energy policy. There would 
also be some differences in the likely fuel mix. 
Demand for fossil fuels, in particular solid fuels, 
would decrease owing primarily to the higher 
price of carbon. Renewables would gain even 
more in importance. Energy dependency would 
still be likely to increase. 
In terms of the possible macroeconomic 
impacts, a wide range of estimates exists for the 
likely impact of carbon reduction measures on 
economic growth. Depending on the scenario, 
the underlying assumptions on how this is 
achieved (for example, actions in developed and 
developing economies, technology sharing, etc.) 
and the model used, current estimates range 
from 0.2% to 3.0% of GDP (see, for example, 
IEA 2009, OECD 2008, IMF 2008, and IPCC 
2007). These costs should be seen as “gross” 
in the context of climate policy since damages 
of climate change owing to inaction would 
have to be netted out (see Box 3 for further 
discussion of this issue). Regarding prices, 
climate change policies will increase the price 
of energy products according to their carbon 
content. In its 2009 study, the IEA assumes a 
price of USD 50 per ton of CO2 by 2020, which 
is equivalent to adding USD 20 per barrel to the 
cost of oil without carbon pricing. At the same 
For instance, recent proposals to amend EU energy labelling  26 
for consumer products (agreed on 17 November 2009 by the 
Council, Commission and Parliament) should increase consumer 
awareness of energy consumption and encourage lower energy 
intensity in consumption.
The Action Plan for Energy Efﬁ  ciency suggests that the services  27 
and commercial sector is that with the highest saving potential, 
estimated around 30% by 2020. Other sectors have potential 
savings of 25-27%. Great importance is given to the development 
of a proper regulation for avoiding stand-by electricity losses from 
various products, which could spare 35 TWh of the 50 consumed 
yearly by residential equipment in stand-by mode.39
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time, the price of fossil fuels excluding carbon 
penalties could be lower than under baseline 
scenarios owing to their dampening impact 
on fossil fuel demand. Furthermore, changes 
in relative prices, in particular that of carbon, 
should not be confused with overall inﬂ  ation. 
Given that carbon pricing will be announced in 
advance (and hence anticipated by agents) and 
that climate change policies may have a small 
downward impact on overall activity, these 
factors may counteract the upward pressure on 
energy prices. 
Overall  at a more global level, it is likely 
that energy markets will remain a source of 
macroeconomic volatility. In oil markets, 
although prices have declined from the peaks 
reached in 2008 and overall demand has fallen, 
it is likely that tightness in the supply-demand 
balance will re-emerge once global economic 
activity resumes its upward trajectory. This 
tightness could be intensiﬁ  ed by the slowdown 
in investment in oil supply as many projects 
have been postponed or cancelled. Moreover, 
energy dependency is expected to remain high 
in the long run. On the other hand, the increasing 
penetration of renewable energy and ongoing 
declines in energy intensity could reduce 
European energy dependency and dampen the 
macroeconomic impact of energy price volatility 
of international markets on euro area economic 
activity and inﬂ  ation.40
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2  THE IMPACT OF ENERGY PRICES 
ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
This chapter studies the short and long-term 
impact of energy prices on economic activity in 
the euro area, in the context of the energy market 
features analysed in Chapter 1. The chapter 
starts with conceptual considerations on the 
main channels through which energy prices can 
affect output. Second, empirical evidence on the 
short and medium-term impact of energy prices 
on activity in the euro area as a whole as well 
as in individual Member States is discussed on 
the basis of simulations with macroeconometric 
models. Finally, the chapter turns to the long-
run effects of energy price changes on output.
2.1  IMPACT ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY – 
CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS
The impact of energy prices on euro area 
economic activity can be disentangled into 
terms of trade, demand  and supply-side effects 
(see Chart 17). Terms-of-trade effects arise from 
an increase in import prices of energy, which 
leads to an increase in total import prices relative 
to export prices. The deterioration in the terms of 
trade may trigger adverse real income and wealth 
effects in net energy-importing countries. Unless 
savings are reduced or borrowing increases, 
this will depress consumption in the domestic 
economy. Demand-side effects are linked to the 
impact of energy prices on inﬂ  ation. As prices 
increase, real disposable income and, therefore, 
consumption is reduced. Supply-side effects 
arise from the importance of energy as an input 
factor in the production process. As a result, 
production costs increase along with increases 
in energy prices.
The mechanism underlying the direct 
demand-side effect is rather immediate. Chart 18 
shows the evolution of real private consumption, 
real disposable income and oil prices  28 since the 
1970s. Oil prices seem to have had some impact 
on real disposable income after the oil price 
hikes in 1973 and 1999, when both real 
disposable income and consumption declined 
shortly after the hikes. The link is less apparent 
for the oil price shock in 1979 which started 
when real disposable income and consumption 
were already on a declining path. The impact of 
smaller increases in oil prices is more difﬁ  cult 
to detect by visual inspection.
Turning to the supply side of the economy, in 
the short term, the ability of ﬁ  rms to react to oil 
price increases by substituting energy with other 
inputs is limited. Past investment represents sunk 
costs so that the energy intensity of production is 
largely given. As a result, an increase in energy 
prices inevitably leads to higher production 
costs. Firms may then react to this shock either 
via their pricing or their production behaviour. 
In terms of the former they can either buffer the 
increase in energy prices by diminishing their 
proﬁ   t margins, or they can pass through the 
Oil prices are used as no equally long series for energy prices  28 
is available. This is justiﬁ  ed as oil prices and energy prices 
co-move closely together. Furthermore, as explained above, 
different sources of energy are hard to substitute in the short 
term.
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higher production costs by increasing selling 
prices, thereby generating indirect effects on 
inﬂ  ation. In terms of their production behaviour, 
ﬁ  rms react to new market conditions by adjusting 
the quantities produced, therefore reducing the 
amount of energy needed for production. As a 
result, investment, employment and wages tend 
to go down. 
To illustrate the link between proﬁ  t margins and 
energy prices over time, Chart 19 shows oil 
prices and proﬁ  t growth since the 1970s. After 
the oil price hikes in 1973 and 1979, proﬁ  t 
growth (approximated by the GDP deﬂ  ator 
growth minus unit labour cost growth) declined 
substantially owing to a stronger increase in unit 
labour costs than in the GDP deﬂ  ator. However, 
the oil price hike in 1999 did not have an effect 
of similar magnitude on proﬁ  ts, given that both 
the GDP deﬂ  ator and unit labour costs grew at 
similar rates.29 At the same time, the oil price 
decline in 1986 was accompanied by an increase 
in proﬁ  t growth.
The adjustment path to a new long-run 
equilibrium is smoother the less nominal 
rigidities exist in the economy. The resulting 
long-term decline in output depends considerably 
on the overall energy intensity of production and 
on the degree to which energy can be substituted 
by other means of production. Producers can 
exploit more and more possibilities to substitute 
energy so that the energy intensity of production 
will decline somewhat in response to a positive 
energy price shock. Indeed, as shown in Chapter 
1, the share of oil in production and the oil 
intensity of consumption have declined in the 
OECD countries compared with the 1970s. 
These long-run trends cushion the effects of 
higher production costs. Therefore, the long-term 
effects on output are typically less pronounced 
than the short-term effects (see Section 2.3). 
Obviously, this substitutability of expensive 
energy for less expensive energy can differ 
across sectors and countries.
The above-mentioned effects depend also on 
the expectation of the duration of energy price 
changes. In general, energy price increases 
which are perceived as permanent have stronger 
adverse long-run impacts on output, while an 
Proﬁ  t mark-ups may have been supported to some extent by the  29 
depreciation of the euro around the time of its launch.
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increase in energy prices which is anticipated 
to be temporary induces an inter-temporal shift 
in consumption and output, decreasing current 
output to a greater extent, but less so in the 
long run. In addition, a fall in output could be 
the consequence of uncertainty when major 
disruptions in energy supply raise doubts about 
the future availability of oil and its price. In such 
a case, purchases of investment and durable 
consumption goods which are complementary 
to energy and are irreversible are likely to be put 
on hold since there is a positive option value of 
waiting to invest or to consume. Consequently, 
the capital stock grows less or even declines, 
weakens the economy’s aggregate demand 
(Bernanke 1983) and consumption of energy-
intensive items, such as cars, may be depressed. 
In this vein, Kilian (2008a) found evidence 
for a much stronger effect of energy price 
shocks on the demand for vehicles than on 
the consumption of other consumption goods. 
However, the overall empirical evidence in 
favour of such a channel has so far been limited 
(see, for example, Peersman and Robays 2009 
and Edelstein and Kilian 2008).
2.2  IMPACT ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY – 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
According to the results of a set of ESCB macro 
econometric models, oil price increases lead to 
output losses, which are quite heterogeneous 
across countries. Table 3 shows the impact of a 
10% permanent rise in oil prices in US dollar 
terms on real GDP over three years. As these 
models usually assume that oil is the only source 
of energy, the simulations are done for a 
change in oil prices and not a change in total 
energy prices. Model simulations are largely 
harmonised, but some important differences 
remain.30 These simulations are based on the 
assumption that the impact of energy price 
changes on activity is the same independently of 
whether the changes are demand or supply 
driven. A 10% increase in oil prices over three 
years would imply that GDP is 0.3-0.4 
percentage point lower than the baseline in 
Belgium, Germany, Greece and Italy, while the 
impact on GDP in Ireland, France, Luxembourg, 
Austria and Slovenia amounts to less than 
0.1 percentage point. The other countries lie 
between these two groups. 
Owing to their interactions, as also reﬂ  ected 
in Chart 2, it is difﬁ  cult to clearly disentangle 
demand and supply-side effects. However, 
a breakdown of GDP into its expenditure 
components can give insights into the source 
of differences in the reaction to changes in oil 
prices across countries. 
The simulations were carried out on a largely harmonised  30 
basis, and under the assumption that monetary policy is 
exogenous (i.e. the nominal interest rate is kept constant, 
except for Greece), ﬁ  scal policy is exogenous and exchange 
rates are assumed not to be affected by the oil price change. 
Beyond this, the models are not harmonised and may differ 
with respect to their size, estimation period and theoretical 
underpinning. There could also be differences in the channels 
through which oil price changes affect the economy and 
in particular with respect to the inclusion of supply-side 
effects of a change in oil prices. In addition, the treatment 
of international spillover effects may differ across models. 
A detailed description of the models used is beyond the scope 
of this report, but a more comprehensive overview of many of 
them can be found in Fagan and Morgan 2005.
Table 3 Effect of a 10% oil price rise 
on real GDP according to traditional 
structural models
(annual averages)
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Belgium -0.09 -0.30 -0.40
Germany -0.16 -0.33 -0.37
Ireland 0.00 -0.03 -0.05
Greece -0.03 -0.13 -0.34
Spain -0.04 -0.21 -0.25
France -0.01 -0.02 -0.05
Italy -0.07 -0.25 -0.36
Cyprus -0.03 -0.08 -0.15
Luxembourg 0.00 -0.03 -0.03
Malta -0.27 -0.26 -0.16
Netherlands -0.03 -0.08 -0.10
Austria -0.07 -0.09 -0.07
Portugal -0.05 -0.11 -0.20
Slovenia 0.01 -0.01 -0.06
Slovakia -0.10 -0.14 -0.14
Euro area average -0.08 -0.19 -0.24
Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: This table indicates the short-run effects of a permanent 
increase in the price of oil by 10% on real GDP in the euro area 
countries. The ﬁ  gures denote cumulated deviations in percent 
from the respective baseline simulation with unchanged oil 
prices. The estimations of the macroeconometric models are 
based on data samples going back to the 1980s for all countries 
with the exceptions of Cyprus and Malta (starting in 1995), 
Slovenia (starting in 1996) and Slovakia (starting in 2000).43
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Looking at the expenditure breakdown of GDP, 
two of the countries with the strongest effects 
on  consumption (Germany and Slovakia, 
see Chart 20) also have a relatively high energy 
content of consumer demand, as reﬂ  ected 
in the HICP weights and input-output tables 
(see Charts 21 and 22). In addition, as real 
income is an important determinant of 
consumption, countries with a relatively large 
simulated negative effect on real income 
(for example Italy and Slovakia, see Chart 23) 
also tend to experience a larger impact on 
consumption, while those with a more muted 
reaction of real income (Belgium, France, 
Malta and Austria) have also relatively small 
consumption effects. 
Interestingly, the relatively strong impact 
on wages for Belgium and Greece (see also 
Section 3.3.3) results in a relatively larger effect 
on employment, while countries with a smaller 
wage reaction (e.g. Ireland and Austria) tend 
to experience a smaller effect on employment 
(see Chart 23). However, this relationship 
between the size of the wage and employment 
reactions also depends on the ﬂ  exibility  of 
Chart 20 Effect of a 10% oil price increase 
according to traditional structural models 
(average effect in year three)
(percentage deviation from baseline (cumulated); percentage 
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labour markets which inﬂ  uences the downward 
adjustment of both wages and employment. 
Overall, the strongest negative impact on 
employment can be observed in Spain, followed 
by Belgium, Greece and Italy, while the effect 
is very small for Ireland, France, Cyprus, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria.
Regarding  investment (see Chart 20), the 
simulation results indicate that the negative 
impact on this GDP component is substantial for 
Greece, which has a very high energy content of 
investment (see Chart 22). Note however that, 
contrary to the other models, the Greek model 
includes an interest rate reaction. Stronger than 
average negative effects on investment can also 
be observed for Belgium, Spain and Malta. The 
negative impact on investment is small for 
Ireland, France, Cyprus and Austria, where a 
rather small energy content of investment can be 
observed for France and Austria.31 In addition, 
in France, the effect is small owing to a positive 
effect on housing investment, as the French 
model predicts a stronger impact stemming from 
a decline in real interest rates as a result of the 
increase in the HICP.
Finally, the simulations differ with respect to the 
impact on the contribution of net exports to GDP 
growth (see Chart 20). While some countries 
seem to react to an increase in oil prices with a 
decline in net exports (Belgium, Spain, Cyprus 
Luxembourg and Portugal), most countries’ net 
exports increase, owing to a relatively stronger 
downward impact on imports than on exports.32 
No input-output tables for 2005 are available for Belgium,  31 
Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta.
Indeed the impact of oil prices on international trade ﬂ  ows  32 
outside the country under consideration is not explicitly 
modelled in most national simulations.
Chart 22 Energy content of final demand
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Note: Negative ﬁ  gures for investment are due to inventories.
Chart 23 Effect of a 10% oil price increase 
according to traditional structural models 
(average effect in year three) – labour market
(percentage deviation from baseline (cumulated))
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Regarding the time taken for a change in oil 
prices to manifest an effect on GDP, there are 
also differences across countries (see Table 3). 
Most countries experience negative impact 
fading relatively gradually to the full impact 
over the three years. Meanwhile, the impact is 
almost nil in Slovenia in the ﬁ  rst year, mainly 
owing to a strong positive effect on investment 
which only becomes negative from the second 
year onwards. For Malta and Austria, the impact 
on GDP declines in year three compared with 
year two, owing to a diminishing investment 
and private consumption effect. The latter could 
be attributable to a relatively small downward 
impact on real wages (see Chart 23). A possible 
reason for the decline in the investment reaction 
is that it is assumed interest rates remain the same 
following the change in oil prices. Given that the 
HICP increases because of the increase in oil 
prices, real interest rates decline, thereby pushing 
investment up. This effect seems to be somewhat 
stronger in Malta and Austria than in the other 
countries. In the case of Malta, the positive 
contribution of net exports (reﬂ  ecting a larger fall 
in imports) also has a signiﬁ  cant impact, mainly 
because of the lagged effect on output growth 
of lower consumption, investment and exports, 
all of which have a high import content.
The large differences across countries in terms 
of trade can partly be explained by the openness 
of the countries, where in particular the effect 
on exports appears to be relatively strong for 
smaller countries (see Chart 20). Furthermore, 
different simulation results for exports can arise 
from differences in the degree of oil import 
dependence, price elasticity of oil demand, 
energy intensity of production and the sectoral 
and geographical decomposition of exports and 
imports. An additional element to be considered 
is that countries beneﬁ   t to a different extent 
from the recycling of petrodollars (see Box 4), 
which is not explicitly included in the simulation 
results above. 
Box 4
ENERGY PRICES AND EXTERNAL IMBALANCES
Energy products represent an important share of international trade. Chart A shows that in 
the period of rising energy prices between 2003 and 2007 the energy balance of the euro area 
countries, which are all net energy importers in nominal terms, deteriorated signiﬁ  cantly as 
compared with the period between 1994 and 1998. In particular, the net external energy deﬁ  cit of 
the euro area reached 2.1% of GDP. Chart B shows that the euro area energy external balance in 
the period 2003-07 almost entirely offset the surplus in the non-energy external balance.
In this box we focus on two channels through which oil price changes affect the external 
accounts of oil-importing countries in the short run. First, we consider the effects associated 
with  international trade. A rise in oil prices directly increases the cost of imported oil, 
which constitutes an adverse shock to the terms of trade, thus decreasing the current account 
balance – the direct trade effect.1 However, higher oil prices increase oil revenues and demand 
for goods and services by oil exporters, leading in principle to higher foreign demand of 
oil-importing countries and thus to increases in their current account balances – the indirect 
trade effect. Second, certain effects of oil price changes on the external balance are associated 
with international ﬁ  nancial markets. As the domestic economies of oil exporters are heavily 
1  The analysis and simulations exclude any trade volume and price changes owing to demand-side (real disposable income) or 
supply-side (production costs) effects of an oil price increase on the current accounts of oil importers. In addition, exchange rate and 
policy-induced changes are not accounted for.46
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reliant on oil-producing industries, part of the additional oil revenues resulting from an increase 
in oil prices is usually channelled into international ﬁ  nancial markets, either by purchasing 
foreign assets (in the form of the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and other cross-
border investments) or by repaying external debt. 
The empirical evidence suggests that in past episodes, roughly half of the overall petrodollar 
windfall gain was spent on foreign goods, while the remainder was invested in foreign assets. 
Nevertheless, there are noticeable differences across countries. In the period between 2002 
and 2006, estimates suggest that 41% of the increase in the euro area’s oil deﬁ  cit and 60% of the 
increase in China’s oil bill were compensated for by higher purchases of domestically-produced 
goods in the oil-exporting countries, as against only 20% for the United States and 18% for 
Japan (Higgins et al. 2006). At the same time, OPEC countries have signiﬁ  cantly increased net 
holdings of foreign assets as a percentage of GDP in recent years. Evidence suggests that the 
bulk was invested in the United States. 
The table below shows the results of a simple benchmark calculation of the combined direct 
and indirect trade channels for two variants of an oil price increase  2: an increase of roughly 
40% (from 52 USD per barrel to 70 USD per barrel) and a stronger increase of 100% 
2  The direct trade effect is simulated assuming inelastic oil demand in the short term (as documented in the literature, see for example 
Hamilton 2009) and a proportional response of oil balances to the change in oil prices. The indirect trade effect assumes that exports by 
oil-importing countries increase in line with the rising demand for imports by the oil-exporting countries (Norway, Russia and OPEC 
members excluding Iraq). We assume that the increase in imports by oil-exporting countries is distributed according to the shares of oil 
importers in those countries’ total goods imports.
Chart B Energy and non-energy external 
trade balances











































Source: Eurosystem staff calculations based on CHELEM data.
Note: The euro area is based on data for the composition of 
12 countries (EA12).
Chart A Energy external balance
































Source: Eurosystem staff calculations based on CHELEM data.
Note: The euro area is based on data for the composition of 
12 countries (EA12).47
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(to 100 USD per barrel) in 2009. Results are shown for four alternative scenarios regarding the 
extent to which petrodollars are recycled. These scenarios are 0%, 20%, 60% and 100%.3 
The results of the simulations broadly conﬁ  rm the ﬁ  ndings of previous empirical research. First, as 
would be expected, the largest net oil importers, i.e. the euro area and the United States, experience 
the most pronounced deterioration in their oil balances in the short term (as illustrated by the ﬁ  rst 
scenario in the table, which assumes no “oil bill recycling”, and thus captures only the direct effect 
of higher oil prices). The deterioration ranges from 0.7% to 1.8% of GDP, depending on the size 
of the change in oil prices. Second, the economies with the largest export activity towards the 
oil-exporting countries, i.e. the euro area and China, signiﬁ  cantly beneﬁ  t from the indirect effect 
of increased import demand by the oil exporters, although in most cases it only partly offsets 
the negative direct effect. As long as the propensity of oil exporters to import does not change 
in favour of more saving, euro area countries should therefore beneﬁ  t from higher exports to 
oil-exporting economies.4 Geographical proximity to most major oil exporters and historical ties 
seem to partly explain the closer trade links between euro area countries and oil exporters and the 
relatively weaker export ties of the United States. Furthermore, the structure of import demand 
from oil-exporting countries, largely determined by an infrastructure and construction-led pattern 
of growth, seems to create a comparative advantage for those euro area countries that specialise 
in the production of capital goods, such as Germany in transport equipment and machinery. The 
euro area as a whole has been gaining import market shares in a number of oil-exporting countries 
3  Exploratory estimates based on a panel of 12 oil-exporting countries over the period from 1980 to 2008 indicate that an increase in oil 
prices tends to result in an increase in the imports of oil exporters amounting to around 60% of additional oil revenues. Therefore, the 
scenario results are ordered according to the results based on this assumption.
4  The “marginal propensity to import out of oil revenues”, deﬁ  ned as the change in imports net of non-oil exports, investment income, 
and transfers over the change in oil exports, seems to have decreased in most oil-exporting countries since the 1970s, but there is some 
evidence that it has started to rise again more recently (see Beck and Kamps 2009).
Combined effect on current account









70 $/bbl  100 $/bbl  70 $/bbl  100 $/bbl  70 $/bbl  100 $/bbl  70 $/bbl  100 $/bbl
Netherlands  -0.1  -0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 1.1 0.8 2.0 
Ireland  -0.2  -0.5  -0.1  -0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 
Italy  -0.5 -1.2 -0.3 -0.9 -0.1 -0.3  0.1  0.3 
Germany  -0.7 -1.8 -0.5 -1.4 -0.3 -0.7  0.0  0.0 
Finland  -1.2 -3.1 -0.9 -2.4 -0.3 -0.9  0.2  0.6 
Spain  -0.5 -1.4 -0.5 -1.3 -0.4 -1.0 -0.3 -0.7 
France -0.8 -2.0 -0.7 -1.8 -0.5 -1.4 -0.4 -1.0 
Austria  -0.8 -2.3 -0.7 -2.0 -0.5 -1.4 -0.3 -0.9 
Slovakia  -1.2 -3.3 -1.0 -2.7 -0.6 -1.7 -0.2 -0.6 
Belgium  -1.4 -3.7 -1.2 -3.2 -0.8 -2.2 -0.5 -1.3 
Greece  -1.0 -2.7 -1.0 -2.7 -0.9 -2.5 -0.9 -2.4 
Portugal  -1.4 -3.8 -1.3 -3.5 -1.1 -2.9 -0.9 -2.3 
Cyprus  -1.2 -3.3 -1.2 -3.2 -1.1 -3.0 -1.0 -2.8 
Luxembourg  -1.4 -3.7 -1.3 -3.6 -1.2 -3.3 -1.1 -3.0 
Slovenia  -1.9 -5.2 -1.8 -4.7 -1.4 -3.7 -1.0 -2.7 
Malta  -1.9 -5.1 -1.7 -4.6 -1.4 -3.8 -1.1 -2.9 
Euro  area  -0.7 -1.8 -0.6 -1.5 -0.3 -0.9 -0.1 -0.4 
United  States  -0.7 -1.8 -0.6 -1.7 -0.6 -1.6 -0.5 -1.4 
China  -0.4 -1.1 -0.3 -0.8 -0.1 -0.3  0.1  0.3
Sources: Eurosystem staff estimates based on the IMF World Economic Outlook and Direction of Trade Statistics.
Note: Euro area countries are ranked in descending order based on the scenario of 70 USD/barrel and 60% change in oil-exporters’ import 
demand as a share of the increase in oil-exporters’ oil export revenues.48
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Country variations in the model results can, in 
addition to different model designs and 
openness of the individual countries, also stem 
from differences in the sector structure.33 
As shown in the input-output table analysis in 
Section 3.3.1, the most affected sectors were 
chemicals manufacturing and transport services 
(see also Knetsch and Molzahn 2009), which 
have different weights in the production of 
each country. Chart 24 shows that these most 
energy-intensive sectors have a relatively large 
share of gross output in the Netherlands and 
Slovenia for the chemicals industry, Slovenia 
and Slovakia, for basic metals, and Greece, 
Italy, Slovakia and Finland for transport 
services. At the same time, the chemicals sector 
has a high energy intensity in the Netherlands 
and Slovakia, while the energy intensity in the 
basic metal industry is particularly high for 
Greece, Austria and Slovakia, and in transport 
services for the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia 
and Slovakia (see Chart 25). In Greece, for 
example, the high energy intensity of the basic 
metal industry might partly explain the large 
impact of a change in oil prices on investment, 
while the impact on private consumption is 
below the euro area average. It is to be noted 
that the impact of energy prices on investment 
can also be quite different depending on 
whether the models differentiate between the 
Berben et al. (2004) examine the reasons for differences in  33 
the estimated transmission mechanisms across countries; 
in particular the extent to which these are attributable to 
differences in the underlying economies or in the modelling 
strategies. They similarly ﬁ  nd that the cross-country variation in 
results appears to be plausible in the sense that they correspond 
to other evidence or characteristics of the economies considered. 
Nevertheless modelling strategies are also likely to play a role.
over the last decade, noticeably in Algeria, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Russia. 
In the scenario analysing the effect of an increase in the oil price to USD 70 per barrel – assuming 
that oil exporters spend 60% of the increase in oil revenues on additional import demand – the 
overall trade balances of countries such as Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Finland 
are likely to respond less negatively to the increase in oil price, while countries with weaker 
export ties with the oil exporters such as Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal and Slovenia 
would seem to bear the highest costs in terms of current account deterioration owing to an oil 
price hike. This ﬁ  nding differs from the simulation results described in the main text as the latter 
does not explicitly take into account the effect of petrodollar recycling.
Chart 24 Share of most energy-intensive 
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impact on energy investment (which should be 
positive), and other investment.34
Results from an oil price scenario using dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium models available 
in the Eurosystem illustrate the role of 
expectation formation and monetary policy.35 
These models allow for the introduction of 
expectations which are not included in the 
traditional macro models described above. As a 
result, economic agents in these models react to 
expected future policy actions, so that the 
speciﬁ  cation of the policy reaction, which was 
assumed to be zero in the previous simulations, 
is crucial.36 The GDP impact is negative 
everywhere (see Table 4) but the results are 
quite different from the results of the traditional 
macroeconometric models described above, in 
particular in the ﬁ  rst year, where the interest rate 
reaction to stabilise inﬂ   ation implies a larger 
reduction in output for all models, except the 
one for the euro area. However, the differences 
between the two types of models diminish over 
time.
None of the above-mentioned models have 
taken explicitly into account the possibility of 
asymmetric effects of changes in oil prices 
(i.e. where oil price increases have a bigger 
impact on the economy than oil price decreases). 
This is an issue which has been extensively 
discussed in the literature, although there is no 
clear agreement on its existence. For example, 
For example, Kilian (2008a) estimates investment equations for  34 
these sub-sectors for the United States and ﬁ  nds a signiﬁ  cant 
positive effect for the mining sector and a signiﬁ  cant negative 
impact for residential investment. His results for total 
non-residential investment (including mining) are not 
signiﬁ  cantly different from zero.
Results are present for the NAWM, the Aino model of Suomen  35 
Pankki – Finlands Bank, Banco de España’s BEMOD model 
and a calibrated DSGE model of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
Furthermore, the exchange rate and world demand and prices  36 
(except in both cases for the Finnish model) also react to the 
shock. All models include a direct link between oil import 
prices and domestic demand prices, deﬁ  ning shares of oil in the 
demand components. Excise taxes also play a role in the models. 
All models except the NAWM include some supply-side effects, 
i.e. ﬁ  rms use oil in production. The elasticity of substitution is 
either calibrated to different values or imprecisely estimated, 
which may explain some of the differences in the results. Finally, 
the way the shocks are implemented also differs across models 
to some extent. The German model simulates a 10% increase 
on imports, generated by a shock to global oil demand, with a 
dampening down effect afterwards.
Chart 25 Share of energy expenditures 
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Sources: Input-output tables from Eurostat and Eurosystem 
staff calculations.
Table 4 Effect of a 10% oil price increase 
on GDP (annual averages) according to DSGE 
models
(percentage deviation from baseline – cumulated)
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
DE -0.89 -1.13 -0.55
ES -0.20 -0.23 -0.18
FI -0.53 -0.32 -0.23
Euro area  -0.01 -0.07 -0.11
Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.
Note: The results for Finland are based on a version of the Aino 
model including a Taylor rule.50
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Mork (1989) and Balke et al. (2002) ﬁ  nd 
evidence of a stronger impact of oil price 
increases than declines on economic output in 
the United States. Jiménez-Rodríguez and 
Sánchez (2005) report similar asymmetric 
effects for the euro area. For a comprehensive 
overview of the literature see Kilian (2008b). 
Kilian and Vigfusson (2009) attribute these 
results to the fact that most authors have 
introduced positive and negative oil price shocks 
separately into their estimation models which 
biases results in favour of asymmetries. Using 
alternative estimation methods not subject to 
this bias, they ﬁ  nd that the impact of oil prices 
on activity in the United States does not yield 
any signiﬁ  cant asymmetries. An application of 
this method to the euro area similarly does not 
suggest any asymmetry in oil price shocks. 
The evidence is somewhat more mixed for 
extreme oil price ﬂ   uctuations over a longer 
horizon. However, this ﬁ   nding may also be 
driven by the nature of the underlying oil 
price shock.37
While the model results reported above assume 
that the impact of oil prices on GDP growth 
has not changed over time, other evidence 
suggests that it has become more muted since 
the 1990s compared with the 1970s. Blanchard 
and Gali (2007) ﬁ  nd for Germany, France and 
Italy a negative effect of oil prices on output 
in the period 1970Q1 to 1983Q4, which 
becomes (close to) zero for France and Italy 
and positive for Germany in the period from 
1984Q1 to 2005Q4. For the United States and 
the United Kingdom, they ﬁ  nd that in the ﬁ  rst 
period oil prices had a stronger negative effect 
on output than in the second period. Replicating 
a similar exercise for the euro area gives a 
similar result, i.e. the effect is larger in the ﬁ  rst 
sub-sample than in the second (see Annex 2.2).
Different arguments have been put forward 
to explain this result. A key factor, as will be 
shown in Section 3.3.2, is that since the 1990s 
there seems to have been a decline in the 
pass-through of oil prices to the HICP compared 
with the 1970s and early 1980s. This decline  is 
attributable to a combination of sources. First, 
labour markets and wage setting are more ﬂ  exible 
today. Social partners have arguably learned 
their lessons and assume their responsibility 
to reduce second-round effects, even though 
some wage indexation mechanisms yielding 
second-round effects, are still in place in some 
countries. Second, an important factor is that 
monetary policy has focused more on anchoring 
inﬂ  ation expectations. Third, the recent period 
of generally low levels of inﬂ  ation has also been 
attributed to globalisation. 
In addition to the lower pass-through into wages 
and prices, other factors may have contributed.   
The lack of other adverse shocks occurring at 
the same time as the oil price shock may also 
have played a role (see Blanchard and Gali 2007 
and Nakov and Pescatori 2009). Furthermore, 
as discussed previously, the higher efﬁ  ciency in 
the use of oil has dampened the impact of oil 
price increases on the economy. Kilian (2008a) 
ﬁ   nds evidence of a lower response of US 
consumption to an energy price shock since the 
end of the 1980s compared with the 1970s and 
the beginning of the 1980s. He attributes this 
mainly to the structure of the US automobile 
sector which has moved to more energy efﬁ  cient 
cars and was thereby less vulnerable to energy 
price shocks over the second sample. 
Finally, such results can also be related to the 
differences in the factors underlying oil price 
movements. While the oil price increases in 
the 1970s were caused by supply disruptions, 
the latest oil price increases have been, at least 
initially, a response to strong oil demand, 
particularly from emerging countries with high 
and more energy-intensive growth (see Hicks 
and Kilian 2009). As a result, the latest 
increases in oil prices should have a more muted 
effect on activity, as they are accompanied by 
stronger world activity. In fact, Kilian (2009) 
ﬁ   nds that supply shocks lead to a temporary 
decline in GDP growth in the United States. 
Aggregate demand shocks, i.e. higher oil 
The evidence was kindly provided by Lutz Kilian in an  37 
unpublished research memorandum entitled “The effects of oil 
price shocks on euro area real GDP”. 51
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prices owing to higher aggregate activity, lead 
to a very small positive effect in the ﬁ  rst four   
quarters, while the increase in oil prices owing 
to precautionary demand (increase in stocks) 
leads to a permanent negative effect on GDP 
growth. The different nature of oil price shocks 
may have been a further reason why the oil 
price increases observed in 2005 and 2007 were 
more gradual. However, it should be noted that 
this may have changed since the second half of 
2007. Supply-side factors, such as heightened 
geopolitical uncertainty and spare capacity 
concerns played an increasing role in shaping 
the last oil price hike (see Box 1 on drivers 
of oil price developments). On this ground, 
oil prices have made a material contribution to 
the recent recession (see Hamilton 2009).
2.3  LONG-RUN IMPACT ON OUTPUT 
This section discusses the macroeconomic 
impact of a higher energy price on euro area 
output in the long run. This issue is often also 
addressed with a view to assessing the potential 
output of the economy. It will be shown that the 
impact of energy prices on long-run or potential 
output depends very much on the substitutability 
of energy by other means of production inputs 
and on the energy efﬁ  ciency of production. In 
economic models, these technological features 
are represented in the macroeconomic production 
function which, simply put, usually describes 
total output in the economy as an outcome of the 
combination of input factors, capital and labour, 
and total factor productivity.38 In the model 
reported below, energy is included as a further 
production factor. The impact of a change in 
energy prices then depends on the ﬂ  exibility of 
the production process and nominal rigidities. 
While nominal rigidities do not directly affect 
the level of potential output in the very long run, 
the extent to which prices and wages cannot 
adjust swiftly makes a substantial difference to 
the adjustment path of output after the energy 
supply shock over a protracted period of time 
and can impact on the overall functioning of the 
economy.
Different economic models conclude that energy 
price hikes have a negative impact on potential 
output. This result emerges in a more traditional 
production-function framework as well as in the 
context of a DSGE model.39 The latter model-based 
approach is followed here, in line with that 
undertaken in Section 2.2, to analyse the short-term 
effects of energy price changes. Furthermore, this 
model-based approach enables a detailed analysis 
of the inﬂ  uence of rigidities in price adjustment on 
the economic adjustment process after an energy 
price increase. Potential output in the DSGE 
framework can be understood as the long-run level 
of output, after short-term adjustments to shocks 
have been absorbed – the so-called steady state of 
output. Similar to the other exercises, results are 
derived by introducing a permanent decrease in oil 
supply, which implies a permanent 10% increase 
in the relative price of energy, vis-à-vis the euro 
area GDP deﬂ   ator. The long-run impact of the 
energy price increase depends greatly on available 
technology. Therefore, in order to illustrate the 
importance of technological progress, the same 
supply shock has been simulated with two variants 
ﬁ   rst, allowing for a more ﬂ  exible  production 
process – captured technically by a higher elasticity 
of substitution between energy and other factors of 
production – and, second, where the energy 
intensity of production is 15% lower. This reﬂ  ects 
developments in euro area industry between 1990 
and 2005 (see Section 1.2.2).
“Total factor productivity” is a “residual” item, which is often  38 
referred to as the impact of technical progress on the production 
process. In fact, it captures the impact of all the factors which are 
not explicitly accounted for in the macroeconomic production 
function, such as varying degrees of capacity utilisation, 
structural changes in the institutional design of the economy, or 
changes in the scarcity of input factors other than capital and 
labour, and in many cases energy.
Estrada and Hernandez de Cos (2009) provide an example of  39 
the production function approach. The model analysis presented 
in the text is based on Jacquinot et al. 2009. The model is 
calibrated to represent three regions, the euro area, energy-
producing countries and the rest of the world, as well as three 
sectors, labelled tradable, non-tradable and energy sector. The 
energy sector uses crude energy, capital and labour as inputs 
to deliver reﬁ  ned energy. Reﬁ  ned energy, capital, labour and 
imported goods are combined to produce tradable and non-
tradable intermediate goods. The latter serve as inputs to ﬁ  nal-
goods ﬁ  rms who produce investment goods and who combine 
intermediate goods with reﬁ  ned energy to produce consumption 
and export goods.52
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After an energy supply shock resulting in a 10% 
increase in energy prices, steady-state output in 
the euro area falls by almost 0.1% compared 
with the baseline scenario (see Table 5). The size 
of the decline may appear insigniﬁ  cant at ﬁ  rst 
sight. It should be considered, however, that the 
calibrated increase in the energy price by 10% is 
small by historical standards. Since the model is 
close to linear, the effect of a supply shock 
inducing an increase in the price of energy by 
50% would inﬂ  ate the macroeconomic impact 
by roughly a factor of ﬁ  ve. Furthermore, while 
the impact of a supply shock on GDP calibrated 
to increase the price by 10% appears limited, 
this is not true for all the sub-components. Thus, 
the fall in output results from considerable drops 
in both the long-run capital stock (-0.3%) as 
well as in consumption (-0.4%). The energy 
share in the production cost increases by 
0.1 percentage point, as energy can only be 
imperfectly substituted by other production 
inputs. The decline in consumption primarily 
reﬂ   ects lower real wages. Despite lower real 
wages, hours worked increase compared with 
the baseline. This is attributable to the loss in 
real income which forces households not only to 
consume fewer goods, but also to spend less 
time in leisure activity and hence to increase 
their supply of labour services. In the new 
equilibrium, exports in the euro area are 
positively affected, mainly owing to the 
recycling of the proceeds from energy accruing 
to energy-producing countries, as well as 
considerable worsening in the terms of trade  40. 
The higher price of energy passes through to an 
increase in the consumer price index of 
around 0.3%.
However, general equilibrium outcomes of 
demand-driven shocks differ substantially from 
those induced by a reduction of energy supply as 
considered in the current exercise. Simulations 
with the same DSGE model assessing the impact 
of a demand-driven increase in energy prices 
resulted, owing to the offsetting effects of the 
The terms of trade is deﬁ  ned as the ratio of import to export  40 
prices, both expressed in domestic currency. An increase 
corresponds to a deterioration of the terms of trade.
Table 5 Long-term macroeconomic effects of an energy supply shock in the euro area
Energy supply shock Higher elasticity of substitution 1) Lower energy intensity 2) 
GDP -0.09  -0.05  -0.06
Real consumption  -0.38  -0.19  -0.32
Capital -0.29  -0.14  -0.24
Energy cost share 3) 0.12  0.00  -0.04
Hours worked  0.10  0.06  0.09
Real wage  -0.53  -0.26  -0.45
Real exports  0.96  0.41  0.85
Real imports  -0.57  -0.33  -0.51
Price of energy  10.00  6.23  10.08 
Price of output (GDP deﬂ  ator)  0.31  0.10  0.27 
HICP 0.31  0.15  0.28 
HICP ex-energy  0.09  0.04  0.08 
Import prices  1.77  0.85  1.56 
Imports ex-energy  0.19  0.09  0.17 
Export prices  0.24  0.11  0.21 
Terms of trade  1.53  0.74  1.36 
Source: DSGE model simulation by Eurosystem staff.
Note: This table indicates the steady-state effects on selected macroeconomic variables in the euro area of a permanent reduction in 
worldwide energy supply of around 2%. All effects are reported as percentage changes relative to the initial steady state. The details of the 
model are discussed in Jacquinot et al. 2009.
1) Combined effects of a permanent reduction in energy supply of 2% and an increase in the elasticity of substitution from 0.2 to 1 
between energy and other inputs to production.
2) Combined effects of a permanent reduction in energy supply of 2% and an increase in the energy efﬁ  ciency of production. The increase 
in energy efﬁ  ciency has been calibrated consistent with a decline in energy intensity in the production of tradable and non-tradable goods 
of 15%.
3) Change of the cost share of reﬁ  ned energy in intermediate production in percentage points. The cost share is calculated as a weighted 
average of nominal outputs in the tradable and non-tradable goods production sectors.53
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related higher world demand, in a reduction of 
output in the euro area. This reduction was only 
around one-quarter of the size of the reduction 
after a similar supply-driven increase in energy 
prices. In more detail, the latter simulations 
assumed a permanent increase in the productivity 
of labour outside the euro area, which resulted in 
higher global energy demand and, thus, higher 
energy prices.41
The results illustrate the importance of 
technological parameters, such as the ease 
with which energy can be substituted by other 
means of production and the energy intensity 
of production.42 If the substitution of energy 
with respect to other factors of production is 
higher the adverse impact of the energy supply 
shock on long-run output would be more 
limited. For instance, increasing the elasticity 
of substitution of energy to a value of one  43 
would approximately halve the impact on real 
macroeconomics variables. With such a high 
elasticity of substitution, the energy cost share 
in production would not change as energy can be 
substituted relatively easily by other production 
inputs in proportion to the increase in the price 
of energy. A higher degree of efﬁ  ciency in the 
use of energy in production would also mitigate 
the adverse effects of higher oil prices, albeit to 
a lesser extent. With energy costs in production 
lowered by 15%, corresponding broadly to 
the decline in energy intensity over the period 
1985-2005 in the euro area, the impact of a 
decline in energy supply reduces the impact of 
the energy supply shock on real GDP by a factor 
of two-thirds. 
The above analysis shows that substitutability 
of energy is a key element in the assessment of 
the long-run impact of energy prices on output. 
The elasticity of substitution between production 
factors – especially between capital and 
energy – has been discussed for a long time. 
Reported elasticities in past studies are highly 
variable and reveal an apparent dichotomy 
between cross-sectional and time-series studies. 
While the former suggests that capital and 
energy are complements, the latter typically 
estimate them to be substitutes.44 The now 
commonly held view is that energy is not easily 
substitutable. Results from a range of empirical 
studies (see, for example, Van der Werf 2008, 
Kemfert 1998, and Thompson and Taylor 1995) 
suggest that the elasticity of substitution of 
energy with respect to the other factors of 
production is signiﬁ  cantly below 1.45 Since it is 
hard to substitute away from energy, it is 
important to advance technological change and 
increase productivity in the long term to mitigate 
the adverse impact of higher energy prices. 
The dynamic adjustment of the economy to the 
long-run steady state can be associated with 
signiﬁ  cantly higher output losses owing to real 
and nominal rigidities. In the model used in the 
present analysis, prices and nominal wages are 
assumed to adjust sluggishly owing to staggered 
price setting and wage contracts. These realistic 
model features can be used to assess the role 
The  ﬁ   ve-year average of the world market price index of  41 
raw energy in the euro area between the years 2004-09 
increased by almost 220% compared with the average over the 
years 1995-99. According to the simulation results above, such 
an increase in the energy price – if fully supply driven – would 
imply a reduction of output of 2.0%. However, it should be kept 
in mind that, ﬁ  rst, the increase in the price of energy took place 
over a period of ten years and, second and more importantly, the 
upward trend in energy prices observed in the recent past has not 
only been supply driven. In particular, it reﬂ  ects to a substantial 
extent the increase in world demand for energy in the wake of the 
considerable expansion in economic activity in emerging market 
economies. For an analysis of the impact of a temporary demand-
driven energy price shock see, e.g. Jacquinot et al. 2009.
Note that in all three scenarios it is the size of the energy supply  42 
shock of -2% that is held constant whereas the price of energy 
increases endogenously as a response to the supply shock in all 
three scenarios. Compared with the ﬁ  rst scenario, the increase in 
the steady state price of energy is lower in scenario two which, 
in addition to the supply shock, assumes that energy can be 
substituted more easily. Scenario three which, in addition to the 
supply shock assumes a lower energy intensity of production, 
yields an increase in the steady state price of energy broadly in 
line with that in the ﬁ  rst scenario.
The elasticity of substitution measures the impact of a change  43 
in the relative price of two factors of production on their ratio 
in production – a value of one implies that energy can be well 
substituted.
In a review of several studies, Thompson and Taylor (1995)  44 
show that the dichotomy primarily derives from the different 
approaches to measuring the elasticity of substitution.
Empirical evidence based on correlation analysis for a cross- 45 
section of countries of a negative link between oil prices and 
investment is also provided in Estrada and Hernandez de Cos 
(2009). However, they ﬁ  nd that this link weakened after the 
mid-1980s, which might suggest some variation in the elasticity 
of substitution, but can also be linked to other factors, such as 
the type of oil price shock.54
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of nominal rigidities on the adjustment of the 
economy after an adverse shock in energy 
supply. Chart 26 depicts the adjustment 
dynamics of selected macroeconomic variables 
in the euro area following a permanent decrease 
in the energy supply in the rest of the world 
under a regime of high and low ﬂ  exibility of 
wages and prices in the euro area. If prices and 
nominal wages can be adjusted more easily, 
the adjustment of output to the new steady 
state after the energy supply shock would be 
smoother. In particular, the undershooting of 
output under its new equilibrium value in the 
initial phase would be avoided as real wages 
Chart 26 The short-run domestic effect of less nominal wage rigidity in the euro area 
on the transmission of a permanent, exogenous negative shock to energy supply
(percentages)
unchanged nominal rigidity
less rigid prices and nominal wages
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Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: This chart depicts the adjustment dynamics of selected variables in the euro area following a permanent decrease in the energy 
supply in the rest of the world for high and low ﬂ  exibility of wages and prices in the euro area. With high ﬂ  exibility, a larger fraction of 
wages and prices can be adjusted optimally at a certain point of time. All dynamic effects are reported as percentage deviations from the 
initial steady state.55
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would fall almost immediately and labour 
supply – as a consequence of the negative 
income effect − would rise faster. Furthermore, 
the capital stock would be cut back in a more 
gradual manner. 
2.4  SUMMARY OF IMPACT ON OUTPUT
The impact of energy price changes on economic 
activity depends on a number of factors, 
including the nature of the shock, the functioning 
of energy markets, the time frame considered and 
the structure of the economy. Shocks to energy 
supply may have a stronger impact on output, 
and permanent shocks may have a larger effect. 
In the short run, as the scope for adjustment is 
limited, an increase in energy costs increases 
ﬁ  rms’ costs and reduces households’ disposable 
income. In the long run, changes in the relative 
price of energy will lead to a substitution away 
from energy products (either via a shift towards 
other, less expensive, factors of production or via 
technological change leading to reduced energy 
intensity of production and consumption).
The empirical evidence from macroeconometric 
models suggests that the overall impact on euro 
area activity of a 10% increase in energy prices 
is estimated to be -0.25% after three years, 
but shows considerable heterogeneity across 
countries (ranging from close to zero to 0.4%). 
These differing effects are partly attributable to 
structural differences in the countries, such as the 
energy intensity of production or consumption, 
the degree of nominal rigidities in the economy, 
the sector structure, and their openness. Some 
countries also beneﬁ   t more than others from 
the recycling of petrodollars, thereby showing 
a smaller deterioration in their external balance. 
The impact of energy prices on activity may 
have attenuated relative to that observed in the 
1970s and early 1980s. This attenuation may 
be attributable to the complex interaction of a 
number of factors including the nature of the 
underlying energy shocks, the lower energy 
intensity of developed economies, changes in 
wage-setting behaviour and the role of monetary 
policy in stabilising inﬂ  ation expectations.
In addition to the short and medium-term 
effects, energy price developments may also 
impact output in the long run. Model estimates 
suggest an impact of approximately 0.1% on 
output in the long run. Such losses are higher 
for the long-term level of consumption and 
investment. A key element affecting the long-run
vulnerability of the economy to energy prices 
is the substitutability of energy. The more 
ﬂ   exible the economy in terms of substituting 
relatively expensive energy sources, the less 
vulnerable it is to energy price ﬂ  uctuations. 
Moreover, wage and price rigidities exacerbate 
the adjustment costs following an energy price 
shock. In particular, the losses of output and 
labour input into the production process will be 
less pronounced if nominal changes allow for a 
more speedy adjustment process.
When considering model-based estimates 
of the impact of energy prices on economic 
activity, it is important to bear in mind that 
macroeconometric models are, by necessity, 
simpliﬁ   cations of the underlying economic 
structure. Even if model builders incorporate 
expectations formation and (monetary or ﬁ  scal) 
policy responses into their toolkit, these are 
impossible to capture in their entirety and may 
change over time. Thus the estimates reported 
here should be considered as indicative rather 
than precise results.56
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3  THE IMPACT OF ENERGY PRICES 
ON INFLATION
This chapter considers the economic impact 
of energy prices on inﬂ   ation, with the 
aim of identifying the determinants of the 
pass-through of energy prices and drawing 
policy conclusions on the structural determinants 
of inﬂ  ationary pressures stemming from energy 
price movements. The ﬁ  rst section provides a 
conceptual framework for guidance throughout 
the chapter. Then the direct pass-through of 
energy prices into liquid fuel and non-liquid fuel 
consumer prices and price level differences are 
assessed. Subsequently, the analysis elaborates 
on indirect and second-round effects. In this 
context, particular attention is paid to the role 
of inﬂ   ation expectation formation, which is 
discussed in more detail in a box.
3.1 CONCEPTUAL  FRAMEWORK
A stylised overview of the main transmission 
mechanisms through which oil prices impact on 
consumer price developments is presented in 
Chart 27. In terms of price effects, the impact of 
energy price changes is often broken down into 
direct and indirect ﬁ   rst and second-round 
effects.46 The direct ﬁ  rst-round effects refer to the 
impact of changes in primary energy prices 
(e.g. oil and gas) on consumer energy prices. 
The indirect ﬁ  rst-round effects refer to the impact 
of changes in consumer prices that occur as 
energy prices impact on producer and distribution 
costs. An oil price increase can, for example, 
affect through higher producer costs the prices of 
goods which may include an energy-based input 
(such as chemical goods) or of transport services 
(such as aviation which have a signiﬁ  cant  oil 
input). Higher distribution costs can affect more 
broadly other consumer prices. First-round 
effects, either direct or indirect, of a one-off 
increase in oil prices only generate a rise in the 
price level, but no lasting inﬂ  ationary effects.
So-called second-round effects capture reactions 
of wage and price-setters to the ﬁ  rst-round 
effects (direct and indirect) of a price shock, in 
an attempt to keep their real wages and proﬁ  ts, 
respectively, unchanged. Second-round effects 
magnify and extend the impact of energy 
price movements. The impact on wages may 
be further reinforced by additional upward 
pressure on the price level. Employers, being 
price-setters, will seek to pass rising labour costs 
on to consumer prices to try to maintain the real 
value of their proﬁ  ts, which are already penalised 
by the higher input prices. These dynamics can 
cause higher inﬂ  ation expectations to become 
embedded in the economy’s wage and price-
setting processes, eventually endangering price 
stability. This dynamic makes indirect ﬁ  rst and 
second-round effects interdependent and often 
difﬁ   cult to disentangle empirically, but they 
remain conceptually different.
This taxonomy of the breakdown of the pass-through of  46 
oil prices into different effects is drawn from ECB (2004). 
The terminology is not uniform in the literature. For example, 
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2005) refers to the impact 
of oil prices via the impact on activity as a third-round effect. 
Esteves and Neves (2004) refer to terms-of-trade effects, whilst 
Bernanke (2006) includes indirect effects as part of second-
round effects.
































Source: Drawn from European Central Bank (2004).57
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3 THE IMPACT 
OF ENERGY PRICES 
ON INFLATION
The following sections ﬁ   rst consider the 
direct effect of consumer liquid fuel prices 
(i.e. transport – petrol and diesel – and 
heating fuels), which generally are the most 
rapidly affected by changes in global energy 
commodity prices, and consumer prices of other 
energy products (primarily gas and electricity). 
The indirect and second-round effects are 
assessed in subsequent sections. Given the 
numerous ways that energy prices may work 
their way through the production chain, three 
alternative approaches (input-output tables, 
small-scale econometric models, and large-
scale macroeconometric models) are considered 
in order to cross-check the information from 
each approach.
3.2  DIRECT FIRST-ROUND EFFECTS
3.2.1 CONSUMER LIQUID FUEL PRICES
Liquid fuel prices enter the HICP in two main 
components – transport fuel and home heating 
fuel. In 2009 liquid fuels accounted for a 
substantial proportion (4.7%) of the overall 
HICP in the euro area, with considerable 
variation across countries (see Table A3 in 
Annex 1). As HICP weights are based on total 
expenditure, and are thus a function of both 
volume and price, variations in the weight of 
liquid fuel prices may reﬂ  ect a combination of 
factors, including living standards, the degree 
of car ownership and intensity of use, climatic 
conditions and fuel tourism, as well as the 
impact of taxes on ﬁ  nal consumer prices.
Given the strong increase in oil prices observed 
over the last decade, unsurprisingly, the average 
annual rate of change in HICP liquid fuel 
prices since 1996, at 4.6%, was considerably 
higher than the average overall HICP inﬂ  ation 
rate (2.0%) (see Table 6). The average rate of 
increase in home heating fuel, at 8.5%, was 
even larger than that for transport fuel (3.9%). 
Much of this difference, as well as the large 
cross-country differences, is attributable to 
differences in excise taxes. As excise taxes are 
set as a value rather than as a percentage of the 
price (as is the case with VAT), a higher level 
of excise tax, whilst increasing the price level, 
dampens the elasticity (percentage response) to 
changes in oil prices. 
HICP liquid fuel prices are among the most 
volatile and variable items in the HICP basket. 
The average standard deviations of month-
on-month changes in transport and home 
heating fuels, at 2.4 and 4.9 percentage points 
respectively, are substantially above that of 
the overall HICP (0.3 percentage point non- 
seasonally adjusted, and 0.2 percentage point 
seasonally adjusted). Liquid fuel prices tend to 
change more frequently with respect to other 
sub-components of the HICP. Table A6 in 
Annex 1 illustrates that, even when using the 
Table 6 HICP liquid fuel components, weight, inflation and volatility
Weight
(2009)






Min. Med. Max. euro 
area
Min. Med. Max. euro 
area
Min. Med. Max.
HICP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 2.0 1.5 2.5 6.0 0.3 0.3 0.5 1.4
HICP excl. energy 90.4 83.7 89.7 93.5 1.8 1.2 2.3 4.8 0.3 0.2 0.5 1.4
Energy 9.6 6.5 10.3 16.3 3.9 3.1 4.6 13.8 1.5 1.2 2.0 3.7
Liquid fuels  4.7 2.4 4.8 8.5 4.6 3.2 4.8 7.2 2.7 2.0 3.1 3.8
Transport 4.0 2.4 3.9 7.7 3.9 2.9 4.4 6.8 2.4 2.0 2.9 3.5
Home heating  0.7 0.0 0.7 2.1 8.5 4.4 8.8 12.6 4.9 2.2 5.8 7.1
Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: For detailed country data see Tables A3 to A6 in Annex 1. Euro area denotes the euro area average; min. denotes the minimum, 
med. the median and max. the maximum across the euro area countries.58
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relatively aggregated HICP data, liquid fuel 
prices changed almost every month in most euro 
area countries over the period 1996-2009.47
In this section, data from the European 
Commission’s (DG-TREN) weekly Oil Bulletin 
are used to consider the pass-through of oil 
prices to consumer liquid fuel prices and 
compare their price levels across countries.48 
Combining the Oil Bulletin data with 
international market data on crude and reﬁ  ned 
oil prices allows us to decompose the wedge 
between crude oil prices and ﬁ  nal  consumer 
prices into three components: reﬁ  ning margins 
and costs, distribution and retail margins and 
costs, and taxes. 
Looking at the evolution of the components 
of liquid fuel prices between 1996 and 2008 
(Chart 28) it can be seen that: (i) most of the 
increase in liquid fuel prices observed in the 
past decade can be attributed to crude oil prices, 
which rose from 10 cent per litre in 1996 to 
41 cent per litre in 2008, (ii) although reﬁ  ning 
costs and margins have been relatively volatile 
in recent years, increases have not persisted,
(iii) the contribution of distribution costs and 
margins has not changed much over time and 
(iv) taxes, which generally represent the largest 
portion of ﬁ  nal prices (with the exception of 
heating fuels), have risen by 18 cent in the 
case of petrol and diesel prices and by 12 cent 
The main exceptions being Greece (heating fuel), Cyprus,  47 
Malta and Portugal. In the case of Cyprus and Portugal the low 
frequency of price changes is attributable to previous pricing 
regimes and the frequency of price changes in the more recent 
period is in line with the euro area pattern. The relatively high 
frequency of price changes of oil energy products has also 
been noted by Dhyne et al. (2006) using micro-level price data 
as part of the Eurosystem Inﬂ  ation Persistence Network (IPN) 
research project. They ﬁ  nd that the frequency of price changes 
of oil energy products is 78% (i.e. 78% of prices for oil energy 
products change every month), which compares to a frequency 
of 28% for unprocessed food, 14% for processed food, 9% for 
non-energy industrial goods and 6% for services items.
The Oil Bulletin data have features that make them suited to  48 
this purpose: they are available for all euro area countries, at 
a weekly frequency, with data on actual prices including and 
excluding taxes. Importantly, although the Oil Bulletin data are 
not collected to the same high standards as the HICP data, they 
co-move quite closely (see Annex 2.3) suggesting that they could 
be used for a deeper analysis of liquid fuel price developments. 
Furthermore, the availability of both petrol and diesel prices 
from the Oil Bulletin is particularly useful, especially in view 
of the growing penetration of diesel cars in the overall passenger 
car stock in Europe and in view of the strongly differing 
evolution of gasoline/petrol and gasoil/diesel reﬁ  ning margins 
in recent years.
Chart 28 Breakdown of consumer liquid fuel prices
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Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Note: Series in chart are cumulated starting with crude oil, then reﬁ  ning costs/margins, taxes and lastly distribution costs/margins.59
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3 THE IMPACT 
OF ENERGY PRICES 
ON INFLATION
in the case of heating oil. Around half of these 
increases were attributable to explicit changes 
in excise duties, and the other half to automatic 
changes in the VAT component in the face of 
broadly unchanged VAT rates.49 
ANALYSIS OF OIL PRICE PASS-THROUGH 
INTO CONSUMER LIQUID FUEL PRICES
The following analysis focuses on developments 
between reﬁ   ned prices and consumer prices 
excluding taxes. It does not explicitly consider 
developments in reﬁ   ning costs and margins 
because  ﬁ   rst, one may observe reﬁ  ned  and 
crude oil prices simultaneously in real time, and 
second, as petroleum markets are global, reﬁ  ning 
margins are most likely to be driven by global 
factors rather than euro area or speciﬁ  c country 
ones. Furthermore, the gap between pre-tax and 
post-tax prices is not considered, as it is fully 
determined by excise and VAT rates.50
The relative stability of distribution costs and 
margins suggests that the pass-through should 
be modelled in terms of absolute levels. Table 7 
shows the amount and speed of pass-through 
from reﬁ   ned oil prices to consumer prices 
(excluding tax) for petrol in each country.51 
At the euro area level, the amount of pass-
through is generally 100% (i.e. a 10 cent per 
litre increase in reﬁ  ned oil prices results in more 
or less a 10 cent per litre increase in consumer 
prices before taxes). Furthermore, the speed of 
pass-through is generally quite rapid, with 50% 
being passed through within two weeks, and 90% 
within three to six-weeks.52 For example, given 
a 10 cent increase in reﬁ  ned oil prices, consumer 
petrol prices increase by 6.0 cent within two 
weeks, and by 9.3 cent within ﬁ  ve  weeks. 
The results on the pass-through for heating 
fuel are broadly of the same pattern as those 
for consumer petrol prices (see Table A12). 
The pass-through for diesel prices, if anything, 
appears even more rapid.
Considering individual country developments, 
it is clear that this pattern is generally shared 
by most countries.53 The pass-through to petrol 
prices seems to be the quickest in Belgium, 
Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, 
possibly reﬂ   ecting the fact that the reﬁ  ned 
prices considered in the analysis above include 
delivery to Rotterdam (i.e. the north-west 
Europe region).54 Using Mediterranean prices 
would perhaps provide a faster pass-through for 
the Mediterranean countries.55 
Regarding the question of whether the pass-
through has changed over time, estimates 
over the entire time period for which data 
are available, 1994-2008, as well as for a 
number of different sub-samples (1994-99, 
2000-08 and 2005-08) conﬁ  rm that the results 
are largely unchanged regardless of the 
estimation period. 
With respect to the issue of whether there is 
asymmetry in the response of pre-tax prices to 
reﬁ  ned oil price changes (i.e. whether consumer 
prices change by more or more quickly when 
reﬁ  ned prices rise than when they fall), there is 
little in the way of economically meaningful 
asymmetry between the pass-through of 
upstream price increases and decreases for the 
euro area as an aggregate (see Table A17 in 
Annex 2.4).56 Recent evidence provided by 
Venditti (2010) on the four largest euro area 
countries also suggests that the role of 
As VAT is levied as a percentage of the selling price, an increase  49 
in the pre-VAT selling price results in an increase in the amount 
of VAT charged even if the VAT rate remains unchanged.
Although taxes are an important component of ﬁ  nal prices, they  50 
are not modelled in the econometric analysis of the pass-through 
as they are likely to be driven by government policies.
For a description of the methodology employed, see Annex 2.4. 51 
One feature of the weekly Oil Bulletin data may mean that the  52 
estimated speed of pass-through is slightly understated. This is 
because most, although not all, countries collect the data on a 
Monday. However, Asplund et al (2000) ﬁ  nd that fewer price 
changes are made on Mondays. Their explanation is that the 
Rotterdam markets are closed over the weekend and thus any 
new information that may have arrived up to the Monday is not 
normally implemented until the following day.
The results for Ireland are affected by the fact that only monthly  53 
average data are provided.
Rotterdam (north-west Europe or Amsterdam, Rotterdam and  54 
Antwerp – ARA) prices are considered to be the benchmark 
for Europe. Rotterdam is by far the biggest liquid bulk port in 
Europe (see European Sea Ports Organisation – ESPO 2008).
The relatively low pass-through for Portugal may reﬂ  ect the fact  55 
that full liberalisation of the liquid fuel market occurred only 
in 2004.
In a small number of instances, statistically signiﬁ  cant evidence  56 
of asymmetry is found; when it is quantiﬁ  ed the asymmetry 
effect is marginal.60
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non-linearity in the adjustment of gasoline 
prices is negligible. The results and analysis 
here are also broadly consistent with Rodrigues 
(2009), who ﬁ  nds evidence of asymmetry in the 
“international” channel (i.e. the reﬁ  ning stage in 
our analysis), but only sporadic instances in the 
“domestic” channel (i.e. the distribution and 
retailing stage in our analysis). 
In summary, the pass-through of oil prices 
into consumer liquid fuel prices appears to be 
complete and relatively quick, with little evidence 
of substantial asymmetries – these results hold 
generally across most euro area countries.
ANALYSIS OF CONSUMER LIQUID FUEL 
PRICE LEVELS
Although liquid fuels are relatively homogeneous 
and tradable goods, the levels of their consumer 
prices appear to differ somewhat across euro 
area economies. Chart 29 reports prices, 
including and excluding taxes, for petrol, diesel 
and heating fuel across the euro area countries 
on average in 2009.57 According to these data, 
consumers in Cyprus, Greece and Spain paid the 
least for one litre of petrol in 2009 (€0.88, €1.00 
and €1.01 respectively). By contrast, Dutch, 
Finnish and German consumers paid the highest 
prices (€1.35, €1.28 and €1.27 respectively). 
Price level differences across countries can arise 
from tax differences as well as from differences 
in costs and margins which, in turn, may be 
related to the degree of market concentration.
By far, the largest part of the discrepancies in 
levels can be attributed to indirect taxes: the 
A possible caveat to using Oil Bulletin data from the European  57 
Commission is that data compilation methods have not been 
uniﬁ   ed. As the discrepancies in pre-tax price levels across 
countries are small (especially in proportion to price volatility), 
this could also be a relevant factor in explaining the differences 
in level observed.
Table 7 Pass-through rates by product and country
(euro cent)

























































































































































































































































































































Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: Figures underlined and in italics denote 50% pass-through reached. Figures underlined denote 90% pass-through reached. Figures 
in parenthesis represent the 99% conﬁ  dence intervals calculated using bootstrap techniques (10,000 iterations). Results on pass-through 
for the latest members of the euro area (Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia) were not estimated as data are only available from 2005.61
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unweighted standard deviation of consumer 
prices excluding taxes was €0.03 in 2009, 
compared with a standard deviation of €0.13 
including taxes.58 An interesting feature of euro 
area prices across countries is that, despite VAT 
rates of around 20% on average levied on the 
pre-tax price plus excise, there is no correlation 
between prices including and excluding taxes. 
An additional feature of cross-country price 
differences is their relative stability in that the 
ranking of price levels has varied little since the 
mid-1990s. The lack of correlation is attributable 
to the fact that countries with lower pre-tax 
prices have higher indirect taxes (both VAT and 
excise). Rietveld and Van Woudenberg (2005), 
for example, ﬁ  nd the pattern that small countries 
tend to be more aggressive with indirect taxes. 
However, they do not address other sources of 
differences in pre-tax prices.
The literature on energy markets mentions a 
number of factors that shape the costs of 
companies operating in liquid fuel markets. 
Differences among these could therefore lead to 
price differentials.59 Costs can be expected to 
lower with: (i) the size and density of the market, 
(ii) the availability of a pipeline infrastructure 
for transporting oil as the marginal cost of 
transporting liquid fuels by pipeline is much 
lower than by road, rail or water, (iii) the country 
reﬁ  ning capacity and (iv) the efﬁ  ciency of the 
distribution sector (measured either in terms of 
turnover per station, or use of self-service vs. 
manned pumps and the prevalence of 
cross-selling other non-petroleum products). In 
turn, costs tend to increase with: (i) the distance 
from Rotterdam, the most important port for the 
shipping of crude and reﬁ  ned petroleum products 
and (ii) the level of income or the general price 
level as ﬁ  nal liquid fuel prices also incorporate 
costs of non-tradable services, such as rents or 
labour costs. 
See also Arpa et al. 2006 for an overview of cross-country  58 
price differences. It should be noted that the differences across 
country averages may be much lower than differences within 
countries. For example, in a study of Irish transport fuel prices, 
the National Consumer Agency (2008) found differences of up 
to 15 cent per litre between the maximum and minimum prices 
of petrol and diesel.
See, for example, the Australian Competition and Consumer  59 
Commission – ACCC 2007, Bello and Cavero 2008, 
Contín-Pilart et al. 2001, Nomisma Energy 2007, and Van 
Meerbeeck 2003. Bello and Cavero (2008) consider a number 
of these indicators in their detailed study of the Spanish gasoline 
market. More speciﬁ  cally,  they  ﬁ  nd  signiﬁ  cant  relationships 
between prices and market power, station density, distance from 
reﬁ  neries, income levels and the degree of cross-selling.
Chart 29 Cross-country comparison of liquid 

















































































Sources: European Commission (DG-TREN) and Eurosystem 
staff calculations.62
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Margins depend on the level of competition, 
price regulation and scale effects. As already 
mentioned (see Section 1.3.2) understanding 
effective competition in the liquid fuel market 
is complicated by the fact that, although there 
is a very large number of individual stations, 
there is a relatively small number of large-scale 
retailer chains, who tend to be vertically 
integrated. On this point, some of the indicators 
mentioned before capture how competition 
impacts on price levels, such as: (i) the degree 
of market concentration, as measured by the 
market share of the three largest companies 
and (ii) competition from supermarkets 
Chart 30 Bivariate charts of petrol prices (excluding taxes) with various indicators
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which can rely either on scale economies or 
loss-leading on a “known-value item”, such as 
petrol, to attract customers. In addition, other 
elements capturing competition and economies 
of scale effects include: (i) whether fuel tourism 
is an issue, (ii) density either in terms of petrol 
stations per capita or population density and 
(iii) the intensity of car use, which could 
increase price monitoring efforts.
Euro area markets are extremely heterogeneous 
in terms of market characteristics, not only with 
regard to competition structures as shown in 
Section 1.3.2, but also cost factors and 
economies of scale. Table A11 presents some 
of these structural indicators. Countries 
characterised by relatively low pre-tax petrol 
prices, such as Germany and France, have a 
higher percentage of self-service stations, fewer 
service stations per capita (and consequently a 
higher sales volume per petrol station), a high 
number of reﬁ  neries, and either a high degree of 
cross-selling (as in Germany) or heavy 
competition from supermarkets (as in France). 
Countries where pre-tax prices are relatively 
high, such as Italy  60 and Greece, show a much 
more fragmented distribution sector (with a 
consequently lower sales volume per petrol 
station), as well as a percentage of self-service 
stations and a degree of cross-selling well below 
the average.
An illustration of the relationship between 
structural indicators and liquid fuel prices is 
provided by bivariate charts (see Charts A9 – A11 
in Annex 1 for an overview). The limited number 
of observations (a maximum of sixteen) does 
not allow for more precise methods although 
the link between market structure and prices is 
obviously complex and multi-dimensional. Many 
of these relationships have the expected sign for 
indicators of efﬁ  ciency (such as sales per petrol 
station or the number of petrol stations per capita) 
and competition from supermarkets, as well as 
for indicators of self-service pumps and cross-
selling, for which the link seems to be fairly strong. 
The distance from Rotterdam also has a strong 
and positive relationship with liquid fuel prices 
(see Chart 30). Thus, although differences in 
pre-tax transport fuel prices across the euro area 
are relatively small, they do appear to be linked 
to some degree to structural features of individual 
country markets. The results for petrol and diesel 
prices are broadly similar. Those for heating 
fuel are quite distinct. However, this market is 
substantially different in nature from the transport 
fuel market.
Nomisma (2007) analyses Italian liquid fuel prices, which  60 
have tended to be above the EU average, and ascribes this to 
a combination of factors including the high degree of manned 
petrol stations, relatively limited cross-selling of non-fuel 
products, road density and limited competition, in particular 
from supermarket retailers.
Box 5
MICRO EVIDENCE ON TRANSPORT FUEL PRICES IN FRANCE
Here we consider detailed micro data on transport fuel prices in France, using a unique dataset 
comprising 8.5 million daily individual price quotes from 1 January 2007 to 31 May 2009 drawn 
from over 10,000 retail stations.1 To assess the degree of price rigidity, some basic indicators are 
calculated, such as the duration of prices and the frequency of price changes. Each day around 
20% of gasoline prices are modiﬁ  ed (19.2% for diesel and 17.9% for petrol) with implied average 
price durations ranging from ﬁ  ve to six days. Chart A plots the price duration distributions for 
diesel and petrol. About one-ﬁ  fth of prices last exactly one day, with less than 20% of prices 
lasting more than one week. Price duration distributions are very similar for petrol and diesel. 
Chart B shows the hazard rate of diesel and petrol prices (i.e. the proportion of prices which are 
1  The dataset consists of individual prices collected by the French Ministry of the Economy, Industry and Employment in petrol stations 
selling more than 500 m3 of gasoline per year (see Gautier and Le Saout 2009).64
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3.2.2 CONSUMER NON-OIL ENERGY PRICES
Non-oil energy prices enter the HICP in four 
sub-components – electricity, gas, heat energy 
and solid fuels.61 These items are used primarily 
for home heating and other domestic purposes 
such as cooking and appliances. Gas and solid 
fuels are generally consumed in their primary 
state without secondary production, whereas 
electricity and heat energy are usually derived 
from a primary source of energy which is then 
transformed. 
Non-oil energy prices accounted for 4.8% 
of the overall HICP in the euro area in 2009 
(see Table 8). However, the range across 
euro area countries is quite large, from 1.5% 
in Greece to 13.9% in Slovakia (see Table A7 
Heat energy is mainly hot water and steam purchased from  61 
district heating plants, but also includes associated expenditure 
such as the hire of meters, reading of meters, standing charges,   
as well as ice used for cooling and refrigeration purposes. Solid 
fuels include coal, coke, briquettes, ﬁ  rewood, charcoal and peat.
modiﬁ  ed against those which have not been changed for X days). Peaks at seven, 14 and 21 days 
reveal strong, time-dependent patterns in gasoline price re-settings. 
Price durations display some heterogeneity along three dimensions. First, price durations are 
shorter in stations where prices are low (on average every ﬁ  ve days) and longer in stations where 
prices are higher than the median price (on average every six days).2 Second, price durations 
were much shorter during the sharp decrease in oil prices (end-2008): on average around 4.5 days 
between July and December 2008 compared with 5.5 days outside this period. Third, prices are 
more likely to be modiﬁ  ed on a Friday (around 21% of all price changes) and Tuesday (19% of 
all price changes) and are less likely to be changed during the weekend (12.5% on Saturdays and 
less than 1% on Sundays). Lastly, there is some evidence that the probability of price changes 
increases the further away the actual prices are from their reference prices (generally reﬁ  ned 
products sold in Rotterdam).
Overall, the results from these French micro data are consistent with and complement the more 
aggregated, but cross-country, data presented earlier – in particular the ﬁ  ndings on the high 
frequency of price changes, the lack of substantial asymmetry, and the competitive impact of 
independent (supermarket) retailers.
2  This may reﬂ  ect some differences in the number of opening days per week.
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in Annex 1). Electricity and gas are by far the 
most important components, with average 
weights of 2.3% and 1.8% respectively. The 
average euro area weights of heat energy 
and solid fuels are much lower at 0.6% and 
0.1% respectively. 
Like liquid fuel prices, non-oil energy prices 
have also risen by more than the overall average 
inﬂ   ation rate over the period 1996 2009 – 
by 3.5% vs. 2.0%. Gas and heat energy 
prices experienced the strongest increases 
at 5.5% and 5.8% respectively, whereas 
electricity prices have risen on average by the 
same amount as the HICP excluding energy 
(i.e. 1.8% per annum). The cross-country range 
of average price increases was much larger for 
non-oil energy than for liquid fuel prices. By far 
the strongest average annual rate of increase was 
in Slovakia, at 16.5%, with the lowest average 
increase recorded in France at 1.7% – see Table 
A8 in Annex 1. The relatively low average rate 
of increase in France primarily reﬂ  ects relatively 
subdued electricity prices. 
Relative to liquid fuel prices, non-oil energy 
prices tend to be much less volatile and change 
less frequently. The average standard deviation 
of month-on-month changes in non-oil energy 
prices, at 0.7 percentage point, was substantially 
lower than for liquid fuels (2.7 percentage 
points). Electricity prices change, on average, 
every four months, against an average of one 
and a half months for gas prices.
ANALYSIS OF PASS-THROUGH INTO CONSUMER 
GAS AND ELECTRICITY PRICES  62
A key and well-known feature of natural gas 
prices is their strong co-movement with crude oil 
prices (see, for example, Brown and Yücel 2009 
and 2007, Bachmeier and Grifﬁ   n 2006 and 
Villar and Joutz 2006). This mainly reﬂ  ects: 
(i) the substitutability of, and competition 
between, gas and oil for certain purposes such 
as electricity generation and (ii) institutional 
arrangements whereby many long-term gas 
supply contracts are explicitly linked to oil 
prices.63 The latter is a crucial determinant of 
co-movements in gas prices since gas, being less 
storable and shippable than oil, is still transmitted 
by pipeline.  64 Thus, in the absence of explicit 
indexing on oil prices, regional supply and 
demand developments will have more impact on 
gas price movements. Chart 31 shows the 
evolution of crude oil prices and border prices 
The analysis is based on Eurostat price level data. A detailed  62 
discussion of this data source is presented in Annex 2.5.
For an economic analysis of the oil price indexing of natural gas  63 
see, for example, Bartholomae and Morasch 2007.
The emergence of liqueﬁ  ed natural gas may diminish somewhat  64 
the regional nature of gas markets. However, the costs of 
transport mean that regional markets may remain rather 
fragmented, particularly in comparison with liquid fuel markets. 
See Neumann 2009 for a discussion on the impact of LNG on 
the linking of natural gas markets.
Table 8 HICP non-oil energy components, weight, inflation and volatility
Weight
(2009)
Year-on-year rate of change 
(1996-2009)
Standard deviation; month on 
month; non-seasonally adjusted
euro 
area Min. Med. Max.
euro 
area Min. Med. Max.
euro 
area Min. Med. Max.
HICP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 2.0 1.5 2.5 6.0 0.3 0.3 0.5 1.4
HICP excl. energy 90.4 83.7 89.7 93.5 1.8 1.2 2.3 4.8 0.3 0.2 0.5 1.4
Energy 9.6 6.5 10.3 16.3 3.9 3.1 4.6 13.8 1.5 1.2 2.0 3.7
Oil 4.7 2.4 4.8 8.5 4.6 3.2 4.8 7.2 2.7 2.0 3.1 3.8
Non-oil 4.8 1.5 3.9 13.9 3.5 1.7 3.8 16.5 0.7 0.7 1.1 4.6
Gas 1.8 0.0 1.2 4.1 5.5 4.1 6.1 18.1 1.3 0.8 2.4 6.6
Electricity 2.3 1.2 2.2 4.5 1.8 -0.3 2.6 16.5 0.6 0.4 1.3 6.0
Heat energy  0.6 0.0 0.0 4.9 5.8 2.3 5.8 15.9 0.9 0.6 1.7 7.8
Solid fuels  0.1 0.0 0.1 1.0 2.5 0.5 2.4 8.9 0.5 0.3 1.0 5.1
Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: For detailed country data see Tables A7-A10 in Annex 1. Euro area denotes the euro area average; min. denotes the minimum, 
med. the median and max. the maximum across the euro area countries.66
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for gas (i.e. mainly cross-border pipeline prices, 
but also LNG), highlighting this strong co-
movement as well as the slight lag in gas prices. 
Consumer gas prices tend to lag both crude oil 
prices and gas border prices somewhat. For 
the euro area as a whole, the peak correlation 
between consumer gas prices and crude oil prices 
is at a lag of eight months in level (0.97) and 
year-on-year (0.79) terms and six months in 
terms of month-on-month changes (0.35). 
The peak correlation between consumer gas 
prices and gas border prices is at three months in 
level (0.95), year-on-year (0.88) and month-on-
month (0.69) terms. This correlation structure 
is broadly shared across euro area countries. 
The gap between the border and the pre-tax 
consumer price (called the mark-up below) 
reﬂ  ects  the  costs of processing, transmitting, 
storing and distributing gas to consumers, as 
well as the margins of the various operators 
along the gas chain. 
Chart 32 shows that movements in consumer 
gas prices mainly reﬂ   ect developments in 
border gas prices. Overall, the “mark-up” has 
remained relatively stable, at around €5/GJ, 
over the period since 1995. This suggests that 
movements in gas border prices are passed 
through fully into consumer prices, albeit with 
some lag, and that as international gas prices 
have increased, the share of consumer prices 
accounted for by raw inputs has also increased. 
One implication of this is that as the price 
level increases, the percentage pass-through 
(i.e. elasticity) increases, although the absolute 
pass-through remains the same (i.e. complete). 
The role of national arrangements in contracts 
and the role of spot markets become more 
apparent in these results when comparing gas 
prices in all the main gas markets (euro area, 
Japan and the United States). Although they all 
co-move with oil prices, euro area and Japanese 
gas prices appear much smoother and more 
formally linked to oil prices. Prices in the United 
States, besides being more volatile, also tend to 
lead slightly those in the euro area. A key difference 
between US markets on the one hand, and euro 
area markets on the other, is the extent to which 
Chart 31 Crude oil prices and euro area 
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Sources: Datastream, Haver Analytics, Gas International Weekly 
and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Note: Based on border prices for Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
France, Italy and the Netherlands.
Chart 32 Euro area consumer gas price 
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prices are determined by long-term contracts 
with explicit indexation on oil prices 65 or in spot 
markets where they are determined by local 
supply and demand conditions. Spot markets 
play a key function in the United States but still 
play a small role in the euro area, though this is 
growing rapidly relative to contracted gas.66 
Chart 33, using data from 2001 onwards, shows 
that the co-movement of spot market prices in 
the euro area and in the United States is very 
strong  67 so that if the weight of long-term 
contracts in the euro area market was to diminish 
over time, regional gas price dynamics could 
become much more synchronised. However, 
transport costs may mean that gas markets remain 
regional, at least to some extent.
Turning to electricity prices, the reaction of 
consumer prices to energy commodity price 
changes is much less clear. However, there 
are notable differences between wholesale 
and consumer electricity price developments. 
Chart 34 shows that there is a considerable 
degree of co-movement between crude oil 
and exchange-based (spot and one-year-ahead 
futures)  wholesale electricity prices. This co-
movement stems from the co-movement of gas 
and oil prices and the key role of gas power 
plants as the “swing” or marginal generator. 
Notwithstanding the link between crude oil and 
exchange-based wholesale electricity prices, 
Japanese gas prices (generally LNG) are also linked by formula  65 
to oil prices, but the formula is generally non-linear (the 
so-called “S-curve”). This may help explain why Japanese gas 
import prices, which were historically higher than euro area and 
US prices as Japan imported LNG, have not risen by as much 
in recent years.
Contracted border prices tend to be smoother than spot market  66 
prices. On the other hand, although spot prices were more 
volatile over the period 2001-09, they were also somewhat lower 
on average by approximately USD 1/MMBtu. There have been 
various arguments put forward in favour and against longer-term 
contracting and indexing of natural gas prices. Those in favour 
argue that given the large capital costs involved in building gas 
infrastructure, longer-term contracts help reduce uncertainty. On 
the other hand, those against argue that indexing on oil prices 
dulls the signal coming from relative supply and demand in gas 
markets. Ultimately, both sets of prices should broadly co-move. 
However, this co-movement may vary over time reﬂ  ecting 
market-speciﬁ  c factors in both oil and gas markets (for a more 
detailed discussion, see for example, IEA 2009, Onour 2009 or 
Hartley et al. 2007).
The chart shows gas prices at the Zeebrugge Hub (Belgium).  67 
The picture remains the same for the Title Transfer Facility 
(TTF, the Netherlands) and the National Balancing Point (NBP, 
the United Kingdom) hubs.
Chart 33 International gas prices
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Chart 34 Crude oil and electricity exchange 
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the link between electricity and oil prices at the 
consumer level is very weak – see Chart 35. 
This is owing to a variety of factors including 
taxes, different fuel mixes, and network costs 
but may also in part reﬂ  ect price regulation.
When consumer electricity prices are 
administered in nature, revisions in regulated 
tariffs usually take place after a set interval of 
either a quarter or one year, and the pass-through 
of commodity price shocks will naturally be 
protracted and cumulated. Regulation may also 
place a limit on the price changes granted which 
is likely to be much lower than the increase in 
input prices. Overall this suggests that proﬁ  t 
margins in some countries buffer, at least in 
the short run, changes in commodity prices. 
The high volatility of energy commodity prices 
and the problem of disentangling transitory and 
persistent price shocks may also help explain 
the long lags observed.
Following liberalisation there appear to have 
been changes in pricing behaviour, at least in 
some countries, with a move away from 
infrequent adjustments towards more frequent 
ones while the importance of traditional 
long-term contracts declines.68 However, higher 
and more volatile energy prices in the recent 
period might also have played a role. With the 
opening of electricity exchanges throughout the 
euro area in the wake of liberalisation, market-
based instruments to procure electricity are 
beginning to replace traditional (long-term) 
bilateral contracts. Some Member States report 
a correlation between spot or future and 
consumer prices, although the impact is hard to 
quantify as trading on electricity exchanges is 
still in its infancy and generally makes up only a 
small proportion of a country’s total electricity 
consumption.69 However, with the trading 
volume fast increasing, the impact will probably 
become stronger and more discernable.70
ANALYSIS OF CONSUMER GAS AND ELECTRICITY 
PRICE LEVELS
Consumer gas price levels differ markedly across 
countries and, with the exception of Slovakia, 
are generally higher than in the United Kingdom, 
a country often taken as a benchmark because 
of its early liberalised and well-developed 
gas market (see Chart 36). Despite tentative 
evidence of price convergence, signalled by a 
decline in price dispersion between 2001 and 
2006, price differentials were still relatively high 
in 2009, resulting in a coefﬁ  cient of variation of 
between 12% and 16% in 2009. Considering 
electricity prices for households across the euro 
Monthly HICP data on electricity from January 1995 to  68 
July 2009 for Austria and Germany show that the frequency 
of non-zero price changes per year is two-thirds higher after 
deregulation than before.
According to NCB information: in Belgium some suppliers use  69 
spot electricity market prices to adjust their prices (see Nationale 
Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique 2008); for 
Germany and the Netherlands there is tentative evidence that 
future electricity market prices are a good predictor of consumer 
prices; in Finland an asymmetric pass-through of electricity 
market prices into consumer ones is observed, with increasing 
prices having a stronger impact than decreasing ones. 
Fuel prices have been identiﬁ  ed as an important factor amongst  70 
others inﬂ  uencing prices on electricity exchanges. Bosco et al. 
(2007)  ﬁ   nd evidence of long-term dynamics between prices 
on a number of euro area electricity exchanges and gas prices. 
Zachmann and von Hirschhausen (2008) conﬁ  rm this ﬁ  nding 
and also identify the prices of CO2 certiﬁ  cates as a determining 
factor of future prices. The “Quarterly Report on European 
Electricity Markets” by the European Commission (2008-
2009) reports that industrial and household demand, capacity 
constraints and weather conditions also play a role.
Chart 35 Crude oil and consumer electricity 
prices
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area, price dispersion is even larger than for gas 
(see Chart 37) and does not show clear signs of 
convergence.71
The considerable cross-country heterogeneity in 
consumer gas and electricity prices, especially 
in comparison with liquid fuel prices, can again 
be explained by three main factors: (i) taxes, 
(ii) costs and (iii) competition and margins.72 
Considering the differences in consumer gas 
price levels across countries, it is clear from 
Charts 38 and 39 that taxes and levies play 
an important role in both gas and electricity 
prices – as substantial and positive correlations 
are evident. However, taxes and levies still play 
a more predominant role in liquid fuel prices.
Gas and electricity are industries for which a 
substantial portion of costs derive from the 
construction and maintenance of networks to 
deliver the end product to consumers.73 In the 
second half of 2008, in the euro area, energy and 
supply costs accounted for around 45% of the 
consumer electricity price  74, and, of those costs, 
“network” costs represented around 25%. On the 
other hand, taxes and levies accounted for around 
35%. In terms of prices excluding taxes and 
levies, the ratio of energy and supply costs to 
network costs was around two-thirds (63%) to 
one-third (37%).75 These differences may stem 
from structural factors such as population density 
and the investment required for maintaining and 
upgrading the network. Alternatively, given that 
some of these network activities are natural 
monopolies, they could represent rent extraction. 
The link between network costs and price 
differentials seems, however, to be weaker for 
For more formal tests of convergence in European gas and  71 
electricity prices, see Robinson (2007a, b).
These factors may not be independent. For example, Brunekreeft  72 
and Keller (2000) report that vertically integrated ﬁ  rms 
concentrate on excessive network access charges.
The “energy and supply” price includes the costs and margins of  73 
generation and of trade and customer services. “Network” costs 
include transmission and distribution tariffs, distribution losses, 
system operation, ancillary services costs and meter rental. 
Taxes include VAT but also other levies such as environmental 
taxes. For a breakdown across the euro area, see Table A13 in 
Annex 1.
This ﬁ  gure is likely to overstate the portion accounted for by  74 
fuel costs as data from France are not available. Given the large 
share of nuclear power in that country, fuel costs are likely to 
be substantially lower, as is suggested by the low selling price 
(€12.3/100kWh).
Correspondingly, typical two-tier consumer tariffs differentiate  75 
between a ﬁ   xed basic fee and rates for volumes consumed. 
They are also reﬂ  ected in the HICP.
Chart 36 Euro area gas prices for medium-sized households
(euro/GJ)
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gas than for electricity. Charts 40 and 41 show 
the relationship between consumer prices 
excluding taxes and network charges/costs for 
gas and electricity respectively. Generally, the 
network access tariffs/costs are lower for gas 
than for electricity. No clear relationship is 
evident concerning gas prices, although there 
appears to be a clearer positive relationship in 
the case of electricity, with Italy and Malta as 
outliers.76
An additional element as regards electricity is 
that it may be generated using a wide range of 
inputs.77 The decomposition of euro area 
electricity generation by fuel type (Chart 42) was 
discussed in Chapter 1. One key feature was the 
heterogeneity in the fuel mix used to generate 
electricity. In particular, some countries were 
There is some evidence that network access tariffs/costs are  76 
affected to some extent by scale effects, as there is a negative 
relationship between network access tariffs on the one hand, and 
market size and population density on the other.
ICF International (2007) provides an overview of electricity  77 
price drivers. Although its report is structured along the lines of 
demand, supply and other factors, the main issues covered are 
the same: fuel input mix, the load duration curve and marginal 
vs. average pricing, transmission and distribution, competition, 
as well as environmental and more general regulations. 
See also KEMA Consulting 2005 for an overview of European 
electricity prices.
Chart 37 Euro area electricity prices for medium-sized households
(euro/kWh)
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Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: Post-2007 prices are computed as average prices for the period January to June (semester 1) or July to December (semester 2). 
The euro area is weighted according to 2009 HICP countries and item weights.
1) Average of the ﬁ  rst and second semesters of 2008.
Chart 38 Consumer gas prices (including 
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more reliant than others on fossil fuels to produce 
electricity. As prices of fossil fuels have risen 
sharply over the last decade, these countries may 
have experienced above average increases in 
costs – especially as, in the short run, it is not 
easy to substitute different fuel types. Chart 43, 
which shows the relationship between consumer 
electricity prices excluding taxes and the share 
of electricity generated using natural gas or oil, 
provides some evidence for this hypothesis.       
However, it should be noted that this relationship 
may not always hold true. Indeed, around the 
late 1990s, gas and oil may have been relatively 
cheap to use compared with other fuel types. 
Indeed the results of the econometric panel 
analysis of electricity prices below and in 
Annex 2.6 suggest this.
Turning to the impact of competition and 
deregulation on price level differences, it should 
be recalled that both gas and electricity markets 
in Europe have undergone a sustained process 
of deregulation dating back to the mid-1990s. 
However, much of this period was also 
characterised by high and volatile energy 
prices. Therefore, disentangling the impact of 
competition and deregulation is challenging. 
Nonetheless, in the empirical literature there is 
some evidence in support of a largely beneﬁ  cial 
impact from deregulation. Martin et al. (2005) 
provide an overview of earlier studies supporting 
the downward impact of liberalisation, in 
particular third-party-access and unbundling, 
on prices in the electricity and gas sector. Their 
own estimates suggest that a reduction in public 
ownership leads to lower electricity and gas 
prices. Polo and Scarpa (2003) also ﬁ  nd a negative 
association between electricity price levels 
Chart 39 Consumer electricity prices 































y-axis: electricity prices including taxes (2008H2)
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x-axis: taxes/levies
Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Chart 40 Consumer gas prices (excluding 


























y-axis: gas prices excluding taxes (2008H2)
x-axis: network costs
Sources: DG-TREN, Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations
Chart 41 Consumer electricity prices 































y-axis: electricity prices excluding taxes (2008H2)
x-axis: network costs
Sources: DG-TREN, Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.72
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and liberalisation policies: according to their 
estimates liberalisation would reduce electricity 
prices by 10%. Copenhagen Economics (2007) 
estimates that in EU15 networks liberalisation 
stimulated a 3% growth in electricity and gas 
output, with a drop in electricity prices and a 
slight increase in gas prices. Finn Roar et al. 
(2008) measure the effect of removing barriers 
to competition in gas and electricity in western 
European markets using a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model, and ﬁ  nd  beneﬁ  cial 
effects for the electricity market. 
Chart 42 Decomposition of euro area 




















Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Chart 43 Consumer electricity prices (excluding 
taxes/levies) 2008H2 (euro cent/kWh) and share 
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Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Chart 44 OECD regulation/competition aggregate indicator: contribution to price levels
(percentage of price level net of taxes)
1998/1999
2006/2007
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Sources: OECD and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Note: Results are based on panel estimations across the euro area countries. The OECD regulation/competition aggregate indicator 
for the electricity market includes three indicators, namely an indicator for entry barriers, an indicator for public ownership and 
an indicator for vertical integration. The OECD regulation/competition aggregate indicator for the gas market includes four indicators, 
namely an indicator for entry barriers, an indicator for public ownership, an indicator for vertical integration and an indicator for C1.73
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To conﬁ  rm and update these ﬁ  ndings, a panel 
model of (pre-tax) electricity and gas prices on 
the OECD regulation/competition indicators 
(covering barriers to entry, the degree of vertical 
integration and public ownership in both sectors, 
and market structure in the gas market, as 
mentioned in Section 1.3.2) was estimated.78 
The empirical ﬁ   ndings further conﬁ  rm  that 
barriers to entry in the electricity and gas sectors, 
as well as vertical integration in the electricity 
sector and public or concentrated ownership in 
the gas sector are associated with higher price 
levels. For the sample of countries, contrary to 
other studies, vertical integration in the gas 
sector is found to have a negative impact on 
prices. According to these estimates, the impact 
of regulation on prices seemed to be more 
diverse for electricity than for gas in the early 
1990s before liberalisation took place 
(see Chart 44). For the euro area aggregate they 
would account for 10% of the electricity price 
level, but the estimated contribution is 
substantially higher in some countries for which 
institutional indicators are available. In addition, 
liberalisation has made a substantial contribution 
to lower price levels. For both sectors, the euro 
area average contribution of regulation to the 
price level in recent years is less than one-third 
of the contribution in the early 1990s. 
3.2.3 SUMMARY OF THE DIRECT FIRST-ROUND 
EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN OIL PRICES 
ON HICP ENERGY
Table 9 summarises the results of the ﬁ  ndings on 
the direct pass-through of crude oil prices into 
consumer energy prices. The highest elasticity 
is for heating fuel owing to the relatively low 
share of taxes in ﬁ  nal consumer prices. The level 
of excise taxes impacts on the elasticity – i.e. 
the percentage response to a given percentage 
change in crude oil prices – of consumer oil 
prices. Other things being equal, a higher level 
of excise taxes increases the level of consumer 
energy prices, but dampens their elasticity 
and vice versa. The elasticities for petrol and 
diesel are broadly similar – although slightly 
lower for the former owing to somewhat higher 
excise taxes on petrol compared with diesel on 
average. The elasticity of natural gas (and heat 
energy, which generally co-moves with natural 
gas) lies between that of transport and heating 
liquid fuels. 
In each case, owing to the, on average, relatively 
constant reﬁ   ning and distribution costs and 
margins, the elasticity is a function of the crude 
oil price level. The elasticity of overall HICP 
energy doubles from around 15% when crude 
oil prices are €20 per barrel to around 30% 
when crude oil prices rise to €50 per barrel. 
If crude oil prices were to reach a level of €100 
per barrel, under the assumptions of broadly 
constant reﬁ   ning and distribution costs and 
margins and excise taxes, the elasticity would 
be slightly over 40%.
For a more detailed technical discussion and presentation of the  78 
results, see Annex 2.6.
Table 9 Crude oil price pass-through into HICP energy components













20 16% 15% 19% 39% 24%
50 30% 31% 37% 62% 44%
100 42% 47% 54% 76% 61%
Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: Based on taxes (VAT, excise and other) as at 19 October 2009 and median reﬁ  ning and distribution costs and margins since 1999. 
Assumes HICP heat energy (0.6% weight) co-moves with natural gas. 
1) Weighted average probably slightly underestimates extent of elasticity as it assumes zero pass-through for electricity and 
solid fuels.
2) Denotes weight in overall HICP.74
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3.3  INDIRECT EFFECTS VIA THE PRODUCTION 
CHAIN
The indirect effects of energy prices through the 
production chain originate from the change in 
the production cost of a consumption good or 
service that uses energy in its own production 
process. This use could be either direct or via 
other intermediate goods or services that are 
used as inputs, as well as distribution costs, and 
indirectly capture the effect of changes in energy 
prices. Indirect price effects arise when ﬁ  rms 
pass changes in energy costs on to their selling 
prices in order to maintain or restore their proﬁ  t 
margin, resulting eventually in rising non-energy 
consumer prices. The degree to which costs 
are passed on to subsequent price stages is 
affected by factors such as the business cycle 
situation and the competitive pressures in the 
respective market. As the transmission of a 
cost increase on prices along the supply chain 
is not immediate, the indirect impact of an oil 
price shock on consumer prices is delayed more 
and takes longer compared with the direct 
effect. As indirect effects can appear along the 
whole production chain from import to ﬁ  nal 
demand prices, it is necessary to disentangle the 
impact on both producer prices and non-energy 
consumer prices, taking account of the different 
degrees of energy input into production. 
A particular caveat to the analysis of indirect 
effects is that it is rather difﬁ  cult to distinguish 
them empirically from second-round effects, as 
an adjustment in non-energy consumer prices 
following an energy shock can either stem from 
pass-through (cost) effects or the reaction of 
wages, proﬁ  t margins and inﬂ  ation expectations 
to the ﬁ  rst-round effects of the shock. A number 
of factors, in particular labour market features 
and wage-setting institutions, can facilitate the 
appearance of second-round effects. However, 
as these are generally not a function of energy 
markets themselves, these institutional details 
are not discussed in this report. For an extensive 
analysis of wage and price-setting features that 
could facilitate the emergence of second-round 
effects in response to energy price movements, 
see the work of the Eurosystem Inﬂ  ation 
Persistence and Wage Dynamics Networks.79
3.3.1 AN ANALYSIS BASED ON INPUT-OUTPUT 
TABLES
The main advantage of using input-output 
tables is that they provide a reﬁ  ned  sector 
decomposition of the production process, based 
upon the interrelationships between the different 
branches of activity in the economy via the cross 
consumption of intermediate inputs. This allows 
the sectors likely to be impacted most by indirect 
effects to be pinpointed more precisely. However 
IOT should be used with some caution as they are 
based on a static structure. In particular, as prices 
rise, users of energy are assumed not to substitute 
away from more expensive products. In addition, 
this approach does not allow an assessment of 
second-round effects – proﬁ  t margins and wages 
are assumed to remain constant – and they do not 
take into account any possible monetary policy 
reaction to shocks.80 
The results of the Inﬂ  ation Persistence Network are summarised  79 
in Altissimo et al. 2006. Studies produced by the Wage 
Dynamics Network are available on the ECB’s website at 
www.ecb.europa.eu.
For a detailed overview of the methodology, see Annex 2.7. 80 
Table 10 Impact of a 10% increase in energy prices on producer prices: direct and indirect 
impact
(2005)
DE IE GR ES FR IT NL AT PT SI SK FI euro area
Direct 0.17 0.13 0.27 0.20 0.16 0.19 0.38 0.22 0.25 0.21 0.42 0.22 0.20
Indirect 0.15 0.12 0.21 0.24 0.14 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.28 0.16 0.36 0.21 0.20
Total 0.33 0.25 0.47 0.44 0.30 0.40 0.79 0.42 0.52 0.36 0.78 0.43 0.39
Share of energy in 
production 3.3 2.5 5.0 4.5 3.5 4.2 6.3 5.1 6.0 3.2 10.1 4.5
Source: Eurosystem staff calculations based on IOT 2005.
Note: Results for the euro area are computed as the weighted average of country results.75
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Considering ﬁ  rst the impact on producer prices, 
for the euro area in aggregate the IOTs suggest 
that the overall impact of a 10% energy price 
increase on producer prices would amount to 
0.39% in 2005 (see Table 10). The direct and 
indirect effects each contribute half to the overall 
development. The direct effect emerges through 
the immediate energy use, while the indirect 
effect through the consumption of other products 
which use energy as an intermediate input. They 
reﬂ  ect the immediate and intermediate impact on 
producer prices and cannot be equated with the 
overall direct and indirect effects on consumer 
prices discussed in other sections. Among 
the 12 countries where data are available, the 
lowest overall impacts are recorded by Ireland 
(0.25%), France (0.30%), Germany (0.33%) and 
Slovenia (0.36%), while the largest impacts are 
obtained in Portugal (0.52%), Slovakia (0.78%) 
and the Netherlands (0.79%). In almost all 
cases, the direct and indirect impacts contribute 
approximately one-half to the overall impact, 
except in Greece and Slovenia where the direct 
impact exceeds somewhat the indirect one.
Turning to differences across branches of 
activity, unsurprisingly the branch the most 
impacted is the energy sector itself, facing a 
cost increase of 4.9% following a 10% rise in 
energy prices in the euro area (see Table 11). 
Looking at broad non-energy sectors, the 
largest increase in costs after that of the energy 
prices increase is recorded by agriculture and 
ﬁ  shing (0.35%), followed by the manufacturing 
industry (0.29%), construction (0.20%) and 
services (0.16%). However, large differences 
are found within these broad sectors: within 
the manufacturing industry, the cost increase 
appears to be especially high in the chemicals 
(0.7%) and basic metal industries (0.59%). On 
the other hand, the impact is found to be very 
limited (lower than 0.15%) in tobacco products, 
wearing apparel and furs, ofﬁ  ce machinery and 
computers, radio, television and communications 
equipment, and medical, precision and technical 
instruments. Within the services sector, the 
transport sub-sector exhibits a much higher 
impact than other services.
Detailed sector results by country help to 
explain the overall relative position of each 
country presented above. In particular, they 
help to disentangle, for each country, the pure 
“energy consumption effect” (stemming from 
a higher energy intensity of some sectors 
of production) from the “structure effect” 
(stemming from the relative specialisation of 
a country in high energy-consuming sectors). 
It indicates, for example, that the lowest 
overall impact in Germany and France is the 
Table 11 Impact of a 10% increase in energy prices on producer prices: breakdown
by main branch of activity
(2005)
DE IE GR ES FR IT NL AT PT SI SK FI euro area
Agriculture and ﬁ  shing  0.36 0.35 0.37 0.29 0.34 0.29 0.53 0.47 0.37 0.63 0.54 0.28 0.35
Manufacturing 0.27 0.11 0.44 0.34 0.21 0.27 0.59 0.35 0.31 0.29 0.44 0.31 0.29
of which:
Chemicals 0.70 0.03 0.36 0.92 0.50 0.38 1.86 1.11 0.91 0.38 1.61 0.80 0.70
Basic metal  0.64 2.59 0.88 0.54 0.29 0.52 0.43 1.43 0.27 0.70 1.29 0.72 0.59
Energy 4.82 4.75 5.26 5.15 4.12 4.90 7.27 4.41 5.20 3.13 4.23 4.95 4.88
Construction 0.18 0.23 0.36 0.18 0.16 0.23 0.17 0.26 0.45 0.44 0.33 0.22 0.20
Services 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.22 0.25 0.38 0.22 0.16
Trade 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.20 0.24 0.18 0.13 0.23 0.20 0.32 0.27 0.19
Transport 0.63 0.54 0.39 0.79 0.46 0.44 0.91 0.62 0.97 1.14 1.21 0.59 0.60
Land transport services  0.47 0.60 1.11 0.90 0.62 0.50 0.85 0.74 1.32 1.54 1.47 0.68 0.64
Water transport services  0.50 0.44 0.16 1.42 0.57 0.29 0.93 0.81 0.61 0.90 1.30 0.60 0.63
Air transport services  2.46 1.06 0.37 1.85 0.67 1.01 2.14 1.22 1.38 1.19 1.40 1.30 1.53
Telecommunications 0.09 0.10 0.17 0.19 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.12
Other services  0.07 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.20 0.15 0.10
Source: Eurosystem staff calculations based on IOT 2005.76
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consequence of the combination of a favourable 
production structure (less oriented towards 
energy-intensive industries) and a relatively 
moderate energy intensity in all branches of 
activity, except agriculture and ﬁ  shing. On the 
other hand, the high impact in the Netherlands is 
explained by a structural effect (specialisation in 
energy and chemicals industries) and by a higher 
energy intensity in agriculture and ﬁ  shing. 
The high impact in Portugal is related to a higher 
energy content in the agriculture and ﬁ  shing, 
construction, and services sectors, as well as by 
a larger than average share of the energy industry 
in the economy (which is however somewhat 
compensated by a lower specialisation in other 
highly energy-intensive sectors).
The overall impact on consumer prices may 
be calculated by taking the results obtained 
for the increase in production cost across 
branches of activity and weighting them by 
the corresponding share in consumption. For 
the euro area in aggregate, IOT suggest that 
a 10% increase in energy prices would feed 
into a 0.36% increase in consumer prices
(see Table 12). Like producer prices, the rise in 
consumer prices before taxes can be split into 
a direct effect through the direct use of energy 
products and an indirect effect through the 
consumption of products which use energy as 
inputs. For the euro area, the contribution of the 
direct consumption of energy products amounts 
to 0.22% while the indirect contribution amounts 
to 0.14%. Thus around 60% of the increase 
in expenditures is attributable to the direct 
consumption of energy products. The dispersion 
of the impact on consumer prices is lower than 
for producer prices, which is consistent with a 
lower heterogeneity in households’ consumption 
pattern than in production structures across euro 
area countries. The impact ranges from 0.32% 
in Spain to 0.63% in Slovakia.
3.3.2 AN ANALYSIS BASED ON SMALL-SCALE 
STRUCTURAL MODELS
Small-scale structural models, such as Structural 
Vector AutoRegression models, provide a 
convenient framework for analysing indirect 
effects as they allow for dynamic and detailed 
interrelations among prices at different stages 
of the production/pricing chain. McCarthy 
(2000) and Hahn (2003) provide an application 
to selected industrialised countries and the euro 
area respectively. In this section, SVARs both 
for the euro area and for the six largest countries 
are estimated and the responses of producer and 
consumer prices to an oil price shock discussed. 
Chart 45 presents the impulse response function, 
cumulated over 12 quarters, to an oil price shock 
(a 10% rise in oil prices) from the SVAR model 
of Hahn (2003), updated over a relatively long 
sample period (1971Q3-2009Q1). The model 
includes oil prices in USD, non-energy 
commodity prices in USD, the three-month 
interest rate, the output gap, the nominal 
effective exchange rate of the euro, the producer 
price index for manufacturing and the 
Table 12 Impact of a 10% increase in energy prices on consumer prices overall, direct 
and indirect impact
(2005)
DE IE GR ES FR IT NL AT PT SI SK FI euro
area
Direct  0.25 0.30 0.20 0.16 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.22 0.45 0.38 0.14 0.22 
Indirect  0.12 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.19 0.17 0.25 0.20 0.14 
Total  0.37 0.44 0.36 0.32 0.34 0.39 0.35 0.42 0.40 0.61 0.63 0.34 0.36 
Share of energy in 
consumption 4.5  3.3 3.0 4.6 4.3 4.1 4.6 3.9 6.1 9.2 2.6 
Source: Eurosystem staff calculations based on IOT 2005.77
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HICP. To capture indirect effects, a second 
model is estimated in which the HICP is replaced 
with the overall index excluding energy.81 
According to these models, the initial impact of 
a 10% increase in oil prices on PPI is about 
0.3%, which rises to a peak effect of around 
0.7% after one year, decreasing 
thereafter. This proﬁ   le may be related to the 
sequential impact of direct effects on producer 
energy prices and indirect effects on producer 
prices more generally.82 The cumulated effect 
after three years is 0.6%, somewhat higher than 
the results for manufacturing from the static IOT 
analysis (but in the latter the manufacturing sector 
excludes energy while the PPI for manufacturing 
covers some part of the energy sector). The effect 
on the HICPX is very small in the ﬁ  rst quarter, 
but rises steadily to about 0.25% after two years 
without further effects thereafter. 
Overall oil price shocks affect headline HICP 
gradually leading to an increase in the HICP of 
0.07% in the ﬁ  rst quarter, of a cumulated 0.3% 
after one year and of 0.45% after three years. 
This overall impact is broadly similar to the 
results from the IOT analysis. 
It has been suggested that the pass-through of 
oil prices to producer and consumer prices 
has declined over time (see, for example, 
Hooker 2002 and Blanchard and Gali 2007). 
Empirical evidence indicates that, among other 
factors, monetary policy regimes oriented to 
the maintenance of price stability contribute 
to creating a more stable macroeconomic 
environment (Benati and Surico 2009; Blanchard 
and Riggi 2009). To check whether the oil price 
pass-through has also declined in the euro 
area over time, the SVAR is re-estimated over 
a rolling window and impulse responses are 
averaged over two sub-periods. The former 
includes the 1970s and excludes the most 
recent ten years, and the latter includes the most 
recent decade but excludes data prior to 1980. 
Results are shown in Table 13. Comparing 
the results of the ﬁ   rst and second sample, 
there is clear evidence that oil price changes 
have, to some extent, lost their power to affect 
inﬂ  ation in the euro area since the early 1980s. 
The pass-through to PPI and to non-energy 
items in the HICP basket has weakened by 
around one-third across the two sub-samples. 
The response of overall HICP has halved.83
Taking into account data properties, all variables are included  81 
as log ﬁ  rst differences apart from the short-term interest rate 
and the output gap which are used in levels. The output gap 
is constructed by applying the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁ  lter to real 
GDP data. The VAR model includes a constant and four lags. 
Shocks are identiﬁ  ed by using a Choleski decomposition with 
the following ordering: oil prices, non-energy commodity 
prices, short-term interest rate, output gap, exchange rate, PPI 
and HICP/HICPX. The original model of Hahn (2003) includes 
non-oil import prices instead of non-energy commodity prices 
but this change does not affect the impulse responses of the PPI, 
HICP and HICPX to an oil price shock. Since the oil price is 
ordered ﬁ  rst, responses to an oil price shock are invariant to 
changes in the ordering of the other variables. 
The reported PPI response is the one in a model that includes  82 
headline HICP. This response does not differ substantially 
from the one estimated in the model in which headline HICP is 
replaced with HICP excluding energy.
In addition to a lower share of energy input into the economy,  83 
relatively small indirect effects could also result from a shift 
in the objective of monetary policy towards maintaining a low 
inﬂ  ation environment (Taylor 2000). The rather limited indirect 
effects of oil price changes over more recent times are conﬁ  rmed 
by Landau and Skudelny (2009) who analyse in a mark-up 
framework, inter alia, the transmission of energy price shocks 
via the different stages of the distribution chain. They suggest a 
long-run impact of a 10% rise in oil prices of about 0.1% on the 
HICP excluding energy and unprocessed food. Most estimations 
in this study start only in the 1990s when, as stated above, the 
pass-through might have been somewhat lower than before.
Chart 45 Impact of a 10% oil price shock 
on euro area prices
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Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.78
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It is also informative to consider whether 
there are large differences in the transmission 
process of oil prices in the individual Member 
States’ inﬂ   ation rates. To investigate this, 
SVARs for Belgium, Germany, Spain 
France, Italy and the Netherlands have been 
estimated using a similar set-up as in the case 
of the euro area. Owing to data availability 
constraints, the country estimates cover the 
period 1985Q1-2009Q1. Table 14 shows the 
effects in these countries on the PPI, the HICP 
and the HICPX. To allow for comparison, the 
euro area estimate over the same sample period 
has been added. 
Three interesting results emerge. First, in all 
countries (and in the euro area) the immediate 
impact on the PPI is usually larger than the 
impact on HICP which, in turn, is generally 
larger than that on HICPX, given the high direct 
effects on HICP energy. Although this was not 
the case according to the static analysis using 
IOT, this was partly attributable to the fact 
that in the IOT analysis, total producer prices 
including services and energy were analysed. 
When looking at the impact on manufacturing 
producer prices only, the input-output tables 
also yield stronger effects on producer prices 
than on consumer prices. Second, industrial 
producer prices tend to respond much more in 
Spain and the Netherlands, while they respond 
less in Germany and France. The relatively 
strong response for the Netherlands is mainly 
related to a relatively high share of energy in 
total production, leading to a somewhat stronger 
effect on producer prices of energy and, thereby, 
on total producer prices (see Section 3.3.1). 
Note that the producer prices used in this section 
include the energy sector. In addition, the 
results for Spain and the Netherlands could be 
relatively strong because of the manufacturing 
chemicals sector. Third, the effect of an oil 
price shock on headline inﬂ  ation is stronger in 
Spain and Italy, mainly reﬂ  ecting the behaviour 
of the non-energy HICP component. This is 
consistent with the ﬁ  ndings using IOT. Initially 
the impacts on total and non-energy HICP are 
relatively similar. However, after a period of 
time, different second-round effects yield rather 
heterogeneous results, with the strongest impact 
for Spain. It should be noted that this result could 
also partly be related to a relatively strong effect 
of the transport sector (see Table 11), owing to 
its energy intensity which is above the euro area 
average. Overall, the ranges of estimates across 
countries are of a similar magnitude as in the 
input-output table analysis above.
Table 14 Impact of a 10% oil price shock on prices across euro area countries
(percentage deviation from baseline)
PPI HICPX HICP
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
BE 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2
DE 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3
ES 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
FR 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3
IT 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
NL 1.9 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4
euro area  0.8 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2
Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.
Table 13 Impact of a 10% oil price shock 
on euro area prices
(percentage deviation from baseline after 12 quarters)
Full sample First sample Second sample
PPI 0.59 0.85 0.56
HICP 0.45 0.68 0.36
HICPX 0.25 0.29 0.20
Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: Full sample refers to 1971Q3-2009Q1. First sample 
is the average of 33 consecutive estimations for the sample 
periods 1971Q3-1995Q3 up to 1979Q4-2000Q4. Second sample 
is the average of 34 consecutive estimations for the sample 
1980Q1-2001Q1 up to 1988Q1-2009Q1.79
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3.3.3 RESULTS FROM LARGE-SCALE 
MACROECONOMETRIC MODELS
The impact of changes in energy prices, and in 
particular, oil prices, on consumer prices does 
not only depend on the reaction of nominal 
variables (prices and costs such as wages). It also 
depends on the response of the real side of the 
economy to an oil price increase (as discussed 
in Chapter 2) and the two-way interaction 
between nominal and real variables. While 
these interlinkages can be manifold, so-called 
structural or large-scale macroeconometric 
models are, in principle, capable of capturing 
them to a signiﬁ  cant extent and should hence 
provide a more complete picture of the impact 
of a change in energy prices (see, for example, 
Álvarez et al. 2009). 
Clearly a crucial factor determining the impact 
of energy price ﬂ  uctuations on inﬂ  ation is the 
reaction of wages. Starting with the simulation 
results which allow for wage responses, the 
left-hand side of Table 15 reports the percentage 
impact of an oil price increase with respect to the 
baseline (unchanged oil prices). The weighted 
average of the country simulation suggests 
that a 10% increase in oil prices leads to a rise 
in the euro area HICP of about 0.2% in the ﬁ  rst 
year, increasing to 0.45% in the third year. This 
is very much in line with the results from the 
SVAR for the full sample and the input-output 
table analysis shown above. Differences across 
countries can broadly be associated with 
differences in the energy share in the HICP basket, 
with Greece, Slovenia and Slovakia on the high 
side and France, Malta and Austria on the low 
side. For the majority of countries and the euro 
area as a whole, only around half (40-60%) of the 
long-run effect has been passed through after one 
year, which indicates that indirect effects and/or 
second-round effects are at work.
The simulation results for the HICPX, also 
reported in Table 15 for most of the euro area 
countries, provide further evidence of important 
effects on consumer prices beyond the direct 
impact. For the euro area as a whole and most 
of the countries (Belgium, Germany, France, 
Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Slovenia),the 
impact on core inﬂ  ation measured by the HICPX 
is very small in the ﬁ  rst year (up to 0.1%) but 
increases gradually up to the third year to around 
0.2%. This is again very much in line with the 
VAR evidence previously shown, although with 
a slightly higher dispersion across countries. 
Slovakia stands out once more with a higher than 
average impact (0.5% after three years) while the 
effect on HICP excluding energy is below 0.2% 
in Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Austria. 
Wage reactions are also quite heterogeneous 
across countries. Wages grow rather strongly in 
Slovakia following an oil price increase: after 
three years, compensation per employee is 0.6% 
higher compared with the baseline. Nominal 
wages in Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany 
show a rather similar reaction in the longer term 
(around 0.4%), but the impact in Belgium and 
Luxembourg is more immediate, most likely 
reﬂ   ecting the existence of formal wage 
indexation 84. The adjustment in Germany, where 
no formal wage indexation is in place, is more 
spread out, pointing to implied nominal wage 
resistance. By contrast, oil price changes are 
estimated to have no effect on wages in Ireland 
and a relatively small impact on wages in Italy 
and Austria, with an increase in compensation 
per employee of slightly more than 0.1% in the 
third year. 
Comparing the reactions in the HICPX to those 
in the HICP, it is possible to obtain an idea of the 
relative size of direct effects on the one hand, and 
indirect and second-round effects on the other. 
According to the macroeconometric models, at 
the euro area level, the indirect/second-round 
effects, at 0.2%, account for roughly half of 
the impact on total HICP (0.45%). This implies 
that direct effects, and indirect or possible 
second-round effects, have almost the same size. 
This is consistent with the results of the SVAR 
(long sample). The IOT analysis suggests that 
the indirect effects are somewhat smaller than 
In Belgium the impact of oil price movements on wages  84 
via the indexation mechanism is mitigated by the use of the 
so-called health index as the reference for indexation. That index 
excludes the prices of petrol and diesel from the overall index.80
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Table 15 Effect of a 10% oil price increase on consumer prices according to traditional 
structural models
(annual averages; percentage deviation from baseline (cumulated))
Wage reaction on Wage reaction off
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 1  Year 2  Year 3
HICP
Belgium 0.32 0.51 0.54 0.29 0.36 0.34
Germany 0.33 0.50 0.54 0.33 0.47 0.47
Ireland 0.09 0.20 0.22---
Greece 0.08 0.36 0.65---
Spain 0.30 0.47 0.46 0.27 0.34 0.26
France 0.12 0.21 0.32 0.10 0.15 0.21
Italy 0.21 0.37 0.44 0.21 0.34 0.40
Cyprus 0.33 0.52 0.56 0.30 0.37 0.32
Luxembourg 0.41 0.55 0.62 0.41 0.44 0.44
Malta 0.33 0.30 0.34 0.33 0.29 0.32
Netherlands 0.20 0.43 0.48 0.20 0.41 0.44
Austria 0.18 0.18 0.19---
Portugal 0.24 0.38 0.58 0.21 0.27 0.38
Slovenia 0.59 0.78 0.82 0.55 0.55 0.55
Slovakia 0.51 0.74 0.90 0.51 0.70 0.78
Euro area average 0.24 0.39 0.45 0.23 0.34 0.36
HICP excluding energy
Belgium 0.04 0.16 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00
Germany 0.07 0.15 0.17 0.07 0.12 0.09
Ireland  ------
Greece  ------
Spain 0.12 0.35 0.36 0.09 0.21 0.15
France 0.01 0.07 0.15 -0.01 0.01 0.03
Italy 0.01 0.10 0.18 0.00 0.06 0.14
Cyprus 0.08 0.23 0.34 0.04 0.07 0.08
Luxembourg 0.01 0.13 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.01
Malta 0.26 0.19 0.24 0.26 0.19 0.21
Netherlands 0.03 0.11 0.13 0.03 0.09 0.09
Austria 0.12 0.12 0.14---
Portugal 0.03 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.07 0.18
Slovenia 0.05 0.26 0.30 0.00 0.01 0.01
Slovakia 0.14 0.39 0.54 0.14 0.34 0.42
Euro area average 0.05 0.15 0.20 0.03 0.09 0.10
Compensation per employee
Belgium 0.13 0.35 0.41 ---
Germany -0.01 0.16 0.39---
Ireland 0.00 0.02 0.02---
Greece 0.04 0.26 0.43---
Spain 0.11 0.27 0.32---
France 0.06 0.15 0.25---
Italy 0.03 0.12 0.13---
Cyprus 0.13 0.17 0.23---
Luxembourg 0.31 0.41 0.43---
Malta -0.04 0.28 0.25---
Netherlands 0.02 0.12 0.18---
Austria 0.06 0.11 0.12---
Portugal 0.06 0.17 0.29---
Slovenia 0.13 0.38 0.41---
Slovakia 0.16 0.37 0.56---
Euro area  average 0.04 0.17 0.28---
Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.81
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the direct effects. However, this seems to be 
plausible, given that the latter does not include 
any wage reaction (see also below on the 
simulation results when switching off the wage 
channel). The models for Belgium, France, 
Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Slovenia also 
suggest that direct effects are about the same 
size as indirect (and second-round) effects, with 
an impact on the HICPX in relative terms to the 
HICP ranging between 40% and 60%. In the 
models for Germany and the Netherlands, the 
reactions of the HICPX relative to the HICP 
are rather small, suggesting that direct effects 
dominate. For Germany, this is congruent to the 
estimate obtained on the basis of the SVAR and 
the input-output table analysis. In Spain, Malta, 
Austria and Portugal, indirect and second-
round effects are the main drivers behind the 
response in total consumer prices. For Spain, 
this is conﬁ  rmed by the SVAR analysis, but not 
entirely when using input-output tables.
For a number of countries, results are also 
available for an oil price scenario when 
switching off the wage channel. They assume 
that wages remain unchanged following an oil 
price increase, which implies that there are no 
second-round effects via wage changes. Such an 
exercise is not without caveats. Switching off 
the wage channel implies that wages cannot 
respond to both the ﬁ   rst-round price effects 
owing to a change in the oil price and the impact 
on activity, which suggests that all the necessary 
adjustment would fall on employment. This is 
a very strong assumption, which can have an 
impact on the stability properties of the models 
and the results should therefore be interpreted 
with caution. Notwithstanding this, a noteworthy 
outcome of this exercise is that in most 
countries, the impact of an oil price increase 
on the HICPX is relatively muted once wage 
reactions are not allowed. For the euro area as a 
whole, the indirect effects amount to 0.1% on a 
cumulative basis by the third year. This implies 
that approximately half of the total impact on 
HICPX (at 0.2%) comes from second-round 
effects via wage changes, triggered by 
either explicit wage indexation or via wage 
negotiations. Regarding country reactions, the 
cumulative indirect effects amount to between 
0.1-0.2% in the third year for seven euro area 
countries (Germany, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Malta, 
the Netherlands and Portugal). Indirect effects 
are on the high side in the model for Slovakia 
(0.4%). There are no or very small indirect 
effects in Belgium, France, Luxembourg and 
Slovenia, which suggests that almost all impact 
on the HICPX stems from second-round effects. 
In this respect, policies aiming at overcoming 
wage indexation mechanisms in the euro area 
and making wages generally more ﬂ  exible are 
of high importance. 
Against this background, it would be of interest to 
explore whether an asymmetric impact of energy 
price ﬂ  uctuations exists. The risk of inﬂ  ationary 
pressures emerging from second-round wage 
effects is particularly likely when institutional 
mechanisms, such as wage indexation, enforce 
downward real wage rigidities. These rigidities 
would then feed into an asymmetric reaction of 
consumer prices. However, unfortunately, the 
set-up of most macroeconometric models does 
not allow an assessment of this issue.
Results from an oil price scenario using the 
available DSGE models in the Eurosystem are 
presented in Table 16. Results are shown from 
the NAWM for the euro area, the Aino model of 
Suomen Pankki – Finlands Bank, Banco de 
España’s BEMOD model and a calibrated DSGE 
model of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Since agents 
in these models react to future policy actions, the 
speciﬁ  cation of the monetary policy reaction is 
crucial. Here we report only results of DSGE 
models in which the policy rules are kept active. 
Furthermore, the exchange rate and world 
demand and prices (except for the Finnish model   
in both cases) also react to the shock.85
All the models include a direct link between imported prices of  85 
oil and domestic demand prices, in the form of shares of oil in 
demand components. Excise taxes also play a role in the models. 
All the models, except the NAWM, also included some supply-
side effect in that ﬁ  rms use oil in production. The elasticity of 
substitution is either calibrated to different values or imprecisely 
estimated, which may explain some of the differences in the 
results. Last but not least, the way the shocks were implemented 
also differed across models to some extent. The German model 
simulates a 10% increase on impact, generated through a shock 
to global oil demand, with a dampening down effect afterwards. 82
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Oil prices seem to have a much higher initial 
impact on HICP in the Finnish and German 
cases. The higher impact in the Finnish model 
may be explained by higher shares of oil use 
in that country, while the German results may 
depend more on the calibration of the model, in 
particular the low calibration for the elasticity 
of substitution. While the oil price impact 
fades away in the German model, the Finnish 
model suggests an increasing impact over time. 
By contrast, the models for Spain and the euro area 
suggest a smaller initial impact compared with 
traditional models with relative little dynamics, 
which is attributable to the monetary policy 
reaction. The models for Germany and Finland 
show notable indirect/second-round effects while, 
in the model for the euro area, the central bank 
reaction counteracts these effects.
Table 16 Effect of a 10% oil price increase on inflation (annual averages) according to DSGE 
models
(percentage deviation from baseline (cumulated))
HICP HICPX
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
DE  0.88 0.67 0.27 0.40 0.47 0.17 
ES  0.20 0.23 0.25  - - -
FI  0.77 0.84 0.90  -0.03 0.05 0.14 
Euro  area  0.12 0.15 0.13 0.00  -0.01  -0.03 
Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.
Note: The results for FI are based on a version of the Aino model including a Taylor rule.
Box 6
MONETARY POLICY RESPONSE TO ENERGY PRICE CHANGES AND THE ROLE OF INFLATION 
EXPECTATIONS
Given that energy price ﬂ  uctuations can have substantial impacts on output and inﬂ  ation, they 
call for an appropriate monetary policy response that aims to maintain price stability over 
the medium term. In doing so, monetary policy takes into account the nature of energy price 
movements that can be temporary or reﬂ  ect more persistent, structural developments in energy 
markets, as well as their impact on the formation of inﬂ  ation expectations. 
As transitory energy price disturbances mainly entail short-run changes in headline inﬂ  ation, a 
medium-term oriented monetary authority looks through the short-term volatility of headline 
inﬂ  ation and does not attempt to ﬁ  ne-tune price and economic developments. In fact, according 
to the standard view on the transmission mechanism, monetary policy affects the economy 
with variable and uncertain lags and therefore any action implemented to undo the direct and 
immediate impact of energy price rises on headline inﬂ  ation can at best be vain and, most likely, 
harmful, as it would become effective only when the temporary inﬂ  ationary impact has already 
faded away. 
A more aggressive monetary policy response is however needed when there are clear signs of 
second-round effects on prices. Wage and price indexation, strong bargaining power on the worker 
side or high pricing power of ﬁ  rms, are features of an economy that make the impact of transitory 
energy price increases on inﬂ  ation more persistent. They largely reﬂ  ect the individually rational 
behaviour of economic agents attempting to reduce the impact of energy price rises on their real 83
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behaviour eventually generates inﬂ  ationary pressures, makes the task of monetary policy more 
challenging and delays the necessary adjustment on the real side of the economy. 
Recurring energy price rises are also challenging from a monetary policy perspective as they 
can lead to a permanent upward shift in energy inﬂ  ation. In general, permanent shocks produce 
a larger effect on the real economy and a permanent change in relative prices calls for sizeable 
sectoral reallocation. On the nominal side of the economy, the new equilibrium allocation would 
require a stronger correction of wages and proﬁ  ts. In such an economic environment, maintaining 
price stability entails a monetary policy stance that appropriately counterbalances the permanent 
effect on inﬂ  ation over the medium term.
The monetary policy response must be tailored to the structure of the domestic economy and, 
in particular, take into account the strength of the second-round effects on headline inﬂ  ation. 
In this respect, the solid anchoring of medium to longer-term inﬂ  ation expectations is pivotal 
to ensuring that price and wage developments remain “in sync” with the central bank’s price 
stability objective. 
Rational expectations versus adaptive learning: unexpected and temporary 10% increase
in real oil prices, spread over a five-year period – Taylor rule policy
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Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: Learning simulations are computed under constant gain adaptive learning, assuming that the economy is initially at the steady 
state and that agents start their learning process with the true parameters of the economy. The gain parameter amounts to 0.001. 
The simulations labelled “adaptive learning (1)” assume that private agents only learn about the variables whose expectations 
matter. The simulations labelled “adaptive learning (2)” assume that private agents learn about all variables. See Darracq-Pariès 
and Moyen 2009.84
ECB
Occasional Paper No 113
June 2010
3.4  CONCLUSION ON THE IMPACT OF ENERGY 
PRICES ON INFLATION
In terms of an overall summary, estimates of 
the energy price pass-through into inﬂ  ation 
according to the various approaches outlined 
above are reported in Table 17. Notwithstanding 
the different underlying assumptions, caveats 
and estimation periods used, there are some 
relatively clear and consistent ﬁ  ndings. 
The  direct pass-through of oil prices into 
pre-tax prices of liquid fuels is complete and 
quick (mainly within two to three weeks), 
and there is little evidence of asymmetry. 
Over time, oil prices and taxes have been the 
main driving forces behind price increases, 
whereas distribution and reﬁ  ning margins have 
remained relatively stable. Gas prices strongly 
co-move with oil prices mainly owing to the 
substitutability of these energy sources and 
institutional arrangements. The direct pass-
through of gas price changes to consumer 
prices takes approximately six to nine months. 
The link between electricity prices and 
oil, evident for wholesale markets, largely 
disappears for consumer electricity prices 
given their administered nature and different 
input compositions. Even in countries where 
price regulation has been largely abolished, 
Insufﬁ  ciently solid anchoring of inﬂ  ation expectations risks undermining the credibility of the 
central bank. Medium to longer-term inﬂ  ation expectations can drift away from the central 
bank’s objective when recurrent energy price increases exerting upward pressures on headline 
inﬂ  ation tarnish the reputation of the central bank in fulﬁ  lling its mandate. This can happen, for 
example, if economic agents cannot fully assess whether the deviations from the price stability 
objective are attributable to the mechanical impact of energy price rises on inﬂ  ation, or to a 
loose monetary policy stance. The additional risks to price stability stemming from individuals 
not having perfect knowledge can be analysed in models including further assumptions on the 
mechanisms of expectation formation. Under the assumption of adaptive learning, individuals 
have a limited amount of information on which to form their expectations about the future path 
of the economy. Their inﬂ  ation forecasts are not rational and diverge from the central bank’s 
view on the outlook for inﬂ  ation. Learning dynamics are a source of additional sensitivity of 
the economy to energy price movements compared with conventional models with fully rational 
expectations. The chart illustrates how departures from the rational expectations paradigm could 
amplify the transmission of oil price changes throughout the economy, leading to pronounced 
underlying inﬂ  ationary pressures and sizeable wage increases. In this case, a lower policy 
tolerance for inﬂ  ation volatility may limit private forecast errors and contribute to the solid 
anchoring of inﬂ  ation expectations.
Table 17 Summary and decomposition of impact of a 10% increase in oil prices on HICP 
using different approaches
Approach  Speciﬁ  cation  Direct  Indirect  Second round  Total
Disaggregated energy 
components 1)
€20 0.15% N/A N/A N/A
€50 0.29% N/A N/A N/A
Input-output tables 2) country avg 0.22% 0.14% N/A 0.36%
SVAR 71-09 0.20% 0.25% 0.45%
71-00 0.39% 0.29% 0.68%
80-09 0.16% 0.20% 0.36%
Macro models wage reaction on 0.25% 0.20% 0.45%
wage reaction off 0.26% 0.10% 0.36%
Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.
1) Pass-through is a function of price level – estimates calculated on the basis of constant reﬁ  ning and distribution costs and margins 
and indirect taxes. 
2) Based on 2005 values (oil averaged €47/barrel). Implicitly assumes constant margins.85
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price adjustments remain relatively infrequent 
compared with fuels and gas. Owing to the 
full pass-through into pre-tax prices, and the 
broad constancy of margins and indirect taxes, 
the overall direct pass-through of oil prices 
into consumer energy prices is a function of 
the crude oil price level. At €20 per barrel 
pass-through to consumer energy prices is 
around 15%, at €50 per barrel it is around 30%. 
If oil prices were to increase to €100 per barrel, 
elasticity (assuming broadly constant reﬁ  ning 
and distribution margins and excise taxes) 
would rise to above 40%.
Price levels may vary across energy markets 
owing to taxes and cost structures, which may 
in turn be a function of energy policy itself. 
However, differences in competition and market 
concentration as well as the degree of vertical 
integration also undoubtedly have a role. In 
this regard, pre-tax price dispersion is generally 
more sizeable in electricity and gas markets 
compared with liquid fuel markets. However, 
there is evidence that liberalisation efforts have 
had a beneﬁ  cial impact on price levels across 
the euro area. In this context, further reforms 
towards a more competitive environment 
creating a level playing ﬁ   eld across the euro 
area would diminish price dispersion and beneﬁ  t 
both consumers and ﬁ  rms.
The evidence on indirect and second-round 
effects of energy prices from the IOT analysis 
and from dynamic simulations of various model 
speciﬁ   cations gives an overall internally 
consistent picture. At the producer level, a 10% 
oil price increase leads to an increase in output 
prices in the manufacturing sector in the euro 
area, not only via the energy sector itself, but 
also through energy-intensive branches 
(chemicals and metals). The magnitude of the 
impact at the producer level is rather 
homogeneous across most countries, with the 
important exception of the Netherlands, where 
the high share of energy-intensive sectors in 
manufacturing output makes producer prices 
much more responsive to oil price ﬂ  uctuations. 
Services prices may also be affected by energy 
shocks at the early stage of production, for 
example in the air transport sector as shown by 
the IOT analysis. At the consumer level, the 
prices of non-energy products respond to oil 
price shocks very gradually. The cumulated 
effect after three years of a 10% oil price 
increase is estimated to be 0.2%, half of which 
seems to be a second-round effect coming from 
the endogenous reaction of wages to energy 
price rises.86 The overall (indirect and second-
round) effect on non-energy consumer prices 
has also weakened over the past twenty years. 
Models in which expectations play a more 
substantial role (DSGE models) point to a 
somewhat milder reaction of core inﬂ  ation to 
commodity prices. At the country level, there 
are important differences in the transmission of 
energy commodity surprises to non-energy 
consumer prices with impacts ranging from 0.1 
to 0.5%. The role of second-round effects seems 
to be generally higher in countries that have 
automatic wage indexation schemes.
Overall, the pass-through of oil prices into 
consumer prices is complex and a function of 
many factors including the price level of oil, 
the amount of indirect taxation (excises), other 
structural aspects of the economy including 
the sector specialisation of activity, and wage 
and price-setting institutions. Indirect and 
second-round effects appear to have moderated 
compared with the 1970s and early 1980s owing, 
in part, to changes in economic structure but 
also, more importantly perhaps, to changes in 
monetary policy and wage and price-setting 
behaviour.
Ultimately, wage and price-setting behaviour 
and a credible monetary policy are the key 
determinants of whether inﬂ  ationary pressures 
from energy prices translate into inﬂ  ation over 
a medium-term horizon. Whilst there is little 
monetary policy can do about the ﬁ  rst-round 
effects of energy price shocks, in particular 
international oil price changes, it can shape 
second-round effects. Monetary policy-making
An important caveat to this result is that it is obtained by  86 
switching off the wage channels of the macro models used at 
national central banks; the consequences of such a modiﬁ  cation 
on the models’ behaviour are unclear.86
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becomes more complicated if inﬂ  ation 
expectations are unanchored by energy price 
changes. If the central bank is not credible, 
and energy price ﬂ   uctuations strongly affect 
expectation formation, more drastic monetary 
policy action would be required to restore price 
stability, which would imply stronger output 
volatility in the short run. Thus, monetary policy 
best counteracts the price and output volatility 
induced by energy price ﬂ  uctuations  by 
implementing a credible medium-term-oriented
monetary policy strategy stabilising inﬂ  ation 
expectations. 87
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1  DETAILED CROSS-COUNTRY CHARTS AND TABLES
Chart A1 Change in share of primary energy 
production by fuel
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area
Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Chart A2 Final inland consumption by product
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Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Chart A3 Final energy consumption by sector
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Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Chart A4 Final energy consumption – 
households
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Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.88
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Chart A5 Final energy consumption – industry
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Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Chart A7 Market share of the three 
largest companies (C3) in the liquid fuel 
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Sources: NCBs, from national sources.
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Sources: NCBs, European Commission and Eurosystem staff calculations.89
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ANNEXES
Chart A8 OECD regulation indicator sub-indices
progress since 1990
level in 2007
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Sources: OECD and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: The indicators are measured on a scale of 0 to 6, reﬂ  ecting the increasing restrictiveness of regulatory provisions on competition 
(see Conway and Nicoletti 2006) for more detail.90
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Chart A9 Cross-sectional charts – petrol
(x-axis: petrol, excluding taxes)
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Sources: Eurostat, European Commission, various national sources and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: Consumer petrol prices (euro cent/litre), excluding taxes, in 2008 are shown on the horizontal axes. The variable shown on the 
vertical axes is given by the chart title.91
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ANNEXES
Chart A9 Cross-sectional charts – petrol (cont’d)
(x-axis: petrol, excluding taxes)
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Sources: Eurostat, European Commission, various national sources and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: Consumer petrol prices (euro cent/litre), excluding taxes, in 2008 are shown on the horizontal axes. The variable shown on the 
vertical axes is given by the chart title.92
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Chart A10 Cross-sectional charts – diesel
(x-axis: diesel, excluding taxes)
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Sources: Eurostat, European Commission, various national sources and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: Consumer diesel prices (euro cent/litre), excluding taxes, in 2008 are shown on the horizontal axes. The variable shown on the 
vertical axes is given by the chart title.93
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ANNEXES
Chart A10 Cross-sectional charts – diesel (cont’d)
(x-axis: diesel, excluding taxes)
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Sources: Eurostat, European Commission, various national sources and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: Consumer diesel prices (euro cent/litre), excluding taxes, in 2008 are shown on the horizontal axes. The variable shown on the 
vertical axes is given by the chart title.94
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Chart A10 Cross-sectional charts – diesel 
(cont’d)
(x-axis: diesel, excluding taxes)
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Sources: Eurostat, European Commission, various national 
sources and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: Consumer diesel prices (euro cent/litre), excluding taxes, 
in 2008 are shown on the horizontal axes. The variable shown 
on the vertical axes is given by the chart title.95
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Chart A11 Cross-sectional charts – heating fuel
(x-axis: heating fuel, excluding taxes)
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Sources: Eurostat, European Commission, various national sources and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: Consumer gas (heating) oil prices (euro cent/litre), excluding taxes, in 2008 are shown on the horizontal axes. The variable shown 
on the vertical axes is given by the chart title.96
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Chart A11 Cross-sectional charts – heating fuel (cont’d)
(x-axis: heating fuel, excluding taxes)
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Sources: Eurostat, European Commission, various national sources and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: Consumer gas (heating) oil prices (euro cent/litre), excluding taxes, in 2008 are shown on the horizontal axes. The variable shown 
on the vertical axes is given by the chart title.97
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Table A1 Overview of euro area electricity generation
euro area BE DE IE GR ES FR IT
Size (TWh) (2007) 2,318,882 88,820 637,101 28,226 63,497 303,293 569,841 313,887
Growth (1990-2007)
Total 2.1 1.3 0.9 4.0 3.6 4.2 1.8 2.2
Nuclear 1.2 0.7 -0.5 - - 0.1 2.0 -
Non-renew. conv. 
thermal 
2.2 1.7 0.3 3.7 3.4 5.8 1.1 2.2
Renewables 4.4 8.7 9.3 7.3 6.2 5.3 1.5 2.8
Share (2007) (%)
Nuclear 31 54 22 - - 18 77 0
Non-renew. conv. thermal 52 40 62 89 92 61 10 83
Coal 15 7 21 19 0 23 4 14
Lignite 10 - 26 8 55100
Oil 4 1 2 7 15 6 1 11
Gas 22 29 12 55 22 31 4 55
Other 1 3200112
Renewables 20 10 20 11 9 22 14 20
Hydro 10 2445 1 0 1 1 1 2
Wind 4 1673911
Other 6 7 1011326
Gross trade ﬂ  ows (2007) 1) 19 28 17 5 13 8 14 16
Net imports (1990-2007) 1) 1 50231 - 1 2 1 6
Inter-trading (2007) 1), 2) 9 1 0703321
Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.
1) As a percentage of total ﬁ  nal inland consumption of electricity.
2) Measures offsetting imports and exports; calculated as the minimum of either imports or exports.
Table A1 Overview of euro area electricity generation (cont'd)
CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI
Size (TWh) (2007) 4,871 4,001 2,296 103,241 63,430 47,253 15,043 28,056 81,249
Growth (1990-2007)
Total 5.5 6.5 4.4 2.1 1.4 3.0 1.1 0.9 2.4
Nuclear - - - 1.1 - - 1.2 1.4 1.2
Non-renew. conv. 
thermal 
5.5 10.7 4.4 1.7 0.8 3.0 1.2 -1.3 3.3
Renewables - 1.7 - 11.8 2.0 3.4 1.0 4.8 3.1
Share (2007) (%)
Nuclear - - - 4 - - 38 55 29
Non-renew. conv. 
thermal
0 72 0 87 30 64 40 27 41
Coal - - - 24 10 26 4 10 17
Lignite - - - - 0 - 33 7 9
Oil - 0 - 2 2 10 0 3 1
Gas - 72 - 57 16 28 3 6 13
Other 0 0 0 4 3 0 0 2 1
Renewables 0 30 0 14 76 40 23 20 42
Hydro - 23 - 0 61 22 22 16 17
Wind 0 2 0 3 3 9 - 0 0
Other 0 6 - 11 13 9 2 4 25
Gross trade ﬂ  ows (2007) 1) 0 2 4 3 02 85 92 58 09 12 2
Net imports (1990-2007) 1) 0 293 0 16 2 5 -9 3 13
Inter-trading (2007) 1), 2) 0 72 0 5 24 5 39 42 4
Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.
1) As a percentage of total ﬁ  nal inland consumption of electricity.
2) Measures offsetting imports and exports; calculated as the minimum of either imports or exports.98
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Table A2 Estimated future energy trends, baseline and policy action scenarios
European Commission (DG-TREN, 2008) IEA (2009)
Baseline scenario  Action scenario  Reference scenario 450 scenario
2005 2020 2020 2020 2020
Index  Share  Index  Share  Index  Share  Index  Share  Index  Share
Primary energy 
demand 100 100 105-109 100 92-95 100 95 100 92 100
Oil 100 37 97-105 34-36 85-91 34-36 84 32 77 31
Gas 100 25 100-113 23-26 78-90 21-23 104 27 96 26
Solids 100 18 106-107 17-18 68-79 13-15 81 15 64 12
Renewables 100 7 160-180 10-12 220-223 16-16 196 14 217 16
Nuclear 100 14 86-97 11-13 85-91 13-14 79 12 100 15
Final energy 
demand 100 100 111-116 100 98-102 100 107 100 103 100
Industry 100 28 110-114 27-28 105-109 30-30 93 24 91 25
Residential 100 26 104-109 25-25 89-92 24-24 126 48 123 49
Tertiary 100 15 111-118 15-15 89-92 14-14
Transport 100 31 117-121 33-33 104-108 33-33 96 28 86 26
Other
Oil 100 42 101-110 39-40 88-94 38-39 102 40 93 38
Gas 100 25 100-109 22-23 82-89 21-22 100 23 95 23
Solids 100 5 104-106 4-4 94-94 4-4 58 2 53 2
Electricity 100 20 127-127 22-23 108-109 22-23 113 21 112 22
Heat 100 4 107-112 3-3 100-100 3-4 159 5 151 5
Other 100 5 162-191 7-8 213-220 10-11 182 8 204 9
Electricity 
generation 100 100 124-125 100 105-107 100 110 100 109 100
Nuclear 100 30 87-98 21-24 85-91 25-26 77 22 99 28
Renewables 100 15 169-182 20-22 223-224 31-32 211 29 230 31
Fossil fuels  100 55 123-133 54-59 83-84 43-44 100 50 81 41
CO2 energy emiss. 98 - 98-105 - 78-80 - 88 - 77 -
Index % Index % Index %
Dependence 100 52.1 116-123 61-64 107-112 56-59
Oil 100 81.6 113-114 93-93 112-113 92-92
Gas 100 57.7 129-134 75-77 123-127 71-73
Solids 100 39.2 145-149 57-59 125-128 49-50
Sources: European Commission, IEA and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: Dependence is deﬁ  ned as net imports as a percentage of total gross inland consumption. In the European Commission projections, 
the baseline scenario includes trends and policies implemented up to the end of 2006 and the action scenario assumes implementation 
of new policies to reach energy and climate targets. In the IEA projections, the reference scenario describes what would happen 
if governments take no new initiatives beyond those already adopted by mid-2009 and the 450 scenario assumes governments adopt 
commitments and policies to limit the long-term concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere to 450 parts per million of 
carbon dioxide equivalent.99
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BE DE IE GR ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI
HICP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
HICP excl. energy 90.4 89.1 88.3 91.2 92.7 89.6 91.9 92.2 88.0 89.1 93.5 89.8 92.2 89.1 88.4 83.7 92.9
Energy 9.6 10.9 11.7 8.8 7.3 10.4 8.1 7.8 12.0 10.9 6.5 10.2 7.8 10.9 11.6 16.3 7.1
Liquid fuels  4.7 4.7 4.6 4.8 5.8 6.5 4.4 4.0 7.9 8.5 4.0 4.1 3.9 5.8 7.0 2.4 4.8
Transport 4.0 3.6 3.7 3.9 3.6 6.0 3.7 3.3 7.0 7.7 4.0 4.1 3.3 5.6 5.5 2.4 4.3
Home heating  0.7 1.1 1.0 0.9 2.1 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.2 1.5 0.0 0.5
Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.




BE DE IE GR ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI
HICP  2.0 2.0 1.5 2.8 3.8 2.9 1.7 2.4 2.7 2.3 2.8 2.2 1.7 2.6 6.0 6.0 1.7 
HICP  excl.  energy  1.8 1.7 1.2 2.7 3.8 2.8 1.6 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.6 1.8 1.5 2.6 4.4 4.8 1.5 
Energy  3.9 4.5 4.6 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 3.2 7.1 4.6 6.7 5.9 3.5 3.6 6.7  13.8 4.0 
Liquid  fuels  4.6 6.2 5.1 4.9 4.7 4.6 4.3 3.2 7.2 5.9 6.2 4.2 4.7 4.6 6.9 5.2 4.4 
Transport  3.9 4.4 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.3 3.7 2.9 6.5 4.8 6.2 4.2 3.9 4.6 6.8 5.1 3.8 
Home  heating  8.5  12.6  10.3 8.2 6.5 8.6 8.1 4.4  12.2  11.4  - - 8.9  - 8.7  - 10.3 
Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.




BE DE IE GR ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI
HICP  0.3 0.8 0.4 0.5 1.2 0.5 0.3 0.4 1.1 0.6 1.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.4 
HICP  excl.  energy  0.3 0.9 0.4 0.5 1.3 0.5 0.2 0.5 1.2 0.6 1.4 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 
Energy  1.5 2.1 1.7 1.8 2.8 1.8 1.6 1.2 2.7 3.0 2.3 2.0 1.7 1.3 2.4 3.7 2.2 
Liquid  fuels  2.7 3.8 3.4 3.2 3.7 2.8 2.7 2.0 3.3 3.8 2.9 2.7 3.1 2.3 3.7 3.0 3.3 
Transport  2.4 2.8 3.0 2.9 3.4 2.7 2.4 2.0 3.1 3.5 2.9 2.7 2.9 2.3 3.5 3.0 3.1 
Home  heating  4.9 7.1 6.6 5.3 6.7 4.6 5.1 2.2 5.8 7.1  - - 4.8  - 5.7  - 6.9 
Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.




BE DE IE GR ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI
HICP  89 95 90 90 98 93 91 90 98 93 94 95 91 94 97 94 91 
HICP  excl.  energy  98 99 86 91 99 98 99 91 99 98 99  100 98 99  100  100 99 
Energy  100  100 98 95 99  100  100 94 99 99 35 99 99 96  100 95  100 
Liquid  fuels  100 99 98 98 99  100  100 94 57 91 31 99 99 69  100 91  100 
Transport  98 99 96 94 99 99 97 96 57 91 30 99 98 69 97 91 98 
Home  heating  99 98 98 98 60 99  100 96 43 85  - - 100  - 97  - 98 
Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.100
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BE DE IE GR ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI
HICP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
HICP excl. energy  90.4 89.1 88.3 91.2 92.7 89.6 91.9 92.2 88.0 89.1 93.5 89.8 92.2 89.1 88.4 83.7 92.9
Energy 9.6 10.9 11.7 8.8 7.3 10.4 8.1 7.8 12.0 10.9 6.5 10.2 7.8 10.9 11.6 16.3 7.1
Non-oil 4.8 6.2 7.0 4.0 1.5 3.9 3.7 3.8 4.2 2.5 2.5 6.2 3.9 5.1 4.6 13.9 2.3
Gas 1.8 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.1 1.3 1.4 2.4 0.6 1.0 0.3 4.1 0.8 1.6 0.9 4.0 0.0
Electricity 2.3 3.1 3.1 2.1 1.2 2.6 2.1 1.3 3.4 1.3 2.2 2.0 1.9 3.4 2.3 4.5 2.2
Heat energy  0.6 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.8 4.9 0.1
Solid 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.7 0.4 0.0
Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.




BE DE IE GR ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI
HICP  2.0 2.0 1.5 2.8 3.8 2.9 1.7 2.4 2.7 2.3 2.8 2.2 1.7 2.6 6.0 6.0 1.7 
HICP  excl.  energy  1.8 1.7 1.2 2.7 3.8 2.8 1.6 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.6 1.8 1.5 2.6 4.4 4.8 1.5 
Energy  3.9 4.5 4.6 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 3.2 7.1 4.6 6.7 5.9 3.5 3.6 6.7  13.8 4.0 
Non-oil  3.5 3.3 4.4 5.4 2.6 1.9 1.7 3.3 7.1 3.5 7.3 7.4 2.6 2.6 6.6  16.5 4.0 
Gas 5.5 6.2 6.2 6.4 5.6 4.5 5.2 4.1 9.1 5.9 5.6 8.7 4.6 6.1  10.1  18.1  -
Electricity  1.8 1.7 2.8 5.2 2.2 0.8  -0.3 2.3 7.7 2.5 7.8 5.5 2.1 1.5 5.3  16.5 3.8 
Heat  energy  5.8 -   6.2  5.4 - - 4.4 - - 8.0 - - 2.3 - 10.1  15.9  4.7 
Solid  2.5 1.5 1.7 5.3 4.6  - 2.3  - 0.6 1.1  - - 2.6 0.5 7.0 8.9 7.3 
Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.




BE DE IE GR ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI
HICP 0.3 0.8 0.4 0.5 1.2 0.5 0.3 0.4 1.1 0.6 1.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.4
HICP excl. energy  0.3 0.9 0.4 0.5 1.3 0.5 0.2 0.5 1.2 0.6 1.4 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3
Energy 1.5 2.1 1.7 1.8 2.8 1.8 1.6 1.2 2.7 3.0 2.3 2.0 1.7 1.3 2.4 3.7 2.2
Non-oil 0.7 1.4 0.9 1.5 1.1 1.1 0.7 1.2 2.9 1.1 3.6 2.5 0.9 0.7 1.1 4.6 0.9
Gas 1.3 2.5 1.8 3.7 0.8 2.7 1.7 1.2 3.8 2.4 3.0 3.1 1.9 1.2 2.2 6.6 -
Electricity 0.6 1.1 1.2 2.2 1.3 0.9 0.4 1.5 3.5 1.4 4.4 2.7 1.1 0.9 1.6 6.0 0.9
Heat energy  0.9 - 0.8 1.4 - - 7.8 - - 1.8 - - 0.6 - 2.8 4.8 1.6
Solid 0.5 1.1 0.3 1.2 0.6 - 0.4 - 0.7 1.0 - - 1.0 1.9 2.4 1.0 5.1
Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.101
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BE DE IE GR ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI
HICP 89 95 90 90 98 93 91 90 98 93 94 95 91 94 97 94 91
HICP excl. energy  98 99 86 91 99 98 99 91 99 98 99 100 98 99 100 100 99
Energy 100 100 98 95 99 100 100 94 99 99 35 99 99 96 100 95 100
Non-oil 100 99 86 50 98 48 90 80 99 94 27 52 96 95 100 83 87
Gas 91 92 83 45 96 46 80 82 37 80 23 37 45 77 92 59 -
Electricity 72 87 60 17 12 10 17 35 98 60 11 50 41 15 18 7 68
Heat energy  96 - 93 91 - - 8 - - 93 - - 39 - 89 35 28
Solid 95 81 83 55 79 - 90 - 28 21 - - 94 94 61 98 97
Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.102
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Table A11 Key structural features of European transport fuel markets





car km travelled 
per capita





Sales per petrol 
station (€1,000)
2006 2006  2006  2007  2007  2007 
euro area  166,255  507  10.1  83,408  256  2,600 
BE 4,976  468  10.4  3,295  310  1,689 
DE 46,570  567  10.6  14,902  181  3,058 
IE 1,779  401  6.6  1,092  251  1,400 
GR  4,543  405  8.1  8,200  733  876 
ES 20,637  453  7.7  8,668  193  2,848 
FR  31,002  483  11.4  12,929  203  3,180 
IT 35,297  589  11.8  21,879  368  1,618 
CY  373  471  6.5  252  321  -
LU  315  645  14.8  235  490  2,385 
MT  218  529  4.9  91  222  -
NL  7,230  440  9.1  3,610  220  2,743 
AT  4,205  504  8.7  2,810  338  2,299 
PT  4,290  404  6.8  2,200  207  -
SI 980  480  11.5  410  203  -
SK 1,334  247  4.8  860  159  -
FI  2,506  472  11.8  1,975  373  2,470 
Sources: European Commission, various national sources and Eurosystem staff calculations.








of reﬁ  neries
Share of demand 
covered by domestic 
reﬁ  neries (%)
Market share 





2007  2005  2008  2005 2005 2007
euro area  72 18  74  122  49  8.8 
BE 65  14  4  185  72  2.0 
DE 99  34  14  118  53  2.0 
IE 81  35  1  36  77  1.0 
GR 1 - 4  133  - 0.3 
ES 24  14  10 91  66  2.1 
FR 98 13  12  103  21  35.0 
IT 29  3  16  139  51  0.4 
CY - - 0 0  73  -
LU 100 - 0  0  55  -
MT - - 0 0  100  -
NL 98 17  6  241  - 0.3 
AT 68 26  1  72  43  0.0 
PT - 6 2  97  70  9.0 
SI - - 1  0  100  -
SK - - 1  206  90  -
FI 100 - 2  151  57  -
Sources: European Commission, various national sources and Eurosystem staff calculations.103
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Table A12 Pass-through of refined gas oil prices into consumer prices (excl. taxes) for diesel 
and heating fuel (from models estimated over the period 2000-2009)
(euro cent)
Diesel Heating  fuel
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 8 Week 12  Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 8 Week 12
Euro 
area 3.3 7.8 9.0 9.3 10.1 10.5 1.6 5.6 7.5 8.3 9.9 10.2
BE 2.4 8.1 9.0 9.3 10.1 10.9 2.2 7.9 9.0 10.1 10.5 10.4
DE 4.1 9.1 9.8 9.5 10.0 10.5 1.5 7.5 9.4 9.5 11.2 11.0
IE -0.3 3.0 4.5 7.1 8.8 9.9 0.1 -0.0 0.7 1.2 2.7 6.5
GR 1.0 5.3 8.1 9.9 10.9 11.9 1.1 5.6 8.2 9.1 10.7 10.3
ES 1.2 3.2 6.9 8.8 10.1 9.7 1.5 4.0 5.8 6.9 8.7 9.3
FR 2.6 7.1 8.8 9.3 10.0 10.4 1.7 6.6 8.7 9.6 10.9 11.1
IT 3.5 6.5 7.6 8.5 9.6 9.8 1.0 3.6 5.9 7.2 9.1 9.3
LU 2.1 8.3 10.1 10.1 10.4 10.4 1.7 8.0 9.9 9.9 11.3 11.1
NL 4.9 8.9 10.2 9.4 9.8 10.7 4.7 9.2 9.9 9.4 10.4 10.5
AT 3.0 7.8 9.3 9.6 9.6 9.8 1.3 5.1 7.0 8.0 9.7 9.8
PT -0.1 0.9 3.4 5.1 5.9 6.4 -0.2 0.7 2.0 3.4 6.1 7.7
FI 4.0 7.5 7.5 8.2 10.5 10.5 3.7 6.7 5.2 5.2 8.6 8.5
Sources: Eurosystem staff calculations
Notes: Figures underlined and in italics denote 50% pass-through reached. Figures underlined denote 90% pass-through reached. Results 
on pass-through for the most recent members of the euro area (Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia) were not estimated as data are only 
available from 2005. The models used are described in Annex 2.4.
Table A13 Disaggregated prices for household consumers, 2008 H2
(consumer band Dc – annual consumption between 2,500 and 5,000 kWh)
Composition of household prices in euro per 100 kWh Share in price without tax (%)
Total price Energy 
and supply
Network costs Taxes and levies Energy 
and supply
Network costs
Euro area  18.2---- -
Euro area 1) 19.8 8.5 5.1 6.1 63 37
BE 20.8 9.0 6.9 3.6 56 44
DE 22.0 8.0 5.4 8.5 60 40
I E  2 0 . 3---- -
G R  1 1 . 0---- -
ES 15.6 8.9 3.8 2.8 70 30
F R  1 2 . 3---- -
IT 22.0 11.1 4.9 5.4 70 30
C Y  2 0 . 4---- -
LU 15.6 6.2 7.5 1.9 45 55
MT 15.4 12.4 2.2 0.8 85 15
N L  1 7 . 8---- -
AT 17.7 6.8 5.9 5.0 53 47
PT 15.3 7.0 4.0 4.3 64 36
SI 11.6 4.6 4.6 2.4 50 50
SK 15.3 6.5 6.3 2.4 51 49
FI 12.7 5.5 4.1 3.2 58 42
Source: European Commission (2009a), Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations. 
1) Denotes euro area aggregate calculated on the basis of available country data (i.e. excluding Ireland, Greece, France, Cyprus and the 
Netherlands – approximately 25% of the euro area coverage). Italics denote Eurostat/Eurosystem estimates.104
ECB
Occasional Paper No 113
June 2010
Table A14 Simulation results for the expenditure components of GDP
(percentage point deviation from baseline)
Real private consumption Investment Employment
Year 1  Year 2  Year 3  Year 1  Year 2  Year 3  Year 1  Year 2  Year 3 
Belgium -0.04 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11 -0.45 -0.72 0.01 -0.04 -0.14
Germany -0.31 -0.53 -0.60 -0.17 -0.31 -0.34 0.04 0.00 -0.06
Ireland 0.00 -0.09 -0.19 0.00 -0.07 -0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Greece -0.04 -0.11 -0.20 -0.26 -1.06 -2.31 -0.01 -0.05 -0.14
Spain -0.06 -0.12 -0.21 -0.10 -0.43 -0.55 0.00 -0.15 -0.34
France -0.04 -0.07 -0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02
Italy -0.09 -0.31 -0.40 -0.04 -0.21 -0.42 -0.01 -0.08 -0.16
Cyprus -0.01 -0.06 -0.16 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 0.00 -0.01 -0.02
Luxembourg -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 0.00 -0.15 -0.24 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Malta -0.12 -0.21 -0.14 -0.41 -0.93 -0.81 0.00 -0.17 -0.10
Netherlands -0.03 -0.13 -0.15 -0.05 -0.19 -0.24 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
Austria -0.17 -0.19 -0.13 -0.08 -0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03
Portugal -0.07 -0.13 -0.20 -0.09 -0.11 -0.17 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04
Slovenia -0.11 -0.08 -0.13 0.40 -0.01 -0.20 0.01 -0.02 -0.06
Slovakia -0.34 -0.42 -0.39 -0.05 -0.08 -0.07 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06
Weighted average -0.14 -0.27 -0.33 -0.09 -0.24 -0.35 0.01 -0.04 -0.11
Minimum -0.34 -0.53 -0.60 -0.41 -1.06 -2.31 -0.04 -0.17 -0.34
Maximum 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 0.40 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.01
Exports  Imports Net exports
Year 1  Year 2  Year 3  Year 1  Year 2  Year 3  Year 1  Year 2  Year 3
Belgium  -0.08 -0.31 -0.46 -0.04 -0.18 -0.26 -0.04 -0.12 -0.14 
Germany  -0.02  -0.07  -0.09  -0.18  -0.22  -0.24 0.07 0.05 0.06 
Ireland  0.00  0.00 -0.01  0.01 -0.04 -0.10 -0.01  0.03  0.07 
Greece  0.00  -0.04  -0.13  -0.19  -0.65  -1.24 0.07 0.18 0.14 
Spain  -0.03 -0.14 -0.11 -0.11  0.12  0.00  0.03 -0.08 -0.04 
France  -0.01  -0.03  -0.07  -0.06  -0.09  -0.10 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Italy  0.00  -0.02  -0.05  -0.06  -0.17  -0.19 0.02 0.04 0.04 
Cyprus  0.00 -0.03 -0.07  0.03  0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
Luxembourg  0.00  -0.02  -0.04  -0.01  -0.04  -0.08 0.02 0.03 0.05 
Malta  -0.21 -0.33 -0.35 -0.08 -0.38 -0.45 -0.11  0.13  0.07 
Netherlands  -0.09  -0.15  -0.16  -0.10  -0.25  -0.26 0.00 0.06 0.04 
Austria  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.07  -0.06  -0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 
Portugal  -0.03 -0.13 -0.26 -0.06 -0.12 -0.17  0.02  0.01 -0.02 
Slovenia  0.00 -0.03  0.00  0.04 -0.08 -0.10 -0.03  0.04  0.07 
Slovakia  -0.07  -0.16  -0.23  -0.22  -0.34  -0.39 0.13 0.12 0.06 
Weighted  average -0.03  -0.09  -0.12  -0.10  -0.15  -0.19 0.03 0.02 0.02
Minimum  -0.21 -0.33 -0.46 -0.22 -0.65 -1.24 -0.11 -0.12 -0.14 
Maximum  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.00 0.13 0.18 0.14 
Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: The simulations assume exogenous monetary and ﬁ  scal policy. Beyond this, the models are not harmonised and can differ with 
respect to their size, estimation period and theoretical underpinning. For a more detailed discussion, see Section 2.2 and Fagan and 
Morgan (2005).105
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2 TECHNICAL  ANNEXES
2.1  TECHNICAL ANNEX TO BOX 2:
SECURITY OF ENERGY SUPPLY
Energy security is a multifaceted concept. 
In order to outline its various facets, this box 
makes use of a synthetic indicator, known as 
an energy security index, which incorporates 
information from a number of relevant variables. 
The indicator draws from and develops on the 
methodology proposed by Avedillo and Muñoz 
(2007). The variables used, and the reasons for 
choosing them, are as follows:
1.  Degree of self-sufﬁ   ciency of primary 
energies: it is assumed that greater control 
over energy resources provides greater 
assurance that the economy will keep 
functioning in the event of an interruption 
in supply. This variable is deﬁ   ned as the 
proportion of consumption covered by 
a country’s primary energy production, 
that is:
  primary energy production j
primary energy consumption j
  where j is the euro area, each euro area 
Member State or the United States.
2.  Reliability of imports: assuming equality in 
the share accounted for by primary energy 
production, the impact of an interruption 
in external supply is reduced by higher 
diversiﬁ   cation of imports and by higher 
political stability of the supplying countries. 
The variable has been calculated by 
multiplying the share of each source in the 
supply of a given fuel (oil or gas) by the 








*g / M + *p / M
 where  si =7-ri and ri is the risk of each source 
country i with values between 0 and 7 87; gi is 
the proportion of gas imported by country j 
from country i; pi is the proportion of crude 
oil imported by country j from country i; 
M=g+p.
3.  Negotiating power in gas markets: 
sometimes an exporting country may be 
as dependent on its exports to a consumer 
country as vice versa, and this endows the 
latter with much negotiating power thereby 
reducing the risk of interruption in supply. 
This variable is deﬁ  ned as each country’s 
share of the purchases from its main supplier 
of gas, since this fuel causes the greatest 





total natural gas exportsi
  where i is the primary supplier of natural gas 
to country j.
4.  Imports of liqueﬁ   ed natural gas : 
LNG imports afford the sector ﬂ  exibility 
because they enable the importer to use 
different suppliers or import routes if the 
need arises. This variable consists of LNG 
imports as a proportion of total natural gas 
imports:
  liquefied natural gas imports j
total natural gas imports j
5.  Degree of electrical connectivity: provides 
ﬂ  exibility to the electricity sector in the event 
of unforeseen occurrences. It is calculated 




electricity imports j electricity exports j +
6. Self-sufﬁ   ciency in electricity generation: 
the vulnerability of the electricity system 
to international shocks decreases with 
increasing domestic electricity production. 
For more details on the risk variable, see the country  87 
risk classiﬁ   cations available on the OECD’s website at 
www.oecd.org106
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The variable is the proportion of total 
electricity that is produced with domestic 
energy (renewable and nuclear):
electricity production 
with renewable and nuclear j
total electricity production j
7.  Degree of diversiﬁ  cation of primary energies: 
diversiﬁ   cation mitigates the vulnerability 
of energy systems by reducing the impact 
of a possible interruption in the supply 
of any of the raw materials in a country’s 
energy basket. It is deﬁ  ned as one minus the 
Herﬁ  ndahl index.




  where i is primary energy consumption 
(petroleum, natural gas, coal, nuclear and 
renewables).
The foregoing variables were calculated for 
the various Member States of the euro area and 
the United States. The euro area is measured 
in two different ways: ﬁ   rst, assuming that it 
is an integrated single market and, therefore, 
subtracting energy exchanges within the area. 
The variable thus constructed is denoted 
“euro area (aggregated)”. Second, the euro 
area is measured as a simple mean of the 
countries, denoted “euro area (average)”. Owing 
to lack of information, the euro area is taken 
as being formed by the 16 countries currently 
composing it, less Cyprus, Luxembourg and 
Malta. For this reason, the period considered 
is 1993-2006. The sources used to construct 
these variables are Eurostat, the EIA and the 
OECD. These variables are represented in 
Charts A12 to A18.
As can be seen in the charts, the situation and 
behaviour of each country in respect of the 
different variables considered is fairly 
heterogeneous, although some general trends 
can be identiﬁ  ed.  Speciﬁ   cally, the degree of 
self-sufﬁ  ciency in primary energies decreased 
over time as a result of consumption growing 
faster than production. In this respect, 
the situation of the euro area countries differs 
somewhat from that of the United States. 
However, in general, the euro area countries 
have increased the reliability of their imports, 
owing to the more stable socio-economic 
situation of their suppliers and to the replacement 
of some of these suppliers by countries with 
lower geopolitical risk. The negotiating power 
of the euro area countries in the gas market has 
not changed much, given that the source 
of the bulk of these countries’ gas imports has, 
with some exceptions such as the Netherlands 88, 
remained the same. Similarly, the degree of 
electrical connectivity has also increased, 
although the growth in the ﬂ  ow of electricity 
between countries has taken place within the 
euro area, so this trend is not observed in the 
euro area in aggregate. LNG imports continue to 
be low, although they represent a substantial 
volume in Spain. The differences in the levels of 
self-sufﬁ  ciency in electricity generation reﬂ  ect 
the different national energy policies followed. 
Thus France, which clearly espouses nuclear 
energy, and Austria, which embraces renewable 
energies, are notable for their self-sufﬁ  ciency in 
electricity generation. Ireland, however, has no 
nuclear power stations and generates little power 
from renewable sources. That said, the 
variability of this variable increases with the 
increasing weight of renewable energies. 
Since self-sufﬁ  ciency in electricity generation is 
generally higher in the larger countries than in 
the smaller ones, the level for the aggregate 
euro area is higher than that for the average 
euro area. Moreover, this is one of the variables 
in which the euro area is less vulnerable 
than the United States. Finally, the degree of 
diversiﬁ  cation of primary energy has increased 
in seven of the euro area countries but has fallen 
in Belgium and Ireland, the ﬁ  nal  result 
being very slight growth in the euro area as a 
whole. Chart A19 gives the energy security 
indices thus calculated for the United States and 
For the Netherlands, this variable is higher than one because of  88 
intra-EU statistical discrepancies (the use of different methods 
for calculating the statistical value of dispatches – f.o.b. value – 
arrivals – c.i.f. value – and triangular trade). Nevertheless, 
the aggregated euro area variable is not affected by these 
discrepancies because its main supplier of gas is Russian.107
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the two deﬁ  nitions of the euro area. The ﬁ  gure 
for the aggregate euro area is higher than that 
for the average euro area because the structure 
for the euro area as a whole is more balanced 
than that of the Member States individually.
Principal factor analysis was used to calculate 
the weights of the above variables in the 
synthetic indicator. This procedure requires all 
the variables to be expressed in the same units 
of measurement, so the seven variables were 
ﬁ  rst normalised using the min./max. method. In 
keeping with standard practice, the factors 
meeting the following three criteria were 
selected: having associated eigenvalues larger 
than one; individually contributing to the 
explanation of the overall variance by more than 
10%; and cumulatively contributing to the 
explanation of the overall variance by more than 
60%. Based on these criteria and assuming the 
euro area to be an integrated single market, 
a single factor is selected, which explains 82% 
of the overall variance. The weight of each 
variable in the energy security index is equal to 
the square of its factor loading divided by the 
overall variance explained by that factor.89 
The weights thus obtained are given in Table 
A15. These same weights were used to calculate 
the euro area (average) index.90
Charts A20 and A21 show how the situation of 
the euro area (aggregated) has been changing 
with respect to the United States. It can be 
seen from the charts that the euro area has 
progressively lost comparative advantage in 
respect of the proportion of LNG in natural gas 
imports, owing to the faster growth of this kind 
of import in the United States. However, the 
electricity sector continues to be less vulnerable 
in the euro area than the United States, given 
the euro area’s higher self-sufﬁ  ciency  and 
connectivity.
For more details about methodology, see OECD 2005. 89 
The euro area (average) is also calculated by averaging the  90 
security indices of each of the 13 Member States which result 
from applying factoral analysis to these countries and the United 
States. Despite the fact that in this case the weights of the various 
variables in the index are somewhat different, the index for the 
average euro area is practically the same.108
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Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.
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Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.
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Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.
Chart A15 Imports of liquefied natural gas
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Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.109
ECB
Occasional Paper No 113
June 2010
ANNEXES




























14 euro area (aggregated)
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Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.110
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Table A15
Variable  Weight in energy security index
Degree of self-sufﬁ  ciency of primary energies 0.168
Reliability of imports  0.142
Negotiating power in gas markets  0.170
Imports of liqueﬁ  ed natural gas  0.156
Degree of electrical connectivity  0.108
Self-sufﬁ  ciency in electricity generation  0.165
Degree of diversiﬁ  cation of primary energies  0.090
Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.
Chart A20 Energy security
(1994)
euro area




















Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.
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2.2  OIL PRICE SHOCKS AND EURO AREA 
OUTPUT IN THE BLANCHARD-GALI (2007) 
FRAMEWORK
In the past decade a broad consensus over the 
diminishing importance of oil price shocks 
on output ﬂ   uctuations has emerged, mainly 
motivated by the muted response of GDP in 
the industrialised economies to the oil shocks 
observed since the late 1990s compared with the 
1970s. 
In an inﬂ   uential paper Blanchard and Gali 
(2007), using a SVAR, show that the output 
reaction to an oil price shock for a set of 
industrialised economies lessened substantially 
after the mid-1980s. In some cases, the GDP 
response has even become positive, lending 
support to the view that recent oil price shocks 
have been driven by a global demand expansion 
that has lifted global output together with 
commodity prices. 
In their contribution, Blanchard and Gali analyse 
separately the three largest euro area countries 
(Germany, France and Italy) but not the euro 
area as a whole. Here we report the results 
obtained by ﬁ  tting their VAR model to euro area 
data. The variables in the VAR are the log of the 
dollar price of oil 91, consumer inﬂ  ation, GDP 
inﬂ   ation, the wage rate, real GDP and 
employment. The last ﬁ  ve variables enter the 
model in quarterly rates of growth. The deviation 
of labour productivity from a quadratic trend 
enters each equation as an exogenous variable. 
This exercise differs from that carried out 
by Blanchard and Gali in two respects. First, 
Blanchard and Gali identify only the oil shock 
by assuming that the oil price is not affected 
contemporaneously by any other variable in the 
system (which is equivalent to assuming that 
the oil price shock is equal to the residuals of 
the oil price equation). Here we adopt a slightly 
different approach, as we identify all the shocks 
by using a Choleski factorisation of the residual 
variance matrix. Oil prices are ordered ﬁ  rst 
so that the deﬁ  nition of an oil price shock is 
consistent with that used by Blanchard and Gali. 
Second, rather than splitting the sample in two, 
we use two windows containing, respectively, 
36 and 35 samples of 85 observations and 
then average responses across these two sets 
of estimates. The former sample includes the 
1970s, while the latter excludes them. 
The results, presented in Table A16, are broadly 
consistent with those of Blanchard and Gali. 
The negative impact of oil price shocks on GDP 
falls signiﬁ  cantly when one excludes the 1970s 
from the analysis: the cumulated impact on GDP 
falls from four to less than two decimal points. 
Note that the full sample effects are very much 
in line with those reported in the main text for 
the euro area weighted average.92
The oil price is not converted into euros for consistency with  91 
Blanchard and Gali’s speciﬁ  cation where the price of oil is not 
converted into domestic currencies. 
The results for inﬂ   ation, not shown here in the interest of  92 
brevity, are consistent with those in Chapter 3 documenting the 
diminished inﬂ  ationary effect of oil price shocks.
Table A16 Effect of a 10% oil price increase on GDP over different sample periods
(annual averages)
Year 1  Year 2  Year 3
First sub-sample  -0.04 -0.23 -0.38
Second sub-sample  0.03 -0.05 -0.18
Full sample  -0.03 -0.25 -0.32
Weighted average from structural models -0.08 -0.19 -0.24
Notes: This table indicates the short-run effects of a permanent increase in the price of oil by around 10% on annual real GDP in the euro 
area. Data are from the euro area-wide model. The ﬁ  gures denote cumulated deviations in percentage points from the respective baseline 
simulation with unchanged oil prices. The estimations of the model over the full sample are based on data from 1970Q1 to 2008Q4. 
The results for the different sub-samples refer to averages of results over two overlapping periods. The former period consists of 36 
samples starting with 1970Q3-1991Q3 and ending with 1979Q2-2000Q2. The latter consists of 35 samples starting with 1979Q3-2000Q3 
and ending with 1987Q4-2008Q4.112
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2.3  COMPARISON OF WEEKLY OIL BULLETIN 
AND HICP DATA
Although HICP data are the ofﬁ  cial consumer 
price data for the European Union and are 
compiled to a very high standard in order to 
ensure maximum comparability, they involve 
some drawbacks when used for the purposes 
of analysing consumer liquid fuel prices. First, 
HICP data are only available in index form 
and not in terms of actual price levels. This 
has important implications for the analysis of 
oil price pass-through and for the comparison 
of price levels. Second, they are only available 
inclusive of tax which, combined with the ﬁ  rst 
point, prevents the calculation of pre-tax prices. 
Lastly, HICP data are only available at a monthly 
frequency. Given the high volatility of oil prices 
and the high frequency of changes in consumer 
liquid fuel prices, it is possible that data at a 
higher frequency could provide better insight 
into very short-term developments in consumer 
liquid fuel prices.
Fortunately, data available from the European 
Commission’s weekly Oil Bulletin on consumer 
liquid fuel prices do not suffer many of these 
drawbacks. First, these data are available in 
terms of absolute prices (i.e. cent per litre). 
Second, they are available both in terms of 
pre-tax and post-tax prices and information is 
provided on excise taxes and VAT rates. Third, 
they are available at a weekly frequency – 
the data are generally collected on the Monday 
of each week. Furthermore, data are also 
available in a very timely fashion, usually within 
two to three days of the reference period 
(at present, the data are released by the European 
Commission on the Wednesday evening of the 
same week that the data are collected). 
In addition, the weekly Oil Bulletin data are 
available for both petrol (euro 95) and diesel 
prices and have been publicly available since 
1994 – a similar period to the HICP liquid fuel 
data. The availability of diesel prices is very 
important given the growing relevance of diesel 
cars for the euro area market – see Chart A23. 
On the other hand, it should be noted that the 
data are not compiled with the same degree of 
harmonisation and assurance of quality as the 
HICP data. This may particularly be an issue 
when we come to consider price level 
differences.93
Chart A22 below illustrates that the weekly 
Oil Bulletin and HICP data for transport and 
For an overview of methodologies and cross-country differences  93 
in the collection of the weekly Oil Bulletin data, see European 
Commission 2009b. Countries differ in the source of data used, the 
degree of market coverage obtained and, in a number of instances, 
data are not collected on the Monday as is the case for most 
countries. A potentially more substantial difference, particularly 
when it comes to comparing price levels, is that some countries 
report prices with ﬁ  delity discounts while the Netherlands only 
reports “advised” rather than actual pump prices.
Chart A22 Weekly Oil Bulletin (WOB) and HICP data
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Sources: Eurostat, European Commission (DG-TREN) and Eurosystem staff calculations.113
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heating fuels for the euro area co-move very 
closely indeed. For heating fuels, the correlation 
coefﬁ   cient is 0.998 in level terms and 0.956 
when considering month-on-month changes. 
For transport fuels, the respective correlation 
coefﬁ   cients are 0.999 and 0.985. The high 
degree of correlation is observed across most 
countries for which data are available with some 
exceptions. In Ireland, the correlation in levels is 
quite high but relatively low in terms of month-
on-month changes; this is because the Irish Oil 
Bulletin data are only collected at a monthly 
frequency. The correlation of data for Greece 
is very low for heating fuel, as the Oil Bulletin 
data are quite seasonal owing to seasonal 
variations in excise rates which are not evident 
in the HICP data. Overall, notwithstanding 
some country-speciﬁ   c caveats, the very close 
co-movement of the weekly Oil Bulletin and 
HICP data suggest that conclusions made based 
on the analysis of weekly Oil Bulletin data will 
most likely hold for ofﬁ  cial HICP also.
2.4  ECONOMETRIC ASSESSMENT OF OIL PRICE 
PASS-THROUGH INTO CONSUMER LIQUID 
FUEL PRICES
The pass-through from oil to gasoline prices 
has been extensively studied in a variety of 
countries, with the bulk of papers written on US 
data and some recent interest in the largest euro 
area countries. The existing empirical evidence 
is, however, extremely heterogeneous in terms 
of the underlying research question, data and 
methodology used. For instance, most studies 
have focused on testing the hypothesis that 
gasoline prices in a speciﬁ   c country respond 
more promptly to upward than to downward 
oil price changes. However, very few have 
tackled the question whether the pass-through 
is complete or not, and whether there exist 
substantial cross-country differences in the 
speed of adjustment of downstream prices to 
oil price ﬂ  uctuations. Some studies have used 
monthly data, while others have focused on 
changes at a weekly or even daily frequency. 
Some papers have argued that the adjustment is 
non-linear, but few have explicitly clariﬁ  ed the 
value added of modelling non-linearity against 
simpler linear alternatives. Critical assessments 
of the existing evidence can be found in Geweke 
(2004) and Manera and Frey (2007). However, 
even these relatively recent overviews have 
been made somewhat outdated by revived 
interest and research on the topic, sustained by 
the effect of volatility of oil prices in the past 
decade on consumer price inﬂ  ation, particularly 
across euro area countries.
Given the diversity of methodologies and 
datasets covered, it is not surprising that the 
ﬁ   ndings of this literature have been mixed. 
In the United States, a number of studies based 
on weekly data and on error correction models 
(Karrenbock 1991, Borenstein et al. 1997, Balke 
et al. 1998, Borenstein et al. 2002, Lewis 2003, 
Ye et al. 2006) have tended to ﬁ  nd  some 
asymmetry in the response of gasoline prices to 
various measures of upstream costs (oil prices 
or wholesale gasoline prices) with some support 
for non-linear adjustment (Radchenko 2005 
and Al Gudhea et al. 2007). Notable exceptions 
Chart A23 Relative importance of diesel 
across euro area countries


































Sources: Eurostat, ACEA (European Automobile 
Manufacturers’ Association), ANFA (the Spanish association 
of car manufacturers) and Eurosystem staff calculations.114
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are given by the GAO report (1993), Burdette 
and Zyren (2002 and 2003) and Bachmaier and 
Grifﬁ  n (2003). Bachmaier and Grifﬁ  n not only 
ﬁ  nd little support for the asymmetry hypothesis 
but also, specifying their model in absolute 
price differences rather than log differences, 
report impulse responses showing a full 
pass-through to both negative and positive 
oil price changes. Studies on the euro area 
aggregate and on euro area countries conﬁ  rm 
that the choice of working in levels rather than 
log differences has important consequences for 
the results – see, for example, Meyler 2009 and 
Rodriguez 2009. 
The (symmetric) pass-through from reﬁ  ned oil 
prices to pre-tax prices is modelled using the 
framework of the equation below.
∆Pi,t  = ci,j + ∑αi,j,k  ∆Pi,t-k  + ∑ βi,j,k ∆Pj,t-k 
+ γi,j (Pi,t-1 − θi,j P I   
 ) 
k=1 k=0





C is the consumer price (excluding 
taxes) of oil energy type i (petrol, diesel or 
heating fuel), Pj
I is the spot price of oil input j 
(reﬁ  ned gasoline or reﬁ  ned gas oil). In addition, 
we allow for, and test, a time trend variable in 
the error correction term. 
The model we use to test for asymmetry is 
shown in the equation below.94 This is similar to 
the ﬁ  rst, with the exception that allowance is 

























































Generally, the results suggest little evidence 
of economically meaningful asymmetry 
(in a small number of cases, there is some 
evidence of statistically signiﬁ  cant asymmetry, 
however, when this is quantiﬁ  ed the effect is 
quite marginal – see Table A17). Furthermore, 
the statistically signiﬁ   cant results should 
be interpreted with caution as they may be 
misleading in one of two ways. First, in some 
of the models with tight conﬁ  dence intervals, 
coefﬁ   cients are signiﬁ   cantly different in a 
statistical sense but not in an economic sense 
(i.e. the degree of apparent asymmetry while 
statistically signiﬁ  cant is very small). Second, 
in some of the models with wide conﬁ  dence 
intervals, coefﬁ   cients are not statistically 
signiﬁ  cantly different owing to large standard 
errors, but if the point estimates are taken 
at face value, they may imply economically 
meaningful differences in response to oil price 
rises and decreases. Ultimately, the fact that 
no statistically signiﬁ   cant asymmetric effects 
are found across all fuel types in any of the 
countries would lend further support to the view 
that the power of these tests is relatively low and 
the evidence for asymmetry is not compelling.
Note that the long-term coefﬁ  cient in the error correction term  94 
is the same for increases and decreases in upstream prices. This 
is because it does not make sense that the long-term coefﬁ  cient 
would vary according to short-term price changes. In any case, 
we tested the euro area results allowing for different long-run 
coefﬁ  cients and found that they were broadly similar.
Table A17 Summary of results of Wald tests 
for asymmetry in pass-through of refined oil 
prices into petrol, diesel and heating fuel prices
Petrol Diesel  Heating  fuel
euro area  0.52 0.37 0.16
BE 0.59 0.54 0.25
DE 0.39 0.52 0.38
IE 0.94 0.19 0.26
GR 0.11 0.26 0.24
ES 0.88 0.81 0.10
FR  0.02* 0.43 0.06*
IT 0.19 0.00* 0.00*
LU  0.02* 0.81 0.55
NL 0.21 0.00* 0.07*
AT 0.82 0.03* 0.09*
PT 0.30 0.13 0.89
FI 0.39 0.03* 0.15
Note: * denotes statistically signiﬁ  cant at standard levels.115
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2.5  GAS AND ELECTRICITY PRICE LEVELS 
(HICP INDEX VS. PRICE LEVEL DATA)
Gas and electricity price level data (with and 
without taxes, in euro per unit of energy) are 
collected by Eurostat on a semi-annual basis. 
Prices valid on the ﬁ  rst day of January and July 
of each year were recorded until 2007, when the 
methodology was substantially changed. That 
change implied a new deﬁ  nition of the standard 
consumption 95 used and a focus on six-month 
average prices, so pre and post-2007 data are 
not directly comparable. Focusing on pre-2007 
data allows a comparison of these price level 
data with HICP index data with a relatively 
large sample. 
Considering gas prices, a high degree of 
correlation can be seen between year-on-year 
price changes between the two datasets for 
the euro area as whole, suggesting that these 
data are representative of prices faced by 
“typical” consumers. However, this is not 
systematically the case at the country level. For 
Germany, Ireland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands and Slovenia, a high correlation 
between the two data sources is found. In Belgium 
and Spain, the correlation between HICP index 
and price level data is weaker because there is an 
additional lag in the HICP index data compared 
with the price level data.96 In Austria the HICP 
index and price level data are weakly correlated. 
For Portugal and Slovakia not enough data are 
available to draw strong conclusions: although 
correlation appears weak in Slovakia where the 
HICP seems to reﬂ  ect a regulated price.
Deﬁ  nition of the standard consumptions (selected as structural  95 
or so-called Lisbon indicator). 
 Gas:  Households pre-2007: type D3 (annual consumption 
83.70 GJ); post-2007: type band D2 (annual consumption between 
20 and 200GJ). Industry pre-2007: type I3-1 (annual consumption 
41,860 GJ; load factor 200 days, 1,600 hours); post-2007: band I3 
(annual consumption between 10,000 and 100,000 GJ).
 Electricity:  Households pre-2007: Dc (annual consumption 
3,500 kWh of which night 1,300); post-2007: band Dc 
(annual consumption between 2,500 and 5,000 kWh). Industry 
pre-2007: Ie (annual consumption 2,000 MWh; maximum 
demand 500 kW; annual load 4,000 hours); post-2007: band Ic 
(annual consumption between 500 and 2,000 MWh).
In Spain this is the case particularly in the period 2000-05,  96 
but not thereafter. In Belgium no lag can be found after 2007: 
from 2007 the HICP only reﬂ   ects current price evolutions, 
whereas before 2007 prices were recorded as 12-month averages 
to reﬂ  ect an annual bill approach.
Chart A24 Euro area gas and electricity prices: comparison of HICP index and medium-sized 
household-level data1)
(annual rates of change on 1 January and 1 July; percentages)
price level database (weighted)
HICP index


































1996 1998 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Sources: Eurostat and ESCB calculations.
1) Price level data according to the pre-2007 methodology: prices valid on the ﬁ  rst of January and the ﬁ  rst of July. The same standard 
medium-sized household is used for each country. The euro area is weighted according to 2009 HICP countries and item weights, for 
countries for which data are available.116
ECB
Occasional Paper No 113
June 2010
As to electricity prices, the correlation between 
year-on-year price changes according to the 
HICP database and the price level database is 
weaker than for gas prices, the euro area and at 
the country level. Although the relationship is 
relatively strong for some countries (Germany, 
Spain, Cyprus, Portugal and Finland) it is rather 
weak for others (Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands). The weak result for Belgium 
is attributable to an additional lag in the HICP 
which has the same methodological origin as for 
gas prices. For other countries, a more general 
possible explanation could be that electricity 
prices vary more across different consumer 
types than is the case for gas (for example, 
inclusion of night tariffs). Thus, the Eurostat 
deﬁ  nition of a standard consumer (according to 
the Lisbon structural indicator database) may not 
be as representative for all consumers. Indeed, 
preliminary results considering the alternative 
household deﬁ   nitions tend to indicate that the 
standard consumer can differ from country 
to country (i.e. the correlation between HICP 
index and price level data can differ according 
to the standard consumer used, and the HICP 
is supposed to reﬂ  ect the national consumption 
pattern very closely). This caveat should be kept 
in mind when analysing electricity price levels. 
2.6  ECONOMETRIC ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT 
OF THE LIBERALISATION OF ELECTRICITY 
AND GAS MARKETS ON CONSUMER PRICES 
The effect of the liberalisation of European 
gas and electricity markets on consumer prices 
has been estimated using a panel framework 
(see equation below). 
N
j=1
γDt P i,t + + + = αi ∑ βjXj,t εi,t
where Pi, t is the level of consumer electricity (gas) 
price net of all taxes, αi is a country, i ﬁ  xed effect, 
Dt is a common time effect which captures a 
common trend across countries 97 and Xj, t is a set 
of  j explanatory variables, for j = 1, ..., N. 
They include competition/regulation indicators, 
consumption intensity and dependency indicators, 
international gas and oil prices and a set of control 
variables such as population and its density. 
The model computes structural coefﬁ  cients 
common across countries for the set of Xt 
explanatory variables. The sample is based on the 
available data for 16 euro area countries analysed 
over 16 years – from 1991 to 2007. In order 
to obtain estimated coefﬁ   cients that reﬂ  ect  a 
euro area average, the estimation procedure 
should account for country differences other 
than the differences already explained in the 
control variables and in ﬁ  xed-term parameters. 
The baseline model outlined in the equation 
above has been augmented with weights – GDP 
weights speciﬁ  cally. These weights should help 
to capture and ameliorate a possible problem of 
heteroskedasticity in the dataset.
Four models for electricity prices and ﬁ  ve 
models for gas prices have been estimated 
since the availability of different regulation and 
competition indicators provided by the OECD, 
namely: an aggregate indicator for competition 
and regulation, an entry barrier indicator, a 
vertical integration indicator, a public ownership 
indicator and a concentration indicator – C1, 
available for the gas market only. The indicators 
have a “descending interpretation” – in other 
words, the higher the level of the index, the 
more the market is concentrated, entry is 
difﬁ   cult and/or, in general, competition is 
lacking or regulation tight. Hence, an estimated 
positive coefﬁ  cient is expected for most of the 
indicators, with the possible exception of the 
vertical integration indicators, as discussed 
further below. The indicators are regressed 
separately for two reasons. First, most of them 
follow a common trend over time. This may 
give rise to a problem of collinearity, which 
could result in wrongly estimated coefﬁ  cients 
if indicators are considered jointly. Second, 
separate regressions can be considered as a 
robustness check for variables other than the 
A Levin, Lin and Chu’s (2002) panel unit root test has been  97 
performed including individual ﬁ   xed effects and a common 
trend. The null hypothesis of unit root is not accepted with 
probability less or equal to ﬁ   ve per cent for both gas and 
electricity prices. As counterfactual evidence, a common trend 
has been estimated and subtracted from the price variables. 
Hence, the same panel unit root test – excluding common trend 
and constant – has been performed. The test does not accept the 
null hypothesis of unit root.117
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ANNEXES
competition/regulation indicators since they are 
common across models.
The results suggest a statistically signiﬁ  cant 
impact of regulation/competition indicators on 
prices in both the gas and electricity markets 
(Tables A18 and A19). Nonetheless, the precise 
magnitude of these results should be interpreted 
with caution. Although it is clear that both 
these sectors, previously highly regulated, 
have undergone some degree of liberalisation, 
this process does not lend itself easily to 
quantiﬁ  cation. It may also be the case that the 
degree of regulation might be endogenous, 
e.g. if high prices are observed, regulation might 
be introduced in an attempt to counter this.
For the electricity market, the coefﬁ  cient 
estimates for the aggregate indicator, as well as 
those for entry barriers and vertical integration, 
are positive and highly statistically signiﬁ  cant 
whilst the coefﬁ   cient for public ownership, 
although positive, is not statistically signiﬁ  cant. 
The coefﬁ   cients on the share of electricity 
generated using nuclear energy and fossil fuel 
inputs are negative, suggesting that these factors 
have, on average over the period considered, 
lowered prices whilst the coefﬁ  cient on the share 
of hydropower is positive.98 Gas prices impact 
positively on electricity prices, as expected, 
given that among fossils gas is the most used 
Network industries usually do not price at marginal cost since  98 
the ﬁ  xed costs of production are high and must be recovered 
in the price paid by consumers. Very often the price schedule 
consists of a two-part tariff aimed at recovering both ﬁ  xed and 
marginal costs of production. Although the marginal cost of 
producing nuclear energy is close to zero, its ﬁ  xed component is 
very large owing to high costs of installation and decommission. 
It should also be noted that the sign of these coefﬁ  cients 
represents an average over the entire sample period, 1991-2007.
At any point in time the coefﬁ  cients on these variables can be 
both negative and positive depending on opportunity costs. 
Lastly, it should be noted that the equation also includes 
international gas/oil prices, which means that the upward 
impact from these prices observed over the period 1999-2009 
may be captured by the coefﬁ  cients.
Table A18 Regressions for electricity prices
Dependent variable: net (excluding all taxes) electricity prices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aggregate indicator  0.30
(12.40)*
Entry barrier  0.21
(14.57)*




























































Observations  1,570 1,570 1,570 1,570 
R-squared  0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 
Notes: Country-speciﬁ  c ﬁ  xed effects have been included as well as a common time trend effect.
Value of t statistics in parentheses.
* signiﬁ  cant at 1%; ** signiﬁ  cant at 5%; *** signiﬁ  cant at 10%.118
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input. When included alongside gas, the oil 
coefﬁ  cient is not signiﬁ  cant.
In the gas market all indicators are signiﬁ  cant 
with the expected positive sign, except for the 
vertical integration indicator which has a negative 
sign. However, as indicated above, a priori, 
the sign on the vertical integration variable is not 
clear. It should carry a positive sign if a reduced 
competition effect prevails, or a negative sign if 
an efﬁ  ciency effect dominates. The results suggest 
that the second interpretation is correct. By 
contrast, the ﬁ  rst interpretation seems to be more 
relevant for the electricity market. An alternative 
interpretation could be that since upstream gas 
supplies are quite integrated (coming mainly from 
Russia and Norway), downstream integration is 
required to offset the upstream negotiation 
position. It should also be noted that, based on the 
analysis contained in the main part of the text, the 
coefﬁ   cient on international gas prices was 
expected to be close to one on average for the euro 
area. In Table A19, the estimated coefﬁ  cient is 
generally around 0.4. Together with the coefﬁ  cient 
on the lagged dependent variable 99 of roughly 0.5, 
this suggests an estimated long-run coefﬁ  cient on 
lagged international gas prices of around 0.8. The 
coefﬁ   cient may be biased downward owing to 
effects already attributed to the country-speciﬁ  c 
ﬁ  xed effects.
2.7 INPUT-OUTPUT  TABLES
Input-output tables provide a reﬁ  ned 
decomposition of the production process, based 
upon the interrelationships between different 
branches of activity in the economy via the 
cross consumption of intermediate inputs. 
Applying the cumulative approach, i.e. by 
going back up the production chain of a branch 
in order to take into account all the direct and 
A lagged dependent variable has been included in the gas market  99 
models because autocorrelation of ﬁ  rst order has been detected 
(i.e. LM test) for some single country regressions.
Table A19 Regressions for gas prices
Dependent variable: net (excluding all taxes) gas prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)








































































Observations 1,542 1,542 1,542 1,542 1,542
R-squared  0.95 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.96 
Notes: Country-speciﬁ  c ﬁ  xed effects have been included as well as a common time trend effect. Value of t statistics in parentheses.
* signiﬁ  cant at 5%; ** signiﬁ  cant at 1%.119
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indirect inputs necessary for that production, it 
is possible to derive not only the direct use of 
energy inputs but also the indirect use, through 
consumption of other products which use energy 
as an intermediate input. Then, by introducing 
a change in the price of energy inputs, we can 
calculate the overall effect it has on the cost 
structure (producer prices), and on consumer 
prices. The overall impact can be decomposed 
into a direct impact (through direct energy 
use) and an indirect one (through consumption 
of other products which use energy as an 
intermediate input).
A cross-country comparison is possible using 
the IOT standardised across EU countries, 
collected by Eurostat. These tables are available 
with details of 59 branches, following the NACE 
classiﬁ  cation. We dispose of IOT for 12 euro area 
countries in 2005, namely Germany, Ireland, 
Greece, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and 
Finland. The euro area results are obtained by 
a weighted average of available country results 
(the weights correspond to the country shares in 
the producer/consumer expenditures, as derived 
from IOT).
The main drawback of using IOT is their static 
character. The production and ﬁ  nal  demand 
structure and the corresponding technical 
coefﬁ  cients  are  ﬁ   xed: as prices rise, users 
of energy do not substitute away from more 
expensive products. Similarly, there are no 
second-round effects – the value of wages 
and proﬁ   t margins remain constant – and no 
monetary policy response to the rise in consumer 
prices. These underlying assumptions suggest 
that the results will tend to overestimate the 
effects of an energy price increase.
A second limitation of this approach is that it is 
not possible to take into account the fact that the 
initial price level is not the same across countries 
(and across branches). A related important 
caveat is that IOT provide only fairly broad 
energy categories. Categories of energy inputs 
available in IOT and to which a direct impulse 
is given according to the energy shock are the 
following 100: 
–  Coal and lignite; peat (NACE 10).
–  Crude petroleum and natural gas; services 
incidental to oil and gas extraction 
(NACE 11).
– Coke, reﬁ   ned petroleum products and 
nuclear fuels (NACE 23).
–  Electrical energy, gas, steam and hot water 
(NACE 40).
As we can see, electricity and gas belong to the 
same category. Even though gas and electricity 
prices may not move simultaneously, they 
must be modelled together when using the 
IOT to understand the impact of an energy 
price shock. Even if some co-movements are 
generally observed in the prices of energy 
inputs, especially internationally traded raw 
energy products, assuming perfect simultaneity 
constitutes a simpliﬁ  cation. 
Third, without information on the production 
structure for imported products, we are not able 
to model the indirect effects of energy price 
increases on import prices. We can account for 
the price effects of imported raw energy products 
or production inputs but not for the effect 
energy price rises might have on other imported 
products. Not taking into consideration increases 
in non-energy imported products suggests that 
our calculations of the impact of energy price 
increases could be on the down side.
To sum up, the 10% energy price increase we 
model is made up of three “components”:
–  a 10% increase in the price of imports of raw 
energy inputs;
Uranium and thorium ores (NACE 12) are not included in our  100 
deﬁ  nition of energy inputs, although they are included in the 
category “energy producing materials” according to the NACE 
classiﬁ  cation.120
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–  a 10% increase in the price of domestically 
produced raw energy inputs;
–  a 10% increase in the price of imports of 
reﬁ  ned energy products.
Raw energy inputs refer to “Coal and lignite; 
peat” (NACE 10) and “Crude petroleum and 
natural gas” (NACE 11); reﬁ  ned energy inputs 
refer to “Coke, reﬁ   ned petroleum products 
and nuclear fuels” (NACE 23) and “Electrical 
energy, gas, steam and hot water” (NACE 40).
Finally, the choice of the reference year could 
clearly affect the results. If energy prices are 
particularly high in the reference year, then the 
share of energy costs in the overall cost structure 
will be high. The effect of the energy price 
increase on the overall costs will also be high, 
compared with a similar exercise conducted in a 
year with lower energy prices. The calculations 
presented in Section 3.3.1 mostly refer to 2005, 
which corresponds to the year of the last 
available dataset for a majority of euro area 
countries.121
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